

T H E
I M M O R T A L I T Y O F T H E S O U L

BY LUTHER LEE,
MINISTER OF THE GOSPEL.

“Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast
that goeth downward to the earth.”

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PREFACE.

The author of this little volume judges it no act of vanity to set up the following claims for his work:

1. The subject of which it treats is vastly important. Whether we have a spiritual nature, or no spiritual nature—whether dying is passing out of existence, or to another state of existence in a world of disembodied spirits—and whether sinners who reject the gospel, are to cease to exist, cease to know, and think, and feel, or to exist, and know, and think, and feel forever, are matters of too great importance to be passed by without receiving the most profound consideration.

2. In this little volume will be found all the essential features of these momentous questions, and all the important facts and arguments having an essential bearing upon them. It is believed that so much argument and truth, bearing directly on the one point of the soul's immortality, cannot be found elsewhere, in any one volume. When the author's attention was called to the subject, he expected to find it treated in some one convenient volume, but he searched in vain for that volume. Fragments of the subject he could find, scattered through various works, treating in the main on other subjects, a fragment here, and a fragment there; an incidental allusion to the subject in this volume, and a single direct argument in that, but in no one volume could he find the subject fully and clearly discussed. To supply this deficiency the present volume has been written, and is now presented to the Christian Public, who are invited to examine and judge with what ability the design has been executed. Though many of the views presented are not new, yet the author has no fear that the candid reader will be in the least inclined to deny his little work the merit of a full share of originality.

3. It is believed that the arrangement of the subjects, together with the full alphabetical and scriptural index, will much increase its value as a book of reference. Any point treated in the work, can be referred to in a moment, by means of the index to the subjects; while the scriptural index will guide to any text quoted, with the remarks that may be made thereon.

4. That such a publication is demanded by the exigencies of the times, the author has no doubt. The errors opposed, the writer regards as one form of infidelity, rendered more dangerous by taking shelter under the name of Christianity, and claiming the sanction of the Scriptures. These views, which embrace one essential feature of infidelity, called materialism, received a new and powerful impulse, a few years since, by being hitched on to the car of excitement which swept over the country, on the subject of the immediate second appearing of Christ, to judge the world. The connection between the Second Advent excitement, and a denial of man's spiritual nature, and a belief in materialism, we will not attempt to explain; but the fact is notorious, that many of the most able Advent lecturers maintained the doctrine that man has no immaterial soul, and that death is the extinction of conscious being; while the excitement about the immediate appearing of Christ, with which it was connected, gave it wings, and power, beyond what it could otherwise have acquired.

Now that the excitement has measurably passed away, enabling its subjects to indulge in sober thoughts, this little volume is commended to their attention, with the hopeful prayers of the author that it may be instrumental in correcting some of the errors they have imbibed. It may also be useful to young and less experienced Christians, in guarding them against the assaults of infidelity on several points, and in furnishing them with the weapons with which they can defend themselves against its specious reasoning. If its usefulness be in proportion to the author's honest purpose and desire to do good, it will not have been written in vain.

THE AUTHOR.

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

CHAPTER I.

THE IMMATERIALITY OF MIND—MIND IS SPIRIT AND NOT MATTER

SECTION I

An argument founded upon the power of volition, self-determination, and self-action.

The soul or mind is not matter but spirit, and of course forms no part of the body. This raises an important issue with one class who deny the immortality of the soul. There are some who deny the existence of a soul or spirit in man, to be contradistinguished from the body, and insist that what we call the mind is a mere function of the brain, and that the brain itself is intelligent.

So far as the researches of philosophy extend, there are but two primary substances in the universe, and these are MATTER and SPIRIT. All we know of these substances is certain properties and phenomena which they exhibit. Matter is known to possess the properties of Impenetrability, Extension, Figure, Divisibility, Indestructibility, Inertia, Attraction. Spirit is that which thinks, perceives, remembers, reasons, wills, and is susceptible of love, hatred, joy, and grief. The former of these properties are found in our bodies, in common with all other matter; the latter constitute the phenomena of the mind. It is not reasonable to suppose that properties so opposite to each other, inhere in the same substance, and the only rational conclusion is that matter is not mind, and that mind is not matter. There must therefore be in man an intelligent spirit, which forms no part of the body, and this is what we call the soul. We reason upon the modern and generally admitted principles of natural philosophy, and unless we are greatly mistaken, the whole system of philosophy will have to be exploded to invalidate our arguments.

The admitted properties of matter, and the admitted properties of mind, cannot inhere in, and be essential properties of the same substance. A few illustrations will make this plain. Inertia, which is an essential property of matter cannot inhere in the same substance with will or volition, which is an essential property of mind. Inertia is that property in matter which renders it incapable of self-motion, or self-action; matter acting only as it is acted upon; will or volition, is that property of mind which renders it capable of self determination and self-action. Now as matter can act only as it is acted upon, and as mind has the power of self-action, they cannot be the same substance,—matter cannot be mind, and mind cannot be matter. Again, matter can be moved only by physical force; matter acts upon matter by contact, and one material body has no power to act on another material body, only as their surfaces come in contact; but mind is acted upon by motives, and acts from motives, and mind acts on mind through the medium of motives without physical contact. This proves as clear as a sun-beam that matter and mind are not the same

To insist in opposition to the above view, that mind is matter; that intelligence and volition are its inherent properties, and consequently that man has no soul, which forms no part of his body, must subvert the admitted principles of philosophy. Philosophy insists that inertia is an essential property of matter; man's body is matter, as shown above, and yet it exhibits locomotive powers, and is seen acting without any visible agent acting upon it, and hence the doctrine of the inertia of matter must be given up, or we must admit that there is a rational soul inhabiting the body, which controls it, moves it, and guides it. We see a steam engine in motion, and we know that the power of motion does not reside in any part of the machine; that it acts only as it is acted upon. We know that the steam propels it, but we know at the same time, that the steam acts only as it is acted upon; that there is an intelligent, reasonable agent that directs the whole.

So with the body; it is an animal machine, the bones are studs and braces to support the frame, and are levers for the purpose of mechanical action; the muscles, by their contractions and distentions, operate on the

bones and set the machinery in motion; but the muscles, have no intelligence, or volition, and when the machine is in order, they are under the control of and are guided by the mind. The foot or hand cannot will to move; the eye cannot will to open or shut. This our own consciousness proves. Let any man try to will with his foot or hand; and his own consciousness, which is the highest proof possible, will tell him that there is no power to will in his foot or hand. Man can will, and may be conscious of willing to move his foot, but at the same time he is conscious that his foot does not will, and that he does not will with his foot, but that he, his mind, wills concerning it. The muscles are put in motion by a power superior to themselves, which must be intelligent. Now what is this power? Those who deny that man has a soul, which is no part of the body, and which is an immaterial spirit, say that the brain is this self-determining, controlling and guiding power. This we deny on the ground, that it is matter, and only matter, and possesses only the properties and powers of matter. If it be said that there is something in or associated with the brain which is not matter, which is superior to matter, the whole argument is given up, for that is just what we contend for, and that superior something which is not matter, we call the soul. If it be said that the brain is only matter, then however refined it may be, it possesses only the properties of matter, one of which is inertia, directly the reverse of self-operation. The brain then cannot act only as it is acted upon, and we come back to the question, what is this superior power that sets the muscles in motion, when we will to move the foot or the hand? If it now be said that it is the brain, we ask what power acts upon the brain, causing it to act on the muscles? The brain being matter, can act only as acted upon. We have then got to give up the first principles of Natural Philosophy, or seek for some higher cause of the phenomenon of motion. We allow that the muscles operate on the bones, that the brain operates on the muscles, through the nerves, all the nerves and spinal marrow terminating in the brain; but we insist at the same time, that there is an intelligent soul which acts on the brain, or it would never act. This doctrine being admitted, the phenomena of matter and mind are made to harmonize without involving any philosophical contradiction, or absurdity; deny it, and the principles of Natural Philosophy, which past ages have developed and matured, are thrown back into chaos, and we have got to begin, de novo, and grope our way in search of first principles.

The above view accords with our own consciousness. Every man is conscious of thinking, but we are not conscious of thinking with any part of our body, not even the brain. That the head is the seat of the intelligence, no rational man can doubt; we are conscious that the thinking operation is carried on within the head, but no man is conscious that his brains think. The rational soul is mysteriously united to the body, and the brain is doubtless the point of union, and constitutes the medium through which the soul holds communion with the physical world without. The fact that this union is mysterious constitutes no objection, for if we deny it, there will be as great a mystery involved in the idea that the whole mental phenomena is the result of properties inherent in matter, and found only in the brain, in contradistinction from all other matter.

SECTION II

An argument founded on the intellectual powers of the mind—Matter cannot think, is not intelligent.

If matter be intelligent and can think, thought must be an essential property of matter, or, it must be the result of some peculiar modification of matter; neither of which can be maintained. If thought be an essential property of matter, every part and particle of matter must think. If thought be essential to matter, what does not think, is not matter. This is too absurd to need a refutation.

Is thought, then, the result of some modification of matter? Certainly not, for thought is now admitted not to be an essential property of matter, and no modification or refinement can add to any substance more than its essential qualities. Matter under every modification is no more than matter, and of course can possess only the properties of matter. Matter is known by the phenomena it exhibits, and all modifications and refinements are but modifications and refinements of these phenomena, without increasing or diminishing their number, and as it is destitute of thought at the commencement, it must remain

destitute of thought through every change and modification. If any thing essential to matter be taken away, it must cease to be matter, and if something be added which is not essential, that something must have its own essential properties as a separate identity or substance, and can form no part of matter; and if that something which is supposed to be added, be thought, it is not matter that thinks, but something that is added to it. This is just what we hold; that in the composition of man, a rational soul is joined to matter, and that it is the soul that thinks, and not the matter. Whatever is essential to matter must be matter, and hence, to say that something not essential to matter, is added to it, so as to become a property of matter, is to say that something is matter which is not matter. This shows that thought, not being a property of matter, cannot become such, otherwise matter without thought would be less than matter, or matter with thought would be more than matter.

The admission that matter is or can be intelligent, must draw after it consequences startling in their nature, if not fatal to our common religion. The intelligence of matter has heretofore been contended for, only by Infidels; and is in fact the doctrine of Atheism. To meet the argument in favor of the existence of God, drawn from the marks of intelligence everywhere impressed upon the visible creation, they have asserted that matter is intelligent. Those who deny the immateriality of the human soul, join the Infidel, and maintain, that matter may possess a very superior degree of intelligence. If this be so, who can prove that there is any thing but matter in the universe, and that what has been deemed the spiritual world is, after all, only a world of materiality? There are the same proofs that the human soul is a spirit that there are that God is a spirit. Let us look at this point in the light of reason. Atheism admits the existence of matter, but denies the existence of spirit, while christianity insists that "God is a Spirit," not matter, but above matter, who created matter, and gave to it its modifications. Now our point is, that every argument which is commonly resorted to, to prove the existence of God, will prove the immateriality of the human soul. To show this let us suppose a conversation between an Atheist and a Christian who holds to the materiality of the human soul.

Christian.—"There must be a God, for as nothing can never produce something, the visible creation proves that there must be a Creator who made all these things."

Atheist.—"It is as easy for me to conceive that nature, or what you call the visible creation, is eternal, and that it contains within itself the cause of all the phenomena which it exhibits, as it is to suppose there is another being which is eternal, whom you call God, or a spirit, but whom I never saw and never expect to see."

Christian.—"It is not possible for us to comprehend eternal existence, yet reason tells us that something must be eternal, and that it is not the visible universe that is eternal, as you suppose; but God who is a Spirit, is proved to be the Creator by the signs of intelligence and marks of design every where to be seen upon the very face of creation."

Atheist.—"Matter itself is intelligent under some of its modifications, as you admit, and hence all the phenomena of the universe may be accounted for without supposing anything superior to matter. If matter may possess one degree of intelligence, it may possess a still greater degree, even perfection of knowledge, which you attribute to your supposed God. The human mind presents the highest degree of intelligence of which we have any personal knowledge; it presents the phenomena of thought, feeling, reason, volition, self-determination, self-action, moral sentiments, love, hatred, &c. These, in kind, are all that you pretend to claim for your supposed God; you only insist that he possesses them in a higher degree, and as you contend that all these are possessed by matter, the human mind being only matter, the marks of intelligence which the visible universe exhibits are no proof of an intelligent Spirit, prior and superior to matter, whom you call God. Take an illustration: suppose you refer me to the solar system with the sun for its centre, and all the planets revolving around it with the regularity of a well adjusted clock, with comets to note the centuries and other periods, and tell me there must be a Creator who made this machine of the universe, who cannot be matter, but who must be spirit. In reply I exhibit to you a time-piece, and tell you that it is a model of the solar system; it has various and complicated wheels, all moving with perfect order, with the moving power

so encased as to be hid from your view; one pointer tells the lapse of every second; another points out the flight of minutes as they depart one by one; a third notes the lapse of hours, and still another counts the days as they pass one after another, so that by looking upon its face, you can read the second of the minute, the minute of the hour, the hour of the day, and the day of the month. This curious machine which gives the most clear proof of intelligence and design, is not only matter itself, but the designer and artificer were matter and nothing but matter, as you insist that the human mind is not spirit but matter. If then matter compressed into so small a compass as the human brain, can design and execute after such a manner, it only requires an organization of this matter, on a larger scale, which may exist somewhere as the great soul of the universe, to account for all the phenomena which you consider proof of the existence of a Spirit-God.”

It is seen from the above, that when we, as christians, deny that man has a soul which is not matter, but which is an immaterial spirit, we break down the great dividing line between christianity and scepticism. How a man can prove the existence of God from the works of creation, when he attributes to matter, wrapt up in the small compass of the human brain, every essential attribute in kind, which he attributes to his God, we need more light to understand. It appears to us that we must admit the immateriality of the human mind, or be driven by infidelity to adopt its theory of a material universe, with a material God, mysteriously folded up in its bosom, or equally mysteriously diffused among its living orbs. He who contends for the materiality of the human soul, may say that he relies upon none of these proofs to support his belief in the existence of God, but relies wholly upon the Scriptures. Well, this issue shall be met in due time, when we will attempt to prove that the Scriptures as clearly teach that the human soul is a spirit, as they do that God is a spirit.

Having urged the doctrine of the immateriality of mind, in an original argument founded upon the fact, that matter is not intelligent, we will, at this point, introduce another argument to the same effect, which we quote from Rev. Richard Watson. We have insisted that to admit that matter can be intelligent, is to give up our strong proofs of the spirituality of God, and break down the principal barrier between Christianity and Atheism; and it will be seen that Mr. Watson arrives at the same conclusion, though by a different process of reasoning. He is treating of the spirituality of God, and remarks as follows:—

“Among the discoveries, made to us by Divine Revelation, we find not only declarations of the *existence* and *unity* of God, but of his nature or *substance*, which is plainly affirmed to be *spiritual*, ‘God is a SPIRIT.’ The sense of the Scriptures in this respect cannot be mistaken. Innumerable passages and allusions in them show, that the terms *spirit* and *body*, or matter, are used in the popular sense for substances of a perfectly distinct kind, and which are manifested by distinct, and, in many respects, opposite and incommunicable properties: that the former only can perceive, think, reason, will, and act; that the latter is passive, imperceptible, divisible, and corruptible. Under these views and in this popular language, God is spoken of in holy writ. He is *spirit*, not *body*; *mind*, not *matter*. He is a pure spirit, unconnected even with bodily form or organs; ‘*the invisible God whom no man hath seen or can see*,’ an immaterial, incorruptible, impassable substance, an immense mind or intelligence, self-acting, self-moving, wholly above the perception of bodily sense; free from the imperfections of matter, and all the infirmities of corporeal beings; far more excellent than any finite and created spirits, because their Creator, and therefore styled, ‘*the Father of spirits*,’ and ‘*the God of the spirits of all flesh*.’

“Such is the express testimony of Scripture as to the Divine Nature. That the distinction which it holds between matter and spirit should be denied or disregarded by infidel philosophers, is not a matter of surprise, since it is as easy and as consistent in them to materialize God as man. But that the attributes of spirit should have been ascribed to matter by those who, nevertheless, profess to admit the authority of the biblical revelation, as in the case of the modern Unitarians* (*What is here said, is doubtless true of the English Unitarians, but it is true of only a part of the Unitarians in this country. We understand some of them, at least, to be firm believers in the immateriality and immortality of the soul.) and some others, is an instance of singular inconsistency. It shows with what daring an unhallowed philosophy will pursue its speculations, and warrants the conclusion, that the Scriptures in such cases are not acknowledged upon their *own proper principles*, but only so far as they are supposed to agree with, or

not to oppose, the philosophic system which such men may have adopted. For, hesitate as they may; to deny the distinction between matter and spirit, is to deny the spirituality of God, and to contradict the distinction, which, as to man, is constantly kept up in every part of the Bible, the distinction between flesh and spirit. To assert that consciousness, thought, volition, &c., are the results of organization, is to deny also what the Scripture so expressly affirms, that the souls of men exist in a disembodied state: and that in this disembodied state, not only do they exist, but that they think, and feel, and act without any diminution of their energy or capacity. The immateriality of the Divine Being may, therefore, be considered as a point of great importance, not only as it affects our views of his nature and attributes, but because when once it is established, that there exists a pure Spirit, living, intelligent, and invested with moral properties, the question of the immateriality of the human soul may be considered as almost settled. Those who deny that, must admit that the Deity is material; or, if they start at this, they must be convicted of the unphilosophical and absurd attempt, to invest a substance allowed to be of an entirely different nature, (the body of man,) with those attributes of intelligence and volition which, in the case of the Divine Being, they have allowed to be the properties of pure unembodied spirit. The propositions are totally inconsistent, for they who believe that God is wholly an immaterial, and that man is wholly a material being, admit that spirit is intelligent, and that matter is intelligent. They cannot, then, be of different essences, and if the premises be followed out to their legitimate conclusion, either that which thinks in man must be allowed to be spiritual, or a material Deity must follow. The whole truth of revelation, both as to God and his creature man, must be acknowledged, or the Atheism of Spinoza and Hobbes must be admitted.

“The decision of Scripture on this point is not to be shaken by human reasoning, were it more plausible in its attempt to prove that matter is capable of originating thought, and that mind is a mere result of organization. The evidence from reason is, however, highly confirmatory of the absolute spirituality of the nature of God, and of the unthinking nature of matter.

“If we allow a First Cause at all, we must allow that cause to be intelligent. This has already been proved, from the *design and contrivance* manifested in his works. The first argument for the spirituality of God is, therefore, drawn from his intelligence, and it rests upon this principle, that intelligence is not a property of matter.

“With material substance we are largely acquainted; and as to the great mass of material bodies, we have the means of knowing that they are wholly unintelligent. This cannot be denied of every unorganized portion of matter. Its essential properties are found to be solidity, extension, divisibility, mobility, passiveness, &c. In all its forms and mutations, from the granite rock to the yielding atmosphere and the rapid lightning, these essential properties are discovered; they take an infinite variety of accidental modes, but give no indication of intelligence, or approach to intelligence. If, then, to know be a property of matter, it is clearly not an *essential* property, inasmuch as it is agreed by all, that vast masses of this substance exist without this property, and it follows, that it must be an *accidental* one. This, therefore, would be the first absurdity into which those would be driven who suppose the Divine Nature to be material, that as intelligence, if allowed to be a property of matter, is an *accidental* and not an *essential* property, on this theory it would be possible to conceive of the existence of a Deity without any intelligence at all. For, take away any property from a subject which is not essential to it, and its essence still remains; and if intelligence, which in this view is but an accidental attribute of Deity, were annihilated, a Deity without perception, thought or knowledge, would still remain. So monstrous a conclusion shows, that if a God be at all allowed, the absolute spirituality of his nature must inevitably follow. For, if we cannot suppose a Deity without intelligence, then do we admit *intelligence* to be one of his *essential* attributes; and, as it is easy for every one to observe that this is not an essential property of matter, the substance to which it is essential cannot be material.

“If the unthinking nature of unorganized matter furnishes an argument in favor of the spirituality of Deity, the attempt to prove, from the fact of intelligence being found in connection

with matter in an organized form, that intelligence, under certain modifications, is a property of matter, may, from its fallacy, be also made to yield its evidence in favor of the truth.

“The position assumed is, that intelligence is the result of material organization. This, at least, is not true of every form of organized matter. Of the unintelligent character of vegetables, we have the same evidence as of the earth on which we tread. The organization, therefore, which is assumed to be the cause of thought, is that which is found in animals; and to use the argument of Dr. Priestley, ‘the powers of sensation, or perception, and thought, as belonging to man, not having been found but in conjunction with a certain organized system of matter, the conclusion is, that they depend upon such a system.’ It need not now be urged, that constant connection does not imply *necessary* connection; and that sufficient reasons may be given to prove the connection alleged to be accidental and arbitrary. It is sufficient, in the first instance, to deny this supposed constant connection between intellectual properties and systems of animal organization; and thus to take away entirely the foundation of the argument.

“Man is to be considered in two states, that of *life*, and that of *death*. In one he thinks, and in the other he ceases to think; and yet for some time after death in many cases, the organization of the human frame continues as perfect as before. All do not die of organic disease. Death by suffocation, and other causes, is often effected without any visible violence being done to the brain, or any other of the most delicate organs. This is a well-established fact; for the most accurate anatomical observation is not able to discover, in such cases as we have referred to, the slightest organic derangement. The machine has been stopped, but the machine itself has suffered no injury; and from the period of death to the time when the matter of the body begins to submit to the laws of chemical decomposition, its organization is as perfect as during life. If an opponent replies, that organic violence *must* have been sustained, though it is indiscernible, he begs the question, and assumes that thought must depend upon organization, the very point in dispute. If more modest, he says, that the organs *may* have suffered, he can give no proof of it; appearances are all against him. And if he argues from the phenomenon of the connection of thought with organization, grounding himself upon what is visible to observation only, the argument is completely repulsed by an appeal in like manner to the *fact*, that the organization of the animal frame can be often exhibited, visibly unimpaired by those causes which have produced death, and yet incapable of thought and intelligence. The conclusion, therefore, is, that mere organization cannot be the cause of intelligence, since it is plain that precisely the same state of the organs shall often be found before and after death; and yet, without any violence having been done to them, in one moment man shall be actually intelligent, and in the next incapable of a thought. So far, then, from the connection between mental phenomena, and the arrangement of matter in the animal structure, being ‘*constant*,’ the ground of the argument of Priestley and other materialists, it is often visibly broken; for a perfect organization of the animal remains after perception has become extinct.”

Little need be added to what has been quoted above from Mr. Watson. It will be seen that he maintains the same view which we have urged, namely, that to admit the materiality of the human soul, or to insist that matter may be intelligent, is to disarm ourselves of the arguments by which we, as Christians, are wont to defend ourselves against infidelity, which denies all spiritual existence. Certain it is, that the materiality of the human mind is the doctrine of all infidels of the Hobbes school. This has been in all ages of the Church, a dividing line between Christians and this class of infidels, and those, professing to be Christians, who deny the immateriality of the human soul, as an intelligent spirit distinct from the body, in this particular, strike hands with the worst opposers Christianity ever had, and join with Hobbes, in saying that, “dying is taking a leap into the dark.”

SECTION III.

An argument founded upon the mental phenomena of memory.

That which remembers must be spirit and not matter. It is not possible for us to conceive how memory can be a property of, or be exercised by, matter. Memory lies at the foundation of all improvement—without it we could make no progress. If the ideas we derive through the medium of the senses, were to pass away with the objects that produce the sensation, the whole of life would be a mere succession of ideas, or mental states, without any accumulation of knowledge; to prevent which, we are endowed with the power of remembering—so that instead of leaving the past a blank, the mind can trace its own history, and view from any point of its journey, all the principal events that have transpired, the objects that it has viewed, the feelings it has experienced, and the thoughts it has entertained, from the twilight dawn of childhood to the present moment. Take, for example, such minds as Bacon, Locke, and Newton, and how powerful must be memory, to treasure a knowledge of almost universal nature—surveying the highway of worlds, and gathering, retaining, and unfolding to the mental vision of others, the numberless laws by which their phenomena are produced, and their motions directed? How vast must be the number of ideas which such minds are capable of retaining? It is not possible to see how matter, in the shape and compass of the human brain, can gather, receive, and retain all these ideas, the originals of which, fill earth and heaven-wide space. Assume that the human mind is material, and there is no known principle of philosophy upon which the phenomena of memory can be explained.

1. According to all admitted principles of philosophy, matter can be operated upon or impressed, only by matter. That which is immaterial cannot impress that which is material. Ideas are immaterial, knowledge is immaterial, thoughts are immaterial, and how they can impress themselves upon matter, so as to be retained for fifty years, and be now and then called up and exhibited as occasion requires, cannot be explained by the known laws and properties of matter. Let us suppose a case:—A person hears his friend narrate the scenes and incidents of his travels in a foreign land—he describes the general face of the country, its productions, the size, complexion and habits of the people, together with all the principal mountains, lakes, and rivers. The listener forms ideas in his mind of all these things, so that he is able to take a mental view of the whole country, and can even describe it to others. Now what is in his mind? Not the country, not its people, mountains, lakes and rivers, they are not in the mind. Nor can there be even the figure or picture of the variegated scenery impressed upon the mind, if it be matter. There has been no contact to impress the brain with the outline of the country. He never saw it—he never saw a map or picture of it. He has only heard certain words, and there is no natural adaptation in those words to impress the mind with the various forms, colors and motions, which a view of the country presents. As matter can be impressed only by matter, to produce this result, the words must not only be material, but must have figure and color, and must be harder than the mind, as the softer always receives the impression of the harder, when material bodies come in contact. One word must have the form of a man, and another the form of a mountain, and another the form of a landscape, and another of a lake, and another of a river, for matter can only receive the form of the object by which it is impressed. But there is another difficulty; motion has no form which can be impressed, engraved, or painted upon matter. Motion cannot be represented by any image; it cannot be represented upon matter, but by the actual motion of the matter. But in the outline of the country impressed upon the mind, as supposed above, there must be a conception of a flowing river, which could never be impressed upon the mind, if it were a material substance, unless the words themselves have the motion of the river, or give to the mind such motion, neither of which can be true upon the supposition that mind is matter. The mind does receive ideas from various sources and through various mediums, and retain them through the whole period of life: and though they are not always in the mind, or, at least, are not always recognized by the mind as a present mental state, yet the mind can recall them at pleasure. The fact that a man having learned any art, or

acquired any information, can afterwards occupy his mind with other matters, not even thinking of the same for years, and then recall the whole on a moment's notice, when occasion shall require, proves, beyond a doubt, that ideas do, in some way, impress themselves upon the mind, or, in some sense, remain in the mind; otherwise an idea, or an art learned, having once occupied the mind, then ceasing to occupy it as a subject of present thought, or a present mental state, could not be recalled with any more facility, than a new thought could be conceived, or a new art learned, which every rational mind knows is not true. To assert it, would be to assert that there is no such thing as memory. Thus the phenomena of memory proves, that the mind cannot be a material substance.

2. Should we go back to the old theory of memory, found in the exploded philosophy of a departed age, we should not be able to reconcile memory with the idea of the materiality of the mind. The theory to which we allude is, that ideas are images of things which are presented to the mind in perception, and that these images are recalled in the act of memory. This would render it necessary to have some place to store them between the primary act of perception, and the subsequent act of memory. This must convert the mind, yea, the brain, if the brain be the mind, into a vast lumber-room, where are stored images of more things than Noah had creatures in the ark. These must be packed away in boxes, laid away upon shelves, or hung up as maps upon a wall; and from among the millions, one after another must come forward from its concealment, and then retire into its hiding place, as one thing after another is recalled by memory. It appears to us, that this philosophy must be adopted by those who hold that the mind is matter, that the brain is the mind; for it is not possible to conceive how forms of material things, and ideas of things in general, can be impressed upon the brain, or any material substance, though it be called mind, so as to be retained and viewed at pleasure. But if this philosophy be once adopted by the materialist, another difficulty will arise which must utterly confound his whole theory. It is this: Images sketched in any manner upon a material substance, must occupy space; and, as we cannot conceive that the brain is divided into as many apartments as there are ideas, each occupying a distant place by itself, they must be piled one upon the other, thousands upon thousands, on precisely the same portion of matter, if the mind be matter. This is absolutely impossible, according to all the known laws of matter; matter must fill its own space, can fill no more than its space, and nothing else can occupy the same space at the same time, which any given portion of matter does fill. If, then, the mind be matter, you can only cover its surface with the impressions or images of ideas; and, of course, the number of ideas which the mind is capable of receiving and retaining, must be limited according to the proportion of space which each occupies, compared with the dimensions of the whole mind. This, every reflecting mind knows cannot be true; for no person ever knew so much that he could learn no more—no person ever found his mind so full, or so entirely occupied, with ideas, that there was no room for more. Keeping in view the fact, that every portion of matter presents a surface of limited and definite extent, we remark that, no more ideas can be impressed upon the mind, if it be matter, than will cover its surface; for a number of impressions, or images, cannot occupy the same space upon the surface of any material body, without defacing each other. If the mind be matter, then each idea must occupy a definite portion of its surface, which must sustain a proportion to the whole mind, or else each idea must occupy the whole mind. If each idea occupies a part of the mind, which sustains a proportion to the whole, then it follows that the mind can receive and retain but a definite number of ideas, according to the size of each compared with the size of the whole mind. This, no one will pretend. But on the other hand, if each idea occupies the whole mind, there must be as many impressions, one upon the other, as the mind receives and retains ideas, a thing absolutely impossible, upon the surface of matter. This has great force in connection with the phenomenon of memory, for, if the mind be matter, all the ideas of a whole life must be impressed upon it, one upon the other, so as to be called up as occasions require, which is impossible; for, in making a second impression upon matter, you necessarily obliterate the first.

3. In materializing the mind, and then storing it with the impressions, or images of things, or ideas,

of half a century's accumulation, another difficulty is involved. Keeping in view the fact that, every portion of matter possesses form and fills space, these images, or ideas, adhering to the mind in any form or manner, must also, each for itself, occupy a portion of the physical dimensions of the mind, as shown above; and if these thoughts, ideas, or images of things, occupy space, their size, compared with each other, must necessarily be proportioned to the relative sizes of the things they represent. Assuming this, it follows that the idea of a mountain must, necessarily, occupy more space in the mind than a pebble, and the thought of an elephant must fill more space in the mind than the thought of an ant. This, our own consciousness contradicts, and, of course, it cannot be true, and, per consequence, the mind cannot be material.

We believe these difficulties cannot be obviated, only by a process of reasoning, applicable alone to spirit and not to matter; and this will be to abandon the whole ground of the mind's materiality, for it will not do to assume that the mind is matter, and then reason as though it were spirit. Those who assert that the mind is matter, are bound to admit that it possesses all the known and essential properties of matter, and that it is governed by all the essential laws known to govern matter; and, admitting these, the above reasoning stands in full force against the materiality of the human mind. But only admit the common theory, that the mind is spirit and not matter, and the above reasoning becomes totally inapplicable, and all the difficulties disappear. Suppose that the mind is immaterial, a spirit, constituting no part of the body; that it is that which thinks and remembers, being a living soul, without figure, form, color, impenetrability, extension—divisibility, gravitation, attraction or repulsion, and not one of the arguments, urged above, against the materiality of the mind can be brought to bear on the subject.

SECTION IV

The immateriality of mind proved from its consciousness of identity and responsibility.

I. The soul, the rational man, cannot be the body, nor any part of it, as is proved from the identity which the mind is conscious of maintaining from the dawn of existence to life's final close. There is no room for dispute about the fact of this consciousness; it is the same in all, as all will admit. The man of three-score and ten years, can look back to the hour of childhood, and trace his history through every intervening period, and is conscious that he has preserved his identity through the whole, and is now the same person that he was at the commencement of life's journey. Consciousness, is that notice which the mind takes of its own operations and modes of existence. Now, allow for a moment, that the mind is material, that the body, or some part of it, is the mind, and see what can be made out of this consciousness of identity. In such case, it is matter, the body, or some part of it, that is conscious of its identity, which must involve the greatest absurdities.

1. Substitute the body, or that part of it which may be supposed to constitute the mind, for the term mind, and the absurdity will be seen at once. Consciousness is that notice which the *body* takes of its own operations and modes of existence. This every one knows is not the true—the body is not conscious. Suppose the brain to be the mind, and it will not be true. We cannot say, consciousness is that notice which the brain takes of its own operations and modes of existence. The brain is not the subject of this consciousness of identity; every man is conscious that it was the same mind that thought, loved, hated, rejoiced, and sorrowed in time past,—that thinks, loves, hates, rejoices and sorrows now; but no man is or can be conscious that he has the same brains now that he had in time past. It is then clear, that the mind is something distinct from the brain, and every other part of the body, as no part of the body is conscious, or the subject of consciousness. We can say that consciousness is that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and every man's internal convictions tell him it is so; but if we say that consciousness is that notice which the brain takes of its own operations, no man feels any internal conviction of the truth of what we affirm.

2. To make the brain, or any other part of the body, both the actor and the subject of this conscious

identity, is to make consciousness utter a falsehood. It is not true that the body preserves its identity; it is the perpetual subject of waste and renovation, keeping up a perpetual change of the particles of matter that compose every part of the body, even the brain itself.—According to the admitted principles of physiology, a person at the age of seventy, must have changed every particle of matter composing his body, some ten times. The system is calculated for reception and discharge, and this is the operation perpetually going on through life. This may be seen by the unlettered reader who has never studied physiology. He knows that he must take food every day to supply the perpetual waste of his system,—that what he eats forms blood, and flesh, and bones. This could not be necessary, were there not a perpetual waste. This is further proved from the fact that the moment we cease to receive a sufficient degree of nutriment, the body begins to waste and become thinner; as the saying is, it grows poor. A person may be nearly starved to death, or emaciated with sickness, until reduced to one quarter the usual weight, and then in a few weeks recover, and be as full and heavy as before. Does the body consist of the same particles of matter now that it did before? Certainly not; the waste has been supplied with new matter, and yet the person is conscious of having preserved his identity through all these changes; he is certain that he that thinks and feels now, is he that thought and felt before these changes took place. This proves that the conscious mind, which preserves its identity amid all the changes of the body, is not the body; is a distinct substance from the body, remaining unchanged.

In reply to the above, it may be said that identity does not depend upon the presence of the same floating particles of matter, but upon the sameness of the organization, and that in this respect there is no change; that we end life with the same organization—the same animal machine with which we commence it. Admit this for the sake of the argument, and nothing is gained to the cause of the materialist.

1. The identity of the organization is preserved only as the identity of a watch is preserved, which, when seventy years old, has had every wheel and part supplied with new ones ten times. All the wheels have been used up and supplied ten times, but it is the same watch. Who does not see that this is trifling with our own consciousness; the mind is not conscious of any such identity as is here described, as will be seen from what follows.

2. The body is not the subject of conscious identity; this every rational person must know for himself, if he will reflect upon his own mental states. No man is or can be conscious that he has the same hands, feet or head, that he had ten years ago. He knows that they are the same from the impossibility of having changed them; but this is not consciousness. Could his hands, feet or head be exchanged while asleep for others looking just like them, consciousness would not detect the change; there would be the same consciousness of identity or continued self as before. This shows that it is not the identity of the body of which we are conscious. A man is conscious that he is the same thinking, morally responsible being now, that he was ten years ago; but he is not and cannot be conscious that he has even the same brains now that he had ten years ago. This proves that the conscious mind is something distinct from the body.

II. Nearly allied to this consciousness of identity, is consciousness of responsibility; in view of which conscience approves or condemns us for what we have done. It is the office of conscience to approve when we do right, and to condemn when we do wrong,—if we can then determine upon what our conscious guilt falls, when conscience condemns us, we shall find the morally responsible man, whether it be the body, or the soul, as distinct from the body. Suppose a man to have committed murder twenty years ago, and no one will doubt that he has carried in his bosom, the canker worm of a guilty conscience; his consciousness tells him that it was he that committed the murder, and not another, while his conscience tells him that he is guilty in view of the offence. What then is guilty? On what does the condemnation rest? Does the murderer feel that it is his feet that are in fault, that his hands are to blame, that his brains are guilty? Surely not; conscience never told a man that his brains were guilty in view of his wrong acts, and this simple fact proves that the brains do not constitute the intellectual and moral man; if they did, our conscience would condemn our brains when we do wrong. Let the conscience smitten sinner philosophize upon the operations of his own mind, and he will come to a right conclusion on this subject.

SECTION V.

The immateriality of mind proved from the nature of its desires.

The spirituality of the human soul may be inferred from the nature of its desires; from its thirst for happiness, which can be slaked only by drinking at the fountain of spiritual bliss. That all men desire happiness will not be denied; and that the greater portion seek it where it is not to be found, must also be admitted. The reason is, they seek it in the gratification of their animal propensities, and in the enjoyment of material objects, which can never feed and satisfy a spirit soul. If the mind was material, right reason must teach us, that matter could answer all the demands of its nature, and satisfy its most capacious desires. Nothing can be more reasonable, than, that all beings should find the centre of their happiness, in the perfection and fulness of the elements of their own natures. If man were only matter, if his soul were only matter compounded of the elements of the material world, in the material world would exist his centre of attraction, and the fountain of his highest enjoyment. That matter should seek an alliance with the spiritual world, and seek for fountains of spiritual bliss, and pant for spiritual joys, is as absurd and unphilosophical, as to suppose it to be governed by other than its own essential laws, and, to act in violation of the essential properties of its own nature. The fact that the world of matter, never did, and never can satisfy the desires of the human soul, is one of the clearest proofs that the soul is not itself matter. The world in any and all its forms, cannot satisfy the desires of one human soul; give it all the elements of earth, sea and air, moulded into every possible form, and it will grasp the whole and thirst and famish still, and pant for higher bliss; there is still an aching void which God and love can fill. The reason of this is, the soul is not matter but spirit; were it matter, in matter would it find the element of its own nature, and the fulness of its own happiness; but it is a spirit, and in this respect like God. It originally came from God, and hence can be happy in God alone, as God dwells in us and we in God. But does God dwell in matter and matter in God? Can matter have fellowship with the Father and the Son? Can matter have communion with the Eternal Spirit? Can matter drink joys from the fountains of the Godhead?

The desire of knowledge, taken in connection with the capacity of the mind to improve, with the comparative progress of the body and mind, furnishes another argument in proof of its immateriality or spiritual nature. That the soul commences its career without knowledge is admitted; it has all to learn, but its capacity to learn furnishes the basis of the argument. The human mind is endowed with reason, which enables it to discover resemblances and differences, compare, judge, and deduce conclusions. This is the foundation of improvement, and distinguishes the human soul from the most intelligent of brutes, as well as from the material body in which it dwells. The mind in its present state is dependent upon the bodily organs for primary ideas; that is, the knowledge derived from seeing is received through the medium of the eyes, and the knowledge derived from hearing is received through the medium of the ears, &c.; yet such is the capacity of the mind, and such the manner of its improvement, as to furnish clear evidence that it is not one with the body, but in its nature, a distinct and spiritual element.

1. Its improvement is a distinct matter from the improvement of the body. The health of the body and mind frequently mutually effect each other, yet they are clearly distinct in their elemental nature. The body may grow and flourish in all the perfection of health, and the mind make little or no progress. Again, the body may be of exceedingly frail structure, pale and wan, and yet a giant mind may develop itself from within. Some of the greatest genius's the world has ever produced, have had but just body enough to hold the soul. These facts certainly indicate that the soul and the body are not one and the same thing.

2. The body comes to maturity and begins to decline, at an age when the mind has but just commenced its career of improvement. The mind often makes its greatest advancement, after the body has commenced its downward course in the scale of being. The body usually possesses its greatest power and activity at twenty-five; at thirty it is in its full strength, but its activity begins to fail; at forty the whole physical system enters upon the downward course of life, and from sixty to seventy, it is generally superannuated. But it is otherwise with the mind; at twenty-five it has usually but begun to learn, its judgment is very far

from being mature; from thirty to forty it begins to develop its powers; at fifty, sixty, and even seventy, the body being comparatively worn out, the mind is in its full strength and glory. This clearly proves, that the mind is not the body, that the growth of the one is not the growth of the other, and that the decay of the one is not the decay of the other.

3. The phenomenon of what is called dotage, or second childhood, which some may regard as over-throwing the above view, when examined, will be found actually to support it. The apparent decay of the mind in cases of second childhood, by their want of uniformity, proves that the body and the soul are not one and the same thing, and that the decay of the one is not necessarily the decay of the other. If the mind were material—if it were not distinguished in the elements of its nature from the material body, then would the intellect necessarily and uniformly grow with the growth, and decay with the decay of the body. This is not the case; mental imbecility is often discovered in those whose bodies are less impaired, and whose general health and vigor of body is far superior to others whose minds appear in their full strength. This could not be the case, if the mind did actually decay with the decay of the body.

4. The doctrine of Phrenology, which makes the size of the brain the measure of mental power, and the comparative size of its parts an index to the prevailing mental propensities, if admitted, would not prove the mind to be matter, or the brain to be the mind. The advocates of Phrenology will not make this the issue, and base their science on the doctrine of materialism, to stand or fall with it. All that can be claimed for Phrenology, is, that the brain is the material organ through which the mind acts and develops itself in its incarnate state, and that it will, of course, develop a power proportioned to the size or strength of the brain; and, that the prevailing direction of the mind will be indicated by the comparative size of the phrenological divisions of the brain. Admitting all this to be true, it does not, in itself, tend to materialism, since it supposes the brain to be only the organ of the mind, and not the mind itself.

5. The mind often develops itself in its greatest power and glory, just at the moment of death, shining out from an emaciated body, already wan and cold. These cases, of very frequent occurrence, clearly indicate that the mind is not the body: that it does not waste with it, and does not die with it. It is true that in some cases the mind appears to decay with the decaying body, but to prove that it is the body or any part of it, this would have to be always so without exception, which is not the case. To make the argument plain, we say that a single instance in which the mind kindles up at the moment of death, and blazes out with unwonted intellectual fires, while the body is wan, cold and helpless, cannot be reconciled with the idea that the mind is any part of the material body, and that it wastes and dies with it. On the other hand, those cases in which the mind appears to waste with the body and go out like the sun, passing gradually behind a cloud, deeper and darker, until its last ray is lost, can be explained in perfect harmony with the theory of the immateriality of the mind, and even its immortality. Does the mind fail, as in second childhood—or does it grow gradually dim as the body wastes under the influence of disease? The explanation is this: the bodily organs through which the mind communicates with the material world, in these particular cases, are impaired by age or disease. In many cases of death from sickness, the mind appears to waste away, or gradually sink into a state of sleep, merely because the will does not determine it in a direction to develop itself to the world without. But that the mind is there, distinct from the wasting, dying body, is clear from the many cases already referred to, in which the mind, being roused by the prospect of heaven, or seized with the terror of impending perdition, flashes with the fires of immortality, and sheds a living glare as it quits its house of clay and enters upon the destinies of the spirit world.

This has often been witnessed in the dying moments of both the Christian and the sinner. There are but few Christian pastors who have been long devoted to their work, that have not in their visits among the sick and dying, more than once stood by the bed-side of those whose last moments left upon their minds a vivid impression of the undying nature of the human soul.

SECTION VI.

The Immateriality of Mind, concluded—The Bible Argument, in which it is shown that the Sacred Writers took it for granted, that the common doctrine was understood and believed.

We now come to inquire, what is the Bible doctrine concerning the human mind? Does the Bible teach that the mind is material or immaterial? that it is the body, or some part of the body, or that the mind is a spirit or a soul which forms no part of the body? We say that the Bible teaches, that man is composed of a body and a soul; that the body is of the earth and material, and that the soul is an immaterial spirit. We will adduce a few proof texts.

The Bible usually assumes the doctrine of the distinction between soul and body, and speaks in a manner which takes it for granted that this distinction is understood and believed. Gen. xxxv. 18. "And it came to pass, as her soul was in departing, (for she died,) that she called his name Ben-oni." This text clearly takes it for granted, that man is composed of a body and a soul, and that what is called death, or dying, is their separation, or the departure of the soul. Dr. Clarke renders the Hebrew of this text, "in the going away of her soul." If man has no immaterial soul, if materialism be true, what went away, or what departed? Her body did not depart. Her brains did not depart. There was nothing which departed, which could consistently be called "her soul," only upon the supposition that there is in man an immaterial spirit, which leaves the body at death. The language is just such as a believer in the common doctrine of the soul would be likely to use, and just such, as none but such a believer would employ. Put the words into the mouth of one who holds the doctrine for which we contend, and they are clear and forcible; but put them into the mouth of a materialist, and they either express a falsehood, or mean nothing. It is then pretty clear, that whoever wrote the book of Genesis, was not a materialist.

Numbers xvi. 22. "And they fell upon their faces, and said, O God, the God of the spirits of all flesh." This text clearly takes for granted, that man is a compound of flesh and spirit. "All flesh," clearly means all mankind, or all human flesh, and "the spirits of all flesh," clearly implies that to each body of flesh there is a spirit. It must appear clear, that no rational person would ever employ such language, who did not believe in the common doctrine of the human soul. It is then clear that these praying Jews, together with their inspired historian, were not materialists. They believed that in man is united a body and a spirit, and that God is especially the God of the spirit. No other meaning can be given to the word spirits, in this text, which will even weaken the argument. The word sometimes signifies wind or breath, but give it either of these significations here, and you will destroy a clear sense, and turn their solemn prayer into mockery. How would it sound to pray, "O God, the God of the winds of all flesh;" or, "the God of the breaths of all flesh?" It would spoil both the beauty and the sense, and turn that which is truly sublime, into that which would approach very nearly to the ridiculous.

Num. xxvii. 15, 16. "And Moses spake unto the Lord, saying, Let the Lord, the God of the spirits of all flesh, set a man over the congregation." What has been remarked upon the preceding text is equally true of this, and need not be repeated. Moses must have believed in the common doctrine of man's compound nature consisting of flesh and spirit.

Job xiv. 22. "But his flesh upon him shall have pain, and his soul within him shall mourn." This text, like the former, does not assert the fact that man is composed of a body and soul, but like them, clearly takes it for granted, that this is a doctrine believed and understood. It clearly distinguishes between the flesh and soul, and affirms that his soul shall mourn within him. Upon the supposition of the materialist, what does Job mean by the soul? It is not the flesh, for he names that as something different from the soul; his flesh is on him, and his soul is in him. Does he mean that his brains shall mourn within him? Does he mean that his wind or breath shall mourn within him? Certainly none of these can be his meaning. Surely Job talked as though he believed the human mind to be something different from the body.

Chap. xxxi. 30. "Neither have I suffered my mouth to sin, by wishing a curse to his soul."

Job is here speaking of his enemy, and by the expression, "his soul," he clearly distinguished between

his soul and body. The body, the visible, tangible man, he represented as the person, and the soul as belonging to it. The language clearly implies a distinction between body and soul.

Chap. xxxii. 8. "But there is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." This text appears to be an allusion to God's breathing into man the breath of life, after he had formed him of the dust of the ground, by which he "became a living soul." The only use we make of it now, is to prove that the mind is spirit and not matter. "There is a spirit in man." Man here denotes the visible, tangible frame, the body; in this there is a spirit. This spirit is doubtless the intelligent part, as it is said, "the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding." The spirit is not only what God infused at first, but upon this same spirit God operates, when, by inspiration, he giveth him understanding.

Prov. xix. 2. "That the soul be without knowledge is not good." This text clearly implies the existence of an intelligent soul, distinct from the body. What does the inspired writer mean by soul, in this text. The word soul is sometimes used to denote man as a whole, or personal being, but the definite article 'the,' attached to it will not allow it to have this meaning. No particular person is spoken of, and hence, soul cannot mean man as an entire personal being. We cannot say, "that the man be without knowledge is not good," when no particular man is intended. Soul cannot here mean wind or breath. There is no sense in saying, "That the wind or breath be without knowledge is not good." It will not better it to substitute brains, for soul. Nothing then can be meant by soul, unless it be the rational spirit in man, according to the common doctrine.

Eccle. xii. 7. "Then shall the dust return unto the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." This is an important text, but we will not enlarge upon it in this place, as we shall have occasion to quote it again in proof of another point. We quote it here to prove the immateriality of the soul in contradistinction from the body. It clearly distinguishes between the material and immaterial parts of man; it separates them at death, and assigns the material part to the earth, and the immaterial part back to God, whence it came.

Ezek. xviii. 4. "Behold, all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine." In this text it is certainly taken for granted that man has a soul, which forms no part of his body. What else can soul mean but the spirit that is in man, in contradistinction from his body? It cannot mean the breath, or wind, in this text, as it sometimes does. God does not mean to say that the air which the father breathes, and which the son breathes, is alike his. It cannot mean the person or whole man. To mean that, it should read, "all souls are mine; as the father is mine so also the son is mine." The expressions "soul of the father," and "soul of the son," proves that the whole man is not meant. The preposition "of" is equivalent to the possessive case, and whether we say "soul of the father," or, father's soul, the sense is the same. The language is then in perfect accordance with the common belief that man is composed of a body and a soul, but deny this doctrine and the sense of the text is destroyed.

Zech. xii. 1. "The Lord, which stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundation of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him." This text is clearly founded upon the belief that, man consists of a body with a spirit in it, nor can it be made to express good sense, without admitting this doctrine, as a truth understood and believed at the time it was uttered. The spirit of man is the subject of remark, and this spirit, God is represented as forming within him. The mind, or immaterial soul, according to the common belief, is the only spirit that God can be supposed to form within man.

Rom. viii. 16. "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God." Here are two spirits named. The first, called "the Spirit," is, no doubt, the Holy Ghost; the second, called "our spirit," is the intelligent mind or soul of man. This proves the human mind to be an immaterial spirit, for the word spirit can mean nothing else in this text. What is it with which the Holy Spirit bears witness? It is not our body, or any part of it; it is not even our brains. It is not wind or our breath. It is not our life. Indeed there is nothing which can be understood by "our spirit," in this text, but the immaterial, intelligent nature of man, according to the common belief of christians.

I. Cor. ii 11. "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." The design of this text is to affirm that, as the spirit of man searches the things of a man, so the Spirit of God searches the things of God, and it proves as

clearly that the intelligent principle in man is spirit, as it does that what is called the Spirit of God, is spirit, that is, an immaterial essence.

Chap. vi. 20. "For ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body, and your spirit, which are God's." This text, as clearly as it possibly could, takes it for granted that man is composed of a body and a spirit, and that the body is not the spirit, and that the spirit is not the body, and that they both constitute the man. It is not possible to conceive that any well informed man, not believing in the common doctrine of body and soul, would employ such language. Paul, then, clearly believed the common doctrine. It was undoubtedly this belief that suggested the mode of expression adopted in the text.

II. Cor. iv. 16. "But though our outward man perish, yet the inward man is renewed day by day." In this text there is a clear distinction made between the body and soul. The body is called the outward man; the soul is called the inward man.

Chap. vii. 1. "Let us cleanse ourselves from all filthiness of the flesh and spirit." Here again the distinction is made between the material and spiritual part of man, and the apostle takes it for granted that this distinction is understood.

James ii. 26. "For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also." This text is sufficient of itself to settle the question, if there was not another to be quoted. The apostle not only assumes, that man is composed of a body and a spirit, but supposes the fact to be plainer and better understood than the connection between faith and works. He is laboring to prove that faith is not vital and saving unless it produces good works, and to make it plainer he introduces as an illustration, the better understood fact of the union of a spirit and body in man, and that the body is dead without the spirit. The remark is founded upon the common belief that the body lives only while the soul remains in it, and that death is a separation between them. The above texts, gathered from the whole face of the Bible, as they have been, are sufficient to establish the truth of the existence of the human mind as an intelligent, immaterial spirit, distinct from matter.

It was remarked in a preceding section, that the Scriptures furnish the same evidence of the spiritual nature of the human soul, that they do that God is a spirit. This point we promised to make plain in its proper place, and will now attempt to redeem the pledge.

The same words which are applied to man, to describe his spiritual nature, are applied to God. It is admitted that these words are indefinite in the original Hebrew and Greek, insomuch that no argument, can be based upon any supposed necessary meaning, but must depend for its force upon the connection and other circumstances; and any criticism which will invalidate the evidence in proof that the human soul is spirit and not matter, will equally weaken the argument in support of the idea that God is a spirit. A few illustrations will make this plain. We will place a few texts in juxtaposition that the eye of the reader may rest upon both classes at the same moment.

SPOKEN OF GOD.

Isa. i. 14. "Your new moons and your appointed feasts my SOUL, hateth."

In this text God represents his own soul as being the subject of hatred.

If the word soul in this text means a spirit, it must mean a spirit in the opposite column, for as it is here the subject of hatred, it is there the subject of love.

Isa. xlii. 1. "Behold mine elect in whom my SOUL, delighteth."

In this text the same term is used to denote the mind of God, that is used to denote the mind of man in the opposite column, and both are represented as the subjects of a like affection.

Job. xxiii. 13. "What his SOUL desireth, even that he doeth."

Jer. v. 9. "Shall I not visit for these things? saith the Lord: and shall not my SOUL be avenged on such a nation as this?"

Jer. vi. 8. "Be thou instructed, O Jerusalem, lest my SOUL depart from thee."

SPOKEN OF MAN.

Deut. xi. 13. "Love the Lord your God with all your SOUL."

In this text God represents the soul of man as being the subject of love.

If the word soul in this text does not mean a spirit, it cannot mean a spirit in the opposite column, for as it here is the subject of love, it is there the subject of hatred.

Isa. Iv. 2. "Let your SOUL delight itself in fatness."

In this text the same word is used to denote the mind of man, that denotes the mind of God in the opposite column, and both are represented as the subjects of a like affection.

Prov. xxi. 10. "The SOUL of the wicked desireth evil."

Lev. xxvi 15. "If your SOUL abhor my judgments, so that ye will not do all my commandments, I also will do this unto you."

Isa. 1v. 3. "Come unto me, and hear, and your SOUL shall live."

In the above texts, the word soul, in the left hand column, is applied to God, to denote his Spirit, or the Holy Ghost; and in the right hand column the same word is used to denote the mind, or intellectual and moral nature of man. If then the one is not spirit, there is no proof that the other is. Any criticism upon the word, where it is applied to man in the right hand column, by which it may be rendered life, disposition, temper of mind, breath, wind or air, must be equally applicable to the word in the left hand column, where it is applied to God; as effectually overturning the proof that God is a spirit, as that the soul of man is a spirit.

We will now consider the word spirit, which is more clearly employed to denote the nature or essence of God, and will show that its use proves that man has a spiritual nature, as clearly as it does that God is a spirit.

APPLIED TO GOD.

Gen. i. 2. "The SPIRIT of God moved upon the face of the waters."

Job. xxvi. 13. "By his SPIRIT he hath garnished the heavens; his hand hath formed the crooked serpent."

Psalms cxxxix. 7-10. "Whither shall I go from thy SPIRIT? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven thou art there; if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me."

John iv. 24. "God is a SPIRIT"

I. Cor. ii. 11. "Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the SPIRIT of God."

APPLIED TO MAN.

Prov. xx. 27. "The SPIRIT of a man is the candle of the Lord, searching all the inward parts of the belly."

Job xxxii. 8 "But there is a SPIRIT in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding."

Eccl. iii. 21, and xii. 7. "Who knoweth the SPIRIT of a man that goeth upward?"

Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the SPIRIT shall return unto God who gave it."

Acts vii. 59. "Lord Jesus receive my SPIRIT."

Heb. xii. 23. "The SPIRITS of just men made perfect."

I. Cor. ii. 11. "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the SPIRIT of man which is in him?"

We have quoted above the principal texts which affirm that God is a spirit, and directly opposite to them in the right hand column, are other texts which just as clearly prove that the intellectual part of man is a spirit. Any criticism which will make the one class of texts harmonize with the materiality of the human mind or soul, will no less make the other class harmonize with the materiality of God.

But the connection in which the sacred writers use the word spirit, applying it to God and to man in the same sentence, proves that by it they mean the same thing in the one case as in the other. We will give a few examples.

John iv. 24. "God is a spirit; and they that worship him must worship in spirit and in truth." Here the word spirit is applied to God and man, in a manner which proves beyond a doubt, that the word means the same thing in both instances. If any text in the Bible proves that God is a spirit, this is the very text, and if this text proves that God is a spirit and not matter, it must follow that man has a spiritual nature which is not matter. The text affirms that God is a spirit, and then announces as a consequence, that is, because God is a spirit, "they that worship him must worship in spirit," using the same term, spirit, to denote the spirit in which man must worship, that is used to express the divine essence which is to be worshiped. God is a spirit, but man is matter and spirit, having a body and soul. The material body may be made to perform certain acts, and assume certain attitudes of worship, in which the mind, the spirit, is not engaged; this is not acceptable. As God is a spirit, no worship can be acceptable to him, which is not performed by the spirit, the soul as well as the body. Indeed, as God is a spirit, we may regard the text as affirming that it requires a being of like nature to worship him; that he can be worshipped by spirits only. If the mind of man is not spirit, but matter, how he can worship God in spirit, or *with* spirit, as the Greek participle signifies, is not possible for ordinary minds to comprehend. Adopt the common theory of the spiritual nature of the human soul, and the text becomes plain; and the doctrine is that a spirit God can be worshiped only by spirit worshipers, and hence man, to worship acceptably, must worship with his spiritual nature—with his soul and not merely with his body.

Rom. viii. 16. "The spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God." In this text there is no doubt that we are to understand, by "the Spirit," the Holy Ghost, and by "our spirit," the intellectual nature of man. The same word is used to denote spirit in both cases in the original, and must be intended to describe a similar essence. If "our spirit," means our body, our matter, or any thing about us that is material, then "the Spirit," may mean the material substance of divinity, and the criticism which will make

the one conclusion plain, will remove all the difficulties out of the way of the other. We trust we have now shown that the Scriptures furnish the same proof of the immateriality of the human soul, that they do that God is an immaterial spirit; and here we close this part of our investigation.

CHAPTER II.

THE RATIONAL SOUL OF MAN DOES NOT DIE WITH THE BODY,
BUT MAINTAINS A CONSCIOUS EXISTENCE AFTER THE BODY IS DEAD.

SECTION I.

An argument from the immateriality, or spiritual nature of the soul.

Our first argument in proof that the soul does not die with the body, but maintains a conscious existence after the body is dead, is drawn from its immateriality or spiritual nature. The foundation for this argument has been laid in the preceding numbers, in which the immateriality of the human soul has been proved. We are not called upon here to prove this point, but only to make an application of it, as a truth already established.

Before we enter upon the direct argument, it is necessary to state the precise point to be proved by it. It has been misunderstood, and hence, met by a misdirected and insufficient reply. Rev. George Storrs, in his six sermons against the soul's immortality, meets the argument thus:

"It is said—*The soul is spiritual, hence indestructible, and therefore immortal.* One single consideration is sufficient to overthrow this argument, and show that it has no force. *He who created can destroy.* Our Savior saith—'Fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell'"

It should be remarked on this extract, that as a reply it is defective in two particulars:

1. It assumes that "destruction," means a loss of conscious existence, when applied to the soul. This is not admitted, but as it belongs to another division of our subject, we will not argue it here, but leave it to be attended to in its proper place.

2. Its capital defect is, it entirely misapprehends the question. The argument does not rest upon the assumption that God cannot destroy or annihilate a spirit after he has created it, but only that the soul is immortal in its nature, having no tendency in itself to annihilation, and must exist forever, unless sent into non-existence by the same Almighty Power which gave it being. There is an important distinction between the natural immortality of the soul, and God's power to annihilate it, which Mr. Storrs entirely overlooked in his attempt to meet the argument. God may be able to destroy what is immortal in its own nature, and what would live forever but for such destruction; hence, could it be proved that God can destroy the human soul; yea, could it be proved that he will annihilate it, it would not follow that it is not ever-living in its own nature. If the soul is not immortal in its own nature, it must cease to exist by the operation of the laws of its being, just as the body does, and can need no destruction from the Almighty, any more than the body, to cause it to cease to exist. To argue that God can destroy the soul, as Mr. Storrs does, implies that it will not die of itself, without the direct exertion of Almighty Power to destroy it. The body is mortal, is a compound, an organism, and by the operation of the laws of its elemental and organic nature, must wear itself out and cease to exist, without being destroyed by the direct operation of external force, as is implied when Mr. Storrs affirms that God can destroy the soul. On the other hand, if the soul is a simple spiritual essence, immaterial, uncompounded, and indivisible, it must be immortal in itself, and must exist forever, unless actually destroyed by the Almighty Power that gave it existence.

This argument then, is not designed to prove that God cannot destroy the human soul, nor even that he will not, but only that the soul, being spirit and not matter, simple and not compound, indivisible and not dissoluble, it must be immortal in its nature, and live after the body is dissolved;

yea, live forever, unless destroyed by the Almighty Power that gave it being. To this point we will now direct a few thoughts.

1. The soul being an immaterial, uncompounded spiritual essence, as fully proved in the first chapter, it cannot be effected by such agents as operate upon and destroy compound bodies and organisms. Frost will kill the body, but no one will contend that an immaterial spirit can be frozen to death. The body is divisible, and may be cut to pieces, but it will not be pretended that an immaterial, intangible, indivisible soul can be cut to pieces, with saws, knives and axes. It is admitted that the soul resides in the body during our natural life; now suppose a machine should be constructed, which at one blow would cut the body as fine as the sand upon the sea shore, would the soul be cut to pieces by the operation, admitting it to be in the body at the time? It certainly would not, unless that which is immaterial can fill space so as to obstruct matter—unless that which is intangible can be hit by a material engine, and unless that which is indivisible can be divided.

Suppose you cast both soul and body together into a furnace as hot as the one prepared by Nebuchadnezzar, and what will be the result? The body will be consumed in a moment; but the soul will not be burned up. An immaterial, uncompounded spirit cannot be affected by material fire, any more than it can by frost; it could dwell alike in the sun or in the polar regions. The reader will now see the importance and force of our long argument on the immateriality of the mind. It is a vital point; if we have proved in the preceding chapter, that the human mind is an immaterial spirit, as we trust we have, the above reasoning shows that it must be immortal in its own nature, and that it will live forever unless it be destroyed by God its Maker. By all the conclusiveness, then, by which we have sustained the immateriality of the soul, does its immortality follow.

2. The argument drawn from the immateriality of the soul, not only proves that it is immortal in itself, living forever, if left to the operations of the laws of its own nature, but it proves that God cannot destroy it, in the manner in which destructionists generally suppose. Be particular; we do not say that God cannot annihilate a human soul, or any simple spirit which he has created, but only that he cannot do it in the manner in which destructionists generally contend he will do it. If God should annihilate the human soul, it would require a simple withdrawal of that Almighty Power which he put forth when he created it, and which not only sustains every human soul, but the universe of both matter and mind. This mode of annihilation forms no part of the creed of destructionists; they argue their doctrine from the Scriptures, which threaten and describe the punishment of the wicked, and represent the loss of existence as a part of, and end of this punishment, and as the result of positive infliction and suffering; and hence, they rely upon the words, destroy, burned up, consumed, and other like expressions. The argument founded upon the spiritual nature of the soul, proves that God cannot annihilate it in this way. If God himself has made the soul immaterial, he cannot destroy it by bringing material agents to act upon it. God cannot dissolve that which is uncompounded, or divide that which is indivisible. The reader is requested to bear in mind that the question at this point, is not—would the soul fall back into non-existence, should God withdraw his creating and sustaining power? but—can the soul be burned up, or be annihilated by the exertion of power upon it? We will close this argument, with the following extract from Mr. Drew's essay on the immortality of the soul. It may not be conclusive in itself, but taken in connection with our reasoning, on the immateriality of the soul, is not without its force.

“It has been already proved, that material bodies can never act but when they bring their surfaces into contact with each other. As an immaterial substance has no surface, it is a contradiction to suppose that matter can ever be brought into contact with it: to suppose such a contact possible, is to suppose a surface in an immaterial being, which at the same time is excluded by its natural immateriality. Whatever has an exterior, must have an interior; and what has both must be extended: and what is thus extended, cannot be immaterial. An immaterial substance, therefore, can have no surface, and that which has no surface can never be brought into contact with that which has; it therefore follows that the soul must be inaccessible to all violence from matter, and that it cannot perish through its instrumentality. As matter can only act by contact, it follows that without being extended beyond its physical nature, it never can destroy the soul. And to suppose matter to be thus extended, is to suppose it to be matter and not matter at the same time.

Nor can any accession of power overcome the contradiction. No acquisition of power can alter the identity of its nature, or communicate to it a force of which its nature is incapable.

“We can conceive that an accession of power can cause matter to accomplish everything which is placed within the reach of its nature: but to suppose matter to extend its influence beyond the limits of its own existence, or to act where it is not, is to suppose its presence and absence at the same time. And to suppose it to annihilate a nature with which it has no physical connection, is to suppose it to act where it can have no influence, or that it can act and not act at the same time; which every one must see, is not only a moral but an absolute impossibility. It therefore follows, that the soul cannot perish by the instrumentality of matter, whatever influence be attributed to the application of its power; hence in reference to every material weapon:

“The soul, secure in her existence, smiles at the drawn dagger and defies its point.”

“It is certain that nothing cannot *communicate* what it does not possess; nor *produce* what it has not the *power of producing*. A being which can communicate annihilation, must be one which is in existence, for that which *is not* in existence can communicate nothing: and for the same reason can produce no effects. And that being which is in existence, cannot from the *certainty of its own existence*, include the *absence of existence* within its nature, and consequently, can never communicate to another that *absence of existence* or *annihilation* which it does not possess itself. Annihilation therefore can never be communicated, either by a being which *is in existence*, or by one which *is not*.

“If the soul be annihilated, it must be either by some thing which is in existence or by some thing which is not. But that which is in existence, can never produce what is physically contrary to itself; and that which has no existence can never act. The power which is supposed to reduce the soul to a point of annihilation, *must* either *exist in this* given point or it *must not*:—if it *exist* we have not yet arrived at that *point* which describes a nonentity: and where *nonentity* is not, *annihilation* can never BE; and if it *exist not* in this given point, the soul can never be annihilated by its influence.

“Annihilation must be the result of power or it must not. If it be the result of power, power must continue to operate upon a subject, until the subject itself, through the influence of that power be reduced to a nonentity. But in admitting power to have an active operation, until it produces a nonentity, we admit a palpable contradiction. The admission of a power which is known to exist only because it produces a nonentity furnishes the mind with a chaos of contradictions—because that which produces a *nonentity* is not power but *nothing*.”

The above extracts from Mr. Drew go to show that the soul cannot be annihilated, as destructionists suppose, by the punishments and pains of hell; and as it (the soul) cannot be annihilated in the way they suppose, and as their arguments all tend to prove that it will take place in this way, so far as they prove anything, their entire theory must fall. But we have yet to consider the main point, which is the Bible doctrine on the subject.

SECTION II.

An argument founded upon the common sentiment of mankind.

That the heathen world believe that the soul survives the death of the body, and is imperishable, will not be denied by any one who has investigated the subject. The following summary of the evidence on this point we quote, ready prepared to our purpose, from “The Philosophy of a Future State,” by Thomas Dick.

“That the thinking principle in man is of an immortal nature, was believed by the ancient Egyptians, the Persians, the Phenicians, the Scythians, the Celts, the Druids, the Assyrians,— by the wisest and the most celebrated characters among the Greeks and Romans, and by almost every other ancient nation and tribe whose records have reached our times. The notions, indeed, which many of them entertained of the scenes of futurity were very obscure and imperfect, but they all embraced the idea, that death is not the destruction of the rational soul, but only its introduction to a new and unknown state of existence. The ancient Scythians believed that death was only a change of habitation; and the Magian sect, which

prevailed in Babylonia, Media, Assyria, and Persia, admitted the doctrine of eternal rewards and punishments. The doctrines taught by the second Zoroaster, who lived in the time of Darius, were, 'that there is one Supreme Being, independent and self-existent from all eternity; that under him there are two angels, one the angel of light, who is the author of all good; and the other the angel of darkness, who is the author of all evil; that they are in a perpetual struggle with each other; that where the angel of light prevails, there good reigns; and that where the angel of darkness prevails, there evil takes place; that this struggle shall continue to the end of the world; that then there shall be a general resurrection and day of judgment, wherein all shall receive a just retribution according to their works. After which, the angel of darkness and his disciples shall go into a world of their own, where they shall suffer in everlasting darkness, the punishment of their evil deeds; and the angel of light and his disciples shall also go into a world of their own, where they shall receive, in everlasting light, the reward due to their good deeds; that after this they shall remain separated forever, and light and darkness be no more mixed to all eternity: (* Rollin's Ancient History, Vol. 2.) The remains of this sect, which are scattered over Persia and India, still hold the same doctrines without any variation, even to this day.

"It is well known, that Plato, Socrates, and other Greek Philosophers, held the doctrine of the soul's immortality. In his admirable dialogue, entitled, 'The Phædon,' Plato represents Socrates, a little before his death, encompassed with a circle of philosophers, and discoursing with them on the arguments which prove the eternal destiny of man.

"'When the dead,' says he, 'are arrived at the rendezvous of departed souls, whither their angel conducts them, they are all judged. Those who have passed their lives in a manner neither entirely criminal, nor absolutely innocent, are sent into a place where they suffer pains proportioned to their faults, till, being purged and cleansed of their guilt, and afterwards restored to liberty, they receive the reward of the good actions they have done in the body. Those who are judged to be incurable, on account of the greatness of their crimes, the fatal Destiny that passes judgment upon them, hurls them into Tartarus, from whence they never depart. Those who are found guilty of crimes, great indeed, but worthy of pardon, who have committed violences, in the transports of rage, against their father or mother, or have killed some one in a like emotion, and afterwards repented—suffer the same punishment with the last, but for a time only, till, by prayers and supplications, they have obtained pardon from those they have injured. But those who have passed through life with peculiar sanctity of manners, are received on high into a pure region, where they live without their bodies to all eternity, in a series of joys and delights which cannot be described.' From such considerations Socrates concludes, 'If the soul be immortal, it requires to be cultivated with attention, not only for what we call the time of life, but for that which is to follow, I mean eternity; and the least neglect in this point may be attended with endless consequences. If death were the final dissolution of being, the wicked would be great gainers by it, by being delivered at once from their bodies, their souls, and their vices; but as the soul is immortal, it has no other means of being freed from its evils, nor any safety for it, but in becoming very good and very wise; for it carries nothing with it, but its good or bad deeds, its virtues and vices, which are commonly the consequences of the education it has received, and the causes of eternal happiness or misery.' Having held such discourses with his friends, he kept silent for some time, and then drank off the whole of the poisonous draught which had been put into his hand, with amazing tranquillity, and an inexpressible serenity of aspect, as one who was about to exchange a short and wretched life, for a blessed and eternal existence.

"The descriptions and allusions contained in the writings of the ancient poets, are a convincing proof, that the notion of the soul's immortality was a universal opinion in the times in which they wrote, and among the nations to whom their writings were addressed. Homer's account of the descent of Ulysses into hell, and his description of Minos in the shades below, distributing justice to the dead assembled in troops around his tribunal, and pronouncing irrevocable judgments, which decide their everlasting fate, demonstrate, that they entertained the belief, that virtues are rewarded, and that crimes are punished in another state of existence. The poems of Ovid and

Virgil contain a variety of descriptions, in which the same opinions are involved. Their notions of future punishment are set forth in the descriptions they give of *Ixion*, who was fastened to a wheel, and whirled about continually with a swift and rapid motion—of *Tantalus*, who for the loathsome banquet he made for the gods, was set in water up to the chin, with apples hanging to his very lips, yet had no power either to stoop to the one to quench his raging thirst, or to reach the other to satisfy his craving appetite—of the *Fifty Daughters of Danaus*, who, for the barbarous massacre of their husbands in one night, were condemned in hell to fill a barrel full of holes with water, which ran out again as fast as it was filled—of *Sisyphus*, who for his robberies, was set to roll a great stone up a steep hill, which, when it was just at the top, suddenly fell down again, and so renewed his labor—and of *Tityus*, who was adjudged to have a vulture to feed upon his liver and entrails, which still grew and increased as they were devoured. Their notions of future happiness are embodied in the descriptions they have given of the Hesperian gardens, and the Elysian fields, where the souls of the virtuous rest secure from every danger, and enjoy perpetual and uninterrupted bliss.

“And as the nations of antiquity recognized the doctrine of a future state of existence, so there is scarcely a nation or tribe of mankind, presently existing, however barbarous and untutored, in which the same opinion does not prevail. The natives of the Society Isles believe, that after death, there is not only a state of conscious existence, but degrees of eminence and felicity, according as men have been more or less pleasing to the Eatova, or Deity, while upon earth. The chiefs of the Friendly Islands believe in the immortality of the soul, which, at death, they say, is immediately conveyed in a fast-sailing canoe, to a distant country, called Doobludha, which they describe as resembling the Mahometan paradise,— that those who are conveyed thither are no more subject to death, but feast on all the favorite productions of their native soil, with which this blissful abode is plentifully furnished. The New Zealanders believe, that the third day after the interment of a man, the heart separates itself from the corpse, and that this separation is announced by a general breeze of wind, which gives warning of its approach, by an inferior divinity that hovers over the grave, and who carries it to the clouds. They believe that the soul of the man whose flesh is devoured by the enemy, is doomed to a perpetual fire, while the soul of the man whose body has been rescued from those that killed him, and the souls of all who die a natural death, ascend to the habitations of the gods. The inhabitants of the Pelew Islands, according to the account of Captain Wilson, although they have few religious rites and ceremonies, believe in one Supreme Being and in a future state of rewards and punishments. In the religion of the Kalmuc Tartars, the doctrine of a future state holds a conspicuous place. They believe that hell is situated in the middle region, between heaven and earth, and their devils are represented with all sorts of frightful forms, of a black and hideous aspect, with the heads of goats, lions, and unicorns. Their holy Lamas, who have obtained a victory over all their passions, are supposed to pass immediately into heaven, where they enjoy perfect rest, and exercise themselves in divine service. The Samoiedians of Northern Tartary believe, that there is one Supreme Being, that he is our all-merciful and common Parent, and that he will reward with a happy state, hereafter, those who live virtuously in this world. The Birmans believe in the transmigration of souls, after which, they maintain, that the radically bad will be sentenced to lasting punishment, while the good will enjoy eternal happiness on a mountain called Meru.

“The various tribes which inhabit the continent of Africa, in so far as we are acquainted with their religious opinions, appear to recognize the doctrine of a future state. ‘I was lately discoursing on this subject,’ says Mr. Addison, in one of his Spectators, ‘with a learned person, who has been very much conversant among the inhabitants of the most western parts of Africa. Upon his conversing with several in that country, he tells me, that their notions of heaven, or of a future state of happiness, is this—that everything we there wish for will immediately present itself to us. We find, say they, that our souls are of such a nature that they require variety, and are not capable of being always delighted with the same objects. The Supreme Being, therefore, in compliance with this taste of happiness which he has implanted in the soul of man, will raise up, from time to time, say they, every gratification which it is in the human nature to be pleased with. If we wish to be in groves or bowers,

among running streams or falls of water, we shall immediately find ourselves in the midst of such a scene as we desire. If we would be entertained with music, and the melody of sounds, the concert arises upon our wish, and the whole region about us is filled with harmony. In short, every desire will be followed by fruition; and whatever a man's inclination directs him to, will be present with him.' The Negroes, and other inhabitants of the interior of Africa, according to the account of Mr. Park, believe in one Supreme Ruler, and expect hereafter to enter into a state of misery or felicity. The Gallas of Abyssinia, though they reject the doctrine of future punishment, admit the reality of a future state. The Mandingoes, the Jaloffs, the Feloops, the Foulahs, the Moors, and all the other tribes who have embraced the Mahometan faith, recognize the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of future rewards in a celestial paradise. The natives of Dahomy entertain the same belief; and hence it is a common practice with the sovereign of that country, to send an account to his forefathers of any remarkable event, by delivering a message to whoever may happen to be near him at the time, and then ordering his head to be chopped off immediately, that he may serve as a courier to convey intelligence to the world of spirits.* (*M'Leod's Voyage to Africa, 1820, p. 64.)

The Persians are said to leave one part of their graves open, from a belief, that the dead will be reanimated, and visited by angels, who will appoint them to their appropriate abodes in a future state. From a similar belief, thousands of Hindoo widows annually sacrifice themselves on the funeral piles of their deceased husbands, in the hope of enjoying with them the felicities of eternal life. The Japanese believe that the souls of men and beasts are alike immortal; that a just distribution of rewards and punishments take place after death; that there are different degrees of happiness, as well as of punishment, and that the souls of the wicked transmigrate, after death, into the bodies of animals, and at last, in case of amendment, are translated back again into the human form.¹ (¹ Thumberg's Travels) From a conviction of the reality of a future world, the Wahabee Arabs regard it as impious to mourn for the dead, who, they say, are enjoying felicity with Mahomet in paradise; and the Javanese make several feasts, on the decease of their friends and relations, to commemorate their entrance into a world of bliss. The North American Indians believe that beyond the most distant mountains of their country, there is a wide river; beyond that river a great country; on the other side of that country, a world of water; in that water are a thousand islands, full of trees and streams of water, and that a thousand buffaloes, and ten thousand deer, graze on the hills, or ruminant in the valleys. When they die, they are persuaded that the Great Spirit will conduct them to this land of souls.

Thus it appears, that not only the philosophers of antiquity, and the most civilized nations presently existing on the globe, have recognized the doctrine of the immortality of man, but that even the most savage and untutored tribes fortify their minds in the prospect of death, with the hope of a happiness commensurate to their desires, in the regions beyond the grave.

Even the poor Indian whose untutored mind Sees God
in clouds, or hears Him in the wind, Whose soul proud
science never taught to stray Far as the solar walk or
milky way—

Yet simple nature to his hope has given
Behind the cloud-topt hill an humbler heaven; Some
safer world in depth of woods embraced, Some happier
island in the watery waste,
Where slaves once more their native land behold, No
fiends torment, no Christians thirst for gold— And thinks,
admitted to you equal sky,
His faithful dog shall bear him company.'—POPE.

“Among the numerous and diversified tribes that are scattered over the different regions of the earth, that agree in scarcely any other sentiment or article of religious belief, we here find the most perfect harmony, in their recognition of a Supreme Intelligence, and in their belief that the soul survives the

dissolution of its mortal frame.”

The above proves the point beyond the power of contradiction, that a belief in the immortality of the human soul is common to our race, and we submit it as very strong presumptive evidence of the truth of the doctrine.

We ask then, in conclusion, from whence did this almost universal belief in the immortality of the soul spring? If it were local, we should infer that it was the offspring of some local cause, but as it is general, pervading all ages, and all lands, and all societies, it must have a cause as general as the effect produced.

If the doctrine of a future existence be an error, it is the most general one that ever entered the world, and must have been introduced in the most insidious manner. Other errors may generally be traced to their sources, and their authors, and the time of their introduction be pointed out; but no account of the origin of the doctrine of life, of the soul after the death of the body can be given, on the supposition that it is false. If some errors cannot be traced back to their origin, they are not general in the world, but are peculiar to particular nations, tribes, or sects; while the sentiment in question is a general one, and prevails most where the Scriptures are most known and read. The doctrine must have had its origin; and as it prevails generally in the world, and as no account can be given of its introduction, it follows that it must have sprung from some one of the following sources:—It must be instinct, the result of natural reason, from the light of nature, the impression of God’s spirit on the mind, or the principle of revelation contained in the Bible. Now, if it be instinct, it must be from the Creator, if it be the result of natural reason, it cannot be unreasonable; if it be from the light of nature, it is a revelation from God; if it be the impression of God’s Spirit on the mind, it is no less a Divine revelation; and if it be the sentiment of the Bible, none but infidels will deny it. If destructionists can prove that the doctrine in question had some other origin, or if some other sentiment can be named, manifestly false, and equally common in the world, of the origin of which no account can be given, we acknowledge that they will evade the force of this argument; but until this be done the argument must prove ruinous to their theory.

SECTION III.

An argument founded upon the well known opinions of the Jews.

The Jews have always believed in the conscious existence of the soul after the death of the body, and in its immortality. We might prove this from the Scriptures, but prefer to introduce other witnesses first, and will here treat of the faith of the Jews as a matter of history. It was shown in the preceding number, that the common sentiments of the heathen world have ever been in favor of the doctrine we advocate, and if it can now be shown that the same doctrine has ever been held by the Jews, to whom was committed the oracles of God, it will greatly strengthen our argument. The first witness we will introduce is Josephus, who is the first authority in matters relating to the Jews.

“The Jews had for a great while, three sects of philosophers, peculiar to themselves; the sect of the Essenes, and the sect of the Sadducees, and the third sort of opinions was that of those called Pharisees.

“Now the Pharisees believe that souls have an immortal vigor in them, and that under the earth there will be rewards and punishments, accordingly as they have lived virtuously or viciously in this life.

“But the doctrine of the Sadducees is this, that souls die with the body. But this doctrine is received but by a few, yet by those of the greatest dignity. But they are able almost to do nothing of themselves; for when they become magistrates, as they are unwillingly and by force sometimes obliged to be, they addict themselves to the notions of the Pharisees, because the multitude would not otherwise hear them.

“The doctrine of the Essenes is this, that all things are best ascribed to God. They teach the immortality of souls, and esteem that the rewards of righteousness are to be earnestly striven for”—*Josephus, Book 18, Chap. 1.*

It is worthy of remark that of the three sects into which the Jews were divided, two clearly

believed in the immortality of the soul. Further, the Sadducees, who alone believed that the soul dies with the body, were very few in number, and had no influence with the common people. This proves that theirs was not the doctrine of the Jews, but an exception to it. They were composed of a few of the wealthy high-livers, and were clearly a set of Jewish heretics, as is proved from the fact that Christ so clearly condemned their doctrine.

The next witness we will introduce is the Jews service book, containing their creed and prayers.

The seventh article of their creed runs thus:—"I believe with a perfect faith that the prophecy of Moses, our instructor, (may his soul rest in peace) was true." In one of their Sabbath morning prayers we find the following expression:—"Therefore, the members of which thou hast formed us, the spirit and soul which thou hast breathed into us."

In an evening prayer we find the following:—"Blessed be the Lord when we lie down, and blessed be the Lord when we rise up; for in thy hand are the souls of the quick and the dead."

The following is taken from a prayer which they read at funerals. After the lecture or discourse, the prayer is read, as follows:—"We beseech thee, O Lord, most merciful King! in whose hand is the soul of every living thing, and the breath of all flesh; let it be willed before thy presence that the lecture and our prayer be in behalf of [here the name of the dead person is pronounced] and be bountiful to her [or him] according to thy great mercy; O unfold for her [or him] the gate of mercy, compassion, and the garden of Eden; and receive her [or him] with love and favor. Send unto her [or him] thy holy angels to direct and to place her [or him] beneath the tree of life, near the souls of the righteous, virtuous and pious saints."

The above extracts are sufficient to prove that the immortality of the soul is clearly recognized in the Jewish religion. The question here is not, are they right? but do they believe in the immortality of the soul?

The third witness which we produce, is the Apochrypha. These writings are not quoted as Bible, but as history; and though they are not regarded as being divinely inspired, they are Jewish writings and are good authority in proof of the opinions that prevailed at the time they were written. A few plain texts will settle this question.

2. Esdras, ix. 11, 12. "And they that loathed my law, while they had yet liberty, and when as yet place of repentance was open unto them, understood, but despised it, the same must know it after death by pain." This certainly looks like a belief in the conscious existence of the soul after the body is dead.

Wisdom, ix. 15. "The corruptible body presseth down the soul, and the earthly tabernacle weigheth down the mind that museth upon many things." This makes a clear distinction between the body and soul. The expression, corruptible body in contradistinction from soul, implies that the soul is not corruptible; and earthly tabernacle, in contradistinction from the mind, that inhabits it, implies that the mind is not earthly. But there are more distinct proofs.

Chap. xvi. 14. "A man indeed killeth through his malice; and the spirit, when it is gone forth, returneth not; neither the soul received up cometh again." This cannot be made plainer by comment. Chap. iii. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, 17, 18, 19. "But the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God, and there shall no torment touch them. In the sight of the unwise they seemed to die, and their departure is taken for misery, and their going from us to be utter destruction; but they are in peace. For though they be punished in the sight of men, yet is their hope full of immortality. And having been a little chastised, for God proved them and found them worthy for himself. As gold in the furnace hath he tried them, and received them as a burnt offering. But the ungodly shall be punished according to their own imaginations, which have neglected the righteous and forsaken the Lord. For though they live long, yet shall they be nothing regarded, and their last age shall be without honor; or if they die they have no hope, neither comfort in the day of trial, for horrible is the end of the unrighteous generation."

The above quotations are sufficient to prove that the writers of the Apochrypha were believers in the immortality of the soul. It is said of the souls of the righteous, that "in the sight of the unwise

they seem to die,” that “their going from us is taken to be utter destruction; but they are in peace,—their hope is full of immortality.” Nothing could be more to the point. The above is not quoted as inspiration, but only as any other writings would be quoted, to prove what were the opinions that prevailed at the time and place when the authors wrote. The books of the Apochrypha are supposed to have been written before the commencement of the christian era, and were clearly written by Jews, who were familiar with the Jewish religion, and are therefore good authority in proof that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul prevailed at that time.

Our final witness on this point is the Bible. We do not propose to introduce our main Bible argument in this place, but only quote a few texts to show what was the prevailing belief of the Jews. The Jews held the common doctrine of the appearance of ghosts or spirits, which is inseparable from a belief in the existence of the soul after death. A few texts will settle this point.

Matt. xiv. 26. “And when the disciples saw him walking on the sea, they were troubled, saying, it is a spirit: and they cried out for fear.” Mark, vi. 49. “But when they saw him walking upon the sea, they supposed it had been a spirit, and cried out.” Luke, xxiv. 36-39. “And as they thus spake, Jesus himself stood in the midst of them, and saith unto them, peace be unto you. But they were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they had seen a spirit. And he said unto them, why are ye troubled? and why do thoughts arise in your hearts? Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself; handle me and see, for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as you see me have.”

These texts not only prove that the Jews believed in the existence of departed spirits, but they appear to give it the sanction of Christ. He did not even give them the slightest hint that they were in error in believing in the existence of spirits. The fact that he was tangible, he appears to consider sufficient proof that he was not a spirit.

Acts, xxiii. 8. “For the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit: but the Pharisees confess both.” This text taken in connection with other well understood facts most clearly proves what was the general doctrine of the Jews. The Sadducees were few in number, while the Pharisees were numerous, and lead the masses. Again, Christ condemned the doctrine of the Sadducees and approved of that held by the Pharisees. See Matt., xxii. 23, Mark, xii. 18, and Luke, xx. 27. The Sadducees were clearly a set of heretics, and the Pharisees held the true doctrine on the subject. What then did the Pharisees believe? Just what the Sadducees denied, which was the resurrection of the dead, and the existence of disembodied or immaterial beings in the form of angels or departed spirits. “The Pharisees confess both.” Both denotes two things, viz: the resurrection of the dead, which is the first thing denied by the Sadducees, and the existence of angels and disembodied spirits, which is the second thing denied by the Sadducees; the existence of angels and spirits being classed together as one article of faith. The Pharisees were the orthodox Jews, and were the representatives of the national doctrine, and they confessed both; that is, they confessed, first, that the dead would be raised, and, secondly, that there are angels and disembodied spirits. This clearly proves the point, that they believed that the soul exists after the death of the body.

The whole of the proof here presented, taken together, can leave no ground to doubt concerning the belief of the Jews. We have proved our point, first, from Josephus, secondly, from the Jewish Prayer Book and Creed, thirdly, from the Apochrypha, and fourthly, from the Bible, and on these testimonials we rest the conclusion that the Jews believed in the immortality of the soul. The force of this position will be more distinctly seen and felt at another point in the argument, yet here it has its force, in view of the fact that they were favored with the oracles of God, and that Jesus Christ walked and taught among them, without ever correcting their opinions on the subject, though he rebuked the opposite doctrine of the Sadducees.

SECTION IV.

The Primitive Church believed that the soul maintained a conscious existence after the death of the body.

In an investigation like the one in which we are engaged, it is of the utmost importance to understand what was the doctrine of the early Christians, who received their instructions from the Apostles, and those who immediately succeeded them. If the first Christians and Martyrs lived and died in the belief that the soul would enter immediately upon a happy future existence, when the body died, it appears almost impossible that any one should doubt the truth of the doctrine. This point we will now attempt to prove. We will first give a few extracts from the writings of the Apostolic Fathers. We quote from Archbishop Wake's translation, London edition, 1840. The following, from the first epistle of St. Clement to the Corinthians, clearly contains the doctrine for which we contend:

"Let us set before our eyes the holy apostle; Peter, by unjust envy, underwent, not one or two, but many sufferings; till at last, being martyred, he went to the place of glory that was due unto him. For the same cause did Paul in like manner receive the reward of his patience. Seven times he was in bonds; he was whipped, was stoned; he preached both in the east and in the west, leaving behind him the glorious report of his faith; and so having taught the whole world righteousness, and for that end traveled even to the utmost bounds of the west, he at last suffered martyrdom, by the command of the governors, and departed out of the world, and went unto his holy place, being become a most eminent pattern of patience unto all ages.

"To these holy apostles were joined a very great number of others, who, having through envy undergone, in like manner, many pains and torments, have left a glorious example to us. For this, not only men, but women, have been persecuted, and, having suffered very grievous and cruel punishments, have finished the course of their faith with firmness, and, though weak in body, yet received a glorious reward."—P. 60.

The above speaks too plainly to be misunderstood. Of Paul it is said, he "departed out of this world and went to his holy place." If Paul's soul died with his body, and both sleep until now; if his great mind was only his brains, which were decomposed after his death, the fluids evaporated, and the solids returned to dust, to be blown in ten thousand directions; in the name of common sense, to what holy place did he go? So of all the Martyr's it is said, they "received a glorious reward." According to the theory we oppose, they received no reward but to die—be eaten up by wild beasts—burned to ashes, or be consumed by worms, and have their fluids mingle with the waters of earth and heaven, and their solids mingle with the dust of earth. Is it a glorious reward to be lost amid the waters of the world, to ascend in the vapor, and fall in the rain and the dew, and in the snow and the hoar frost? is it a glorious reward to become fine dust, and be made the sport of the winds, and be blown along the streets, and even blinding the eyes of the living, to their annoyance? If not, then St. Clement did not believe that the mind is matter, and that it dies with the body.

The following is from the Epistle of St. Polycarp to the Philippians:

"Wherefore I exhort all of you that ye obey the word of righteousness, and exercise all patience, which ye have seen set forth before your eyes, not only in the blessed Ignatius, and Zozimus, and Rufus, but in others among yourselves, and in Paul himself, and the rest of the apostles. Being confident of this, that all these have not run in vain, but in faith and righteousness, and are gone to the place that was due to them from the Lord, with whom also they suffered; for they loved not this present world, but him who died, and was raised again by God for us."—P. 109.

Here it is declared that those who were dead "are gone to the place that was due to them from the Lord." Was that place non-existence? Surely not, for he said, "I go to prepare a place for you." "Father, I will that they also whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am; that they may behold my glory."

The following is from the Epistle of Ignatius to the Trallians:

"Stop your ears therefore, as often as any one shall speak contrary to Jesus Christ, who was of the race

of David, of the Virgin Mary; who was truly born, and did eat and drink; and was truly persecuted under Pontius Pilate; was truly crucified and dead, both those in heaven and on earth, and under the earth, being spectators of it. Who was also truly raised from the dead by his Father, after the manner as He will also raise up us who believe in him, by Christ Jesus, without whom we have no true life.”—P. 142.

The strong point in this extract is the assertion that, “those in heaven and on earth, and under the earth,” were spectators of Christ’s death and resurrection. This three-fold expression includes the living, the saved and the lost, and of course death was not, in the mind of the writer, the extinction of being.

The following is from the Epistle of St. Ignatius to the Romans.

“But I would not that ye should please men, but God; whom also ye do please. For neither shall I ever hereafter have such an opportunity of going unto God; nor will you, if ye shall now be silent, ever be entitled to a better work. For if you shall be silent in my behalf, I shall be made partaker of God; but if you shall love my body, I shall have my course again to run.”—Pp. 146, 147.

Again he says—

“All the ends of the world, and the kingdoms of it, will profit me nothing; I would rather die for Jesus Christ, than rule to the utmost ends of the earth.—Him I seek who died for us; Him I desire who rose again for us. This is the gain that is laid up for me. Pardon me, my brethren; ye shall not hinder me from living: [nor, seeing I desire to go to God, may you separate me from him for the sake of this world; nor seduce me by any of the desires of it]. Suffer me to enter into pure light; where being come, I shall be indeed the servant of God.”—Pp. 148, 149.

In the above extracts the writer is speaking of his impending martyrdom, and requests them not to interfere to prevent it. He calls it, “going to God,” and being “made partaker of God.” He represents their preventing his martyrdom, as hindering him “from living;” and separating him “from God for the sake of the world;” and finally, he represents his suffering martyrdom, the same as to “enter into pure light; where being come,” he says, “I shall be the servant of God.” Surely he did not believe his material brains were all the mind he had, nor could he have embraced the cold, dark doctrine of the death sleep of the soul.

The following is from the same author’s epistle to the Smyrneans:

“Now all these things he suffered for us, that we might be saved. And he suffered truly, as he also truly raised up himself; and not, as some unbelievers say, that he only seemed to suffer, they themselves only seeming to be. And as they believe, so it shall happen unto them; when being divested of the body, they shall become mere spirits.”—Pp. 158, 159.

“For if all these things were done only in show by our Lord, then do I also seem only to be bound. And why have I given myself up to death, to the fire, to the sword, to wild beasts? But now the nearer I am to the sword, the nearer I am to God: when I shall come among the wild beasts, I shall come to God. Only, in the name of Jesus Christ, I undergo all, to suffer together with him; He who was made a perfect man strengthening me.”—P. 159.

The above extracts cannot be made more forcible, or more clearly to express the doctrine of the life of the soul after the death of the body, by any comments we might add.

The following is from the account of the martyrdom of St. Ignatius:

“Wherefore with much readiness and joy, out of his desire to suffer, he left Antioch and came to Seleucia; from whence he was to sail. And after a great deal of toil, being come to Smyrna, he left the ship with great gladness and hastened to see the holy Polycarp, his fellow-scholar, who was bishop there; for they had both of them been formerly the disciples of St. John.

“Being brought to him, and communicating to him some spiritual gifts, and glorying in his bonds, he entreated, first of all, the whole church (for the churches and cities of Asia attended this holy man by their bishops, and priests, and deacons, all hastening to him, if by any means they might receive some part of his spiritual gift), but more particularly Polycarp, to contend with God in his behalf; that being suddenly taken by the beasts from the world, he might appear before the face of Christ. And this he thus spake, and testified, extending so much his love for Christ as one who was about to receive heaven through his own good confession, and the earnest contention of those who prayed together with him.”—Pp. 179, 180.

The following is from an epistle or circular which the church of Smyrna sent out concerning the

martyrdom of Polycarp:

“Wherefore being supported by the grace of Christ, they despised all the torments of the world; by the sufferings of an hour redeeming themselves from everlasting punishment. For this cause, even the fire of their cruel and barbarous executioners seemed cold to them; whilst they hoped thereby to escape that fire which is eternal, and shall never be extinguished; and beheld, with the eyes of faith, those good things which are reserved for them that endure to the end; ‘which neither ear has heard, nor eye seen, nor have they entered into the heart of man.’ But to them they were now revealed by the Lord; as being no longer men, but already become angels.”—P. 193.

“But when he emulous, and envious, and wicked adversary of the race of the just, saw the greatness of his martyrdom, and considered how irreprehensible his conversation had been from the beginning, and how he was now to be crowned with the crown of immortality, having without all controversy received his reward, he took all possible care that not the least remainder of his body should be taken away by us, although many desired to do it, and to be made partakers of his holy flesh. And to that end, he suggested it to Nicetas, the father of Herod and brother of Alce, to go to the governor, and hinder him from giving us his body to be buried.”—P. 200.

“For having by patience overcome the unjust governor, and so received the crown of immortality, he now, together with the apostles, and all other righteous men who have gone before, with great triumph glorifies God, even the Father, and blesses our Lord, the governor both of our souls and bodies, and shepherd of the Catholic Church which is over all the earth.”—P. 201.

These extracts from the Fathers, show clearly that the early churches who were moulded by the hand of inspired apostles, held the doctrine of an intermediate state, and the immortality of the soul. Ignatius suffered martyrdom in the 147th year of the Christian Era.

The next work we will introduce, is, the Ecclesiastical History of Eusebius. Eusebius wrote the first history of the Christian Church, that was ever written, excepting the Acts of the Apostles, and his work is the best authority concerning the first three centuries of the Christian Era, which we have, after the New Testament itself. A few extracts will be sufficient. We quote by page, from the Philadelphia edition, 1833. It will be seen that Eusebius speaks of some of the same transactions as those described by some of the other writers previously quoted. In speaking of the martyrdom of Polycarp, he makes the following remark concerning him, after he was dead: “But that envious and malignant adversary, that wicked enemy of all the righteous, seeing the lustre of his martyrdom, and his uniform walk and conversation, and him now crowned with the crown of immortality, and bearing off the indisputable prize, had provided that not even his corpse could be obtained by us.”—P. 148.

This clearly speaks of his having been already crowned with the crown of immortality, while his corpse was yet with them unburied. A clearer proof could hardly be given, of the writer’s belief in the immortality of the soul.

In giving an account of the martyrdom of Lucius, he represents him as saying to his judge, “I thank thee, for now I am liberated from wicked masters, and am going to God.”—P. 154.

In speaking of the martyrs that suffered in Gaul, he says: “The firmness of the champions for the true religion, their fortitude in the endurance of numberless trials, their trophies erected over demoniacal agency, and their victories over their invisible antagonists, and the crowns that have been placed upon all these; it would proclaim and perpetuate by an everlasting remembrance.—P. 168.

In speaking of the martyrdom of Blandina, he says: “Thus she overcame the enemy, in many trials, and in the conflict received the crown of immortality.”—P. 176. Again it is said: “But the blessed Blandina, last of all, as a noble mother that had animated her children, and sent them as victors to the king, herself with joy hastened to them, as if she were invited to a marriage feast, and not to be cast to wild beasts”—P 179.

Of the martyrs in general, he says: “Always lovers of peace, they always recommended peace, and with peace they departed to God.”—P. 182. All these passages contain clear evidence of a belief in the doctrine

of an intermediate state, on the part of the martyrs. Lucius said, when suffering martyrdom, "I am going to God." The expression, "the crowns that have been placed upon all these," when applied to the dead, proves a belief in the life of the soul after the death of the body. "She received the crown of immortality," spoken of one already dead, proves the point. The martyrs are said to have been sent away to the king, and then Blandina is said to have hastened to them, when she was martyred. In the face of these proofs, are we to be told that the early christians believed that soul and body die together, and must sleep together until the end of the world?

When Basilides, an officer, was leading Potamiæna to execution, he protected her against the insults of the multitude, in view of which, it is said of her, "Perceiving the man's sympathy, she exhorted him to be of good cheer, for that after she was gone, she would intercede for him with her Lord, and it would not belong before she would reward him for his kind deeds towards her."—P. 224.

Soon after the above occurrence, Basilides himself was committed to prison, on his own declaration that he was a christian; and when some of the brethren called upon him to learn the ground of his sudden change, "he is said to have declared that Potamiæna, three days after her martyrdom, standing before him at night, placed a crown upon his head, and said that she had entreated the Lord on his account, and that she had obtained her prayer, and that ere long she would take him to her."—*Ib.*

The reader may abate what he pleases for the vision part of this extract, and still it will prove all that we claim to prove by it, viz: what was the belief, at that time, concerning the life of the soul after the death of the body. If the vision was a reality, our doctrine has the proof of a miracle; but suppose it to have been a creature of the fancy, it still contains the following facts: First, the martyr, while being led to execution, instead of supposing her soul was about to die with her body, she believed it would live, and so enter into the presence of Christ, as to enable her to intercede with him for her sympathizing executioner. Secondly, this was also believed by the executioner, a military officer, making such an impression on his mind, that he fancied he saw her in a vision, unless she did really appear to him; and so strong was his belief that the martyr's soul was alive after her body had been burned to ashes, and that he had seen her, that he submitted to be beheaded for the sake of the faith. Thirdly, the most learned and pious christian writers of those times, recorded these things, most clearly, in full faith that they were true. This proves beyond a doubt, that Christians generally, at that time, must have held that the soul lives after the body is dead.

On one occasion, when the judge had condemned one to martyrdom, and he had been executed, another was seized and brought before him, and then it is said, that the judge, "as if to urge him to attach himself to the former as his companion on the way to heaven, commanded him immediately to be put to death."—P. 372. This clearly shows that the death sleep of the soul was unknown to the faith and language of those times. Of this same martyr, it is said again, "He was the tenth after those wrestlers mentioned, that were perfected on one and the same day, on which, as is probable, the mighty portals of eternal life were opened to Pamphilus, in a manner worthy of the man, and presented to him and to others, a ready entrance into the kingdom of heaven"—*Ib.* Such expressions, as the portals of eternal life being open to men when they die, giving a "ready entrance into the kingdom of heaven," clearly proves that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, was held by the writers. One John, an Egyptian christian, is said to have lost his eyes, and to have been crippled in his limbs by the tortures he endured; yet such was his memory, that he could repeat whole books of the Sacred Scriptures. In speaking of having seen him and heard him address an assembly, our author says: "I seemed to behold an evidence, and solid proof in facts, that not he who appear in the external form is the real man, but in truth that which is in the soul and mind. For he, though mutilated in body, exhibited the greater power."—P. 177. This language indicates a belief in the existence of the soul, as something different from the body, which is not affected by its decay.

We will now give our concluding extract from Eusebius. It proves clearly that the death sleep of the soul, was not the doctrine of the church in the times of which he wrote. On the subject of the errors of the times, Eusebius says: "But about this time, other men sprung up in Arabia, as the propagators of false opinions. These asserted, that the human soul, as long as the present state of the world exists, perished at death and died with the body, but that it would be raised again with the body

at the time of the resurrection. And as a considerable council was held on account of this, Origen, being again requested, likewise here discussed the point in question, with so much force, that those who had before been led astray, completely changed their opinions.”—P. 253.

This shows that the death sleep of the soul was never heard of in the christian church before this period, which must have been early in the third century, as Origen was born in the year 185, and died 253. The doctrine described is precisely that which is now maintained by Rev. George Storrs, and others who sympathize with his views. And it is here plain, that it was not the doctrine of the early church; that it was introduced early in the third century, refuted and abandoned. It is not necessary to pursue this point further, and here we close the use we make of the testimony of Eusebius, though there are other similar passages we might quote.

SECTION V.

Direct Scriptural proof that the soul lives after the body is dead.

Before entering upon the Bible argument, it appears proper to sum up what has preceded, that it may be seen where we are, and in what particular state we carry the question into the Scriptures. The following points have been proved:

1. The doctrine, that the soul maintains a conscious existence after the body is dead, has the support of the common sentiment of mankind, and is taught by every system of religion that has been propagated in every age and land. The few who have denied it as a part of their religion, have been exceptions, and have been so few in number as not to constitute a religious system or organization.

2. The Jews in particular held this doctrine. The denial of the doctrine by the Sadducees is referred to in a manner which shows their views to have been an exception, and renders the evidence more certain that the opposite was the general doctrine, than it would have been if no allusions had been made to exceptions.

3. The early Christians most clearly believed the doctrine in question; and under the influence of their faith, confessors and martyrs bore every possible torture and joyfully died.

With these points full in view, we invite the reader to accompany us in an investigation of the subject simply as a Bible question. The fact being established beyond a doubt, that the Jews and early Christians held the doctrine for which we contend, must furnish essential aid in the interpretation of those Scriptures, which refer to the subject. The language of Christ and his apostles, must be easier understood after having arrived at a clear understanding of the sentiments held by those whom they addressed. With these remarks, we enter upon our argument founded upon the word of God.

Eccl. iii. 21. “Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?” Dr. Clark, whose knowledge of Hebrew will not be questioned, says the literal translation of this text, is thus: “Who considereth the immortal spirit of the sons of Adam, which ascendeth [*lost word*] is from above; and the spirit or breath of the cattle, which descendeth? It is downwards unto the earth, that is, it tends to the earth only.”

The following has been handed to us, by Prof. Roy, author of Roy’s Hebrew and English Dictionary, which he affirms to be a true and literal translation of the text.

“Who knoweth the spirit of the sons of Adam that ascends upward to the highest place; or even the spirit of the cattle which descends downwards into the lowest part of the earth.”

It will be seen that these translations essentially agree, and the text as it stands in our own common translation, or as here rendered, contains the following points:

1. The spirit of a man and the spirit of a brute are distinguished the one from the other, and are particularly marked as tending in different directions, so that the destiny of the one cannot be inferred from the destiny of the other.

2. The expression, “the spirit of a man that goeth upward,” clearly denotes, not only continued,

but more elevated existence, and hence it may be regarded as a proof that the spirit survives the death of the body.

Eccl. xii. 7. "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was: and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." We may test this text by a common sense rule, and learn its meaning, as we may most other texts. Suppose the text was not in the Bible; and suppose further, that the community were divided in opinion, some believing that the soul dies with the body, and others that it lives in the spirit world after the body is dead; and suppose still further, that a person whose opinion was unknown, should address this divided community, and should say, "Friends, you must all die, and then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it," would any one doubt that he took sides with those who hold that the soul lives after the body is dead? No one could doubt it; yea, the language would be offensive, under such circumstances, to those who deny that the soul lives after the body is dead; they would feel that the declaration was made against their views. Then are we sure that the writer of the text, believed that the soul lives after the body is dead. The writer is clearly speaking of death, and when it shall take place he declares; "then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, the spirit shall return unto God who gave it," which proves that the soul does not return to the earth with the body, as clearly as words can prove it.

Psal. xc. 10. "The days of our years are three-score years and ten; and, if by reason of strength they be four-score years, yet is their strength labor and sorrow; for it is soon cut off and we fly away." Our argument hangs upon the last clause of this text: "We fly away." No man of sense and taste would use such language, with reference to death, who believes that there is in man no living soul, which continues to live after the body is dead. Suppose the doctrine to prevail that when the body dies, the whole man dies, and that all there is of the man is laid in the grave, would any one, even by any rhetorical flourish, call dying, flying away? Never; the very figure, if it be called a figure, is borrowed from the belief that man has a soul which departs to the spirit world when the body dies; this belief alone could suggest the idea of saying that men fly away when they die.

Matt. x. 28. "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.

Luke xii. 4. 5. "Be not afraid of them that kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do; but I forewarn you whom ye shall fear; fear him, which after he hath killed, hath power to cast into hell." These texts are sufficient to settle the question, if we put a plain common sense construction upon the language. The following points are perfectly clear:

1. The body and soul are not the same. They are spoken of as distinct matters.
2. Men are capable of killing the body. This refers to the persecutions which were to come, in which they should be put to death. Men did kill their bodies.
3. Men are not able to kill the soul. This is most clearly asserted. The first text asserts that they "are not able to kill the soul," and the second asserts that, "them that kill the body have nothing more that they can do;" which is the same as to assert that they cannot kill the soul.
4. From the above, it follows that the soul does not die with the body. If the soul does not live without the body, or after the body is dead, then persecutors could kill the soul, the very thing which Christ affirmed they could not do. If the soul dies with the body, then to kill the body is to kill the soul; but men can kill the body, but cannot kill the soul; and, therefore, the soul does not die with the body. We are certainly unable to see how this argument can be answered with any show of plausibility.

Matt. xvii. 3. "And behold, there appeared unto them Moses and Elias talking with him." The force of the argument drawn from this text, depends upon the circumstance that those who had been long dead, appeared on this occasion. So far as Elias is concerned, we admit there is little or no force in it, since he was translated, and did not die, but so far as Moses is concerned, the argument is conclusive. The death of Moses is described in Deut. xxxiv. 5, 6. "So Moses the servant of the Lord died there in the land of Moab, according to the word of the Lord. And he buried him in a valley in the land of Moab, over against Bethpeor: but no man knoweth of his sepulchre unto this day." Moses then died, and was buried, and yet he appeared upon the mount, and talked with Christ, nearly fifteen hundred years afterwards. To assume, as

some have, that the soul of Moses died with his body, and that he was raised again, as all will be, at the resurrection, is without foundation. There is not the slightest proof to sustain the assumption. The fact, then, that one whose body is proved to have been dead and buried, afterwards appeared and conversed, is clear proof that the soul lives after the body is dead.

Matt. xxii. 31, 32. "But as touching the resurrection of the dead, have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." See also Mark xii. 27, and Exodus iii. 6, from whence the quotation is made. We are aware that it will be said that this text speaks only of the resurrection of the body, and not of the conscious existence of the soul while the body is dead. This is not true, the expression, "God is not the God of the dead, but of the living," clearly refers to the life of the soul after the death of the body, because it is applied to those whose bodies were, at the time, dead. The argument may be stated thus: God is not the God of the dead, but of the living; but God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and therefore they must be living. But the bodies of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, were dead, and therefore it must have been their souls that were living. This certainly is the most rational construction which can be put upon the language; and that it is most in harmony with the grand design of our Lord, which was to refute the Sadducees and establish the doctrine of the resurrection, will appear from the following considerations:

1. The Sadducees were materialists, and denied the existence of spirits, as well as the resurrection of the body. These two ideas were linked together in their views, to stand or fall together. To sweep their theory away, Christ included both branches, but more particularly the existence of the soul after the death of the body, by which he removed their greatest objection to the resurrection of the body, and laid the foundation for it, by establishing the separate existence of the soul.

2. It was necessary for Christ to establish the separate existence of the soul, as he did, in order to prove the resurrection of the body, in a discussion with the Sadducees. There can be no resurrection, unless the soul maintains its conscious existence during the interim, and as the Sadducees denied this, he had to prove it to lay the foundation on which to build the resurrection of the body. The identity of man is to be looked for in the soul, and not in the matter that composes the body, and the only reliable evidence of identity, is our own consciousness; hence if consciousness cease at death, upon the principle that the mind dies with the body and returns to dust with it, a link is broken in the chain of our existence, and the man this side of death, can never be joined to the man beyond the resurrection. The mind ceases to exist upon the principle we oppose. When a person dies, if the mind is only the brain, or a function of the brain, as an individual once said to the writer, then it dies and ceases to exist. There is then no mind after the person is dead. The brains may be taken out and the watery part be evaporated, and the solid reduced to powder and preserved, or thrown to the winds, but no one would say that what had been evaporated and lost amid the world of waters is the mind. Nor will any one pretend that the powder preserved or thrown to the winds, is mind, or that it approaches to mind, any more than any other dust of the same amount, which may be taken from the earth anywhere between the poles. There is then no mind after the person is dead, and the mind having ceased to exist, there can be no resurrection of mind; if mind exists again it must be a new mind, a new creation, and not a resurrection, and such a being must date his existence from such re-production, and can never be linked with some other mind that once existed, but which ceased to exist. The theory we oppose asserts that mind or intelligence is the result of organization, and hence, when the organization ceases, the mind must cease to exist. Should the same particles of matter be organized into a thinking machine, a thousand years afterwards, it would not, it could not be the same mind, for identity does not lie in the particles of matter, but in the conscious mind; and this new mind cannot, by memory or consciousness, ally itself to the former being which was, and which ceased to be, a thousand years before.

Let us take another view of the same point. Some of the martyrs were burned to ashes, and the ashes were then gathered up and scattered upon the waters of the rivers or ocean, so as to prevent a resurrection, as the heathen persecutors supposed. Now, upon the supposition that the mind is a property of matter, the mere result of organization, where is the mind of one of those martyrs now. It has no existence, and has had none since the hour when the body was burned. The fluid of the body that was burned exists somewhere in the universe of waters; it may have a thousand times ascended in vapor, and fallen in dew and

rain: it may have floated in the clouds, it may have flowed from the fountain, run in the stream, and mingled in the ocean; it may have formed the sap of trees and plants, and it may have been repeatedly drunk by men and beasts. So with the solid part of the body that was thus burned; the ashes may have been washed away by ten thousand waters, and blown away by ten thousand winds; it may have fattened the soil, been absorbed in growing plants, and entered into the composition of other animal bodies. In this state of things the particles of matter are not the mind of the person that was burned. Nor are these floating particles of matter the body of the martyr that was burned. The human body is an organism, but these particles of matter are not an organism, any more than the dew drop that trembles upon the spray, or the dust that cleaves to our feet. These particles of matter are no more a man, than the dust of the ground out of which God formed the body of Adam, was a man, before God laid his plastic hand upon that dust. When the martyr was burned, the man ceased to be, according to the theory we oppose, and everything pertaining to man, which distinguishes him from the common dust of earth and the common water of the ocean, ceased to be; certainly so, unless his soul lives in the spirit world, as we suppose. These facts are so plain, that it is folly for any one, Christian or Infidel, to pretend to deny them. We insist, then, that there can be no resurrection, if the mind does not live after the death of the body, to preserve a continuous being, whose consciousness shall extend back to the commencement of being. God can at the end of the world, produce as many beings as have been, and as have died, but they will not be the same beings. As there was no man, no mind, during the interim between the burning of the martyr and this reproduction of being, consciousness cannot extend back beyond this reproduction, or commencement of this new being. To say that consciousness can extend through these thousands of years of non-existence, and identify itself with some one that once existed, but which ceased to exist, is to say that the mind can be conscious of time during which it does not itself exist, which is the same as to say that nothing can be conscious of something or that something can be conscious of nothing. If the new organism be composed of the same particles of matter, admitting this to be possible with God, it will not relieve the difficulty, for conscious identity and responsibility do not depend upon the presence of the same particles of matter, but upon the sameness of mind; it is the mind that constitutes the man, and not the bones and fat, and the lean flesh, which are ever varying; and the mind has ceased to be, as has been shown. The mind is not, and cannot be conscious of the presence of the same particles of matter at different periods, and hence the presence of the same particles of matter in the new organism, cannot, through the consciousness of the mind, prove identity with some being that once existed, and ceased to exist five thousand years ago. Nothing is, therefore, gained by supposing the presence of the same particles of matter in the resurrection body. As identity or personal sameness does not depend on the presence of the same particles of matter, but upon the sameness of mind, there can be no resurrection which will link the post mortem being on to the ante mortem being, without preserving consciousness during the period that elapses between death and the resurrection. This state of facts rendered it necessary for Christ to prove that the soul lives after the body is dead, in order to refute the Sadducees, which he did by showing that God was the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, who were dead, and then affirming that he is not the God of the dead but of the living; per-consequence, though the bodies of the patriarchs were dead, their souls were alive. This maintenance of conscious being during the intermediate state, linked Abraham beyond the resurrection, with Abraham dwelling in tents and tabernacles with Isaac and Jacob, heirs of the same promise, and laid the foundation for the resurrection, and refuted the Sadducees beyond their power to reply. We have elaborated this subject at this point, because it is important to the general subject, and because it essentially belongs to a clear and full exposition of the text under consideration. We will now sum up our argument based upon the text, by stating the following points, which we claim to have made plain:

1. The Sadducees not only denied the resurrection of the body, but the existence of spirits, insisting that death is the utter extinction of being.
2. To refute this denial of the resurrection of the body, and establish the fact of a future existence, which shall involve the responsibilities of this life, the chain of consciousness, which is the only sure

proof of identity, must be maintained unbroken between our present and future existence.

3. To maintain this connecting link of conscious identity between our present and future existence, the soul or mind must maintain a conscious existence after the body is dead, and during the whole period of the intermediate state.

4. To prove this vital point of unbroken consciousness, connecting our present with our future being, Christ quoted the words of Jehovah: "I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob", and then added on his own authority: "God is not the God of the dead but of the living;" per-consequence, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are living, though their bodies are dead, and the only, and irresistible conclusion is, that the soul or mind does not die with the body, but lives after the body is dead.

Luke xvi. 22, 23. "And it came to pass, that the beggar died and was carried by angels into Abraham's bosom. The rich man also died, and was buried: And in hell he lifted up his eyes, being in torments, and seeth Abraham afar off; and Lazarus in his bosom."

It is not necessary to discuss the question, whether this is a literal narrative, or a parable, as it fully answers the purpose of our argument in either case. If it be a literal narrative, it clearly proves that the soul lives after the body is dead. If it be a parable, it must still be founded upon the fact that the human soul does live after the body is dead, otherwise it would be false and deceptive. When a parable has the form of a narrative, though the narrative may not have transpired, it must be what is likely to take place, otherwise it will have no force, or it will mislead. This representation of the rich man and Lazarus, be it parable or fact, clearly inculcates the doctrine that souls live after the body is dead. This it does in three particulars.

1. It represents Lazarus as having a conscious existence after he died; he died, and his soul doubtless "was carried by angels into Abraham's bosom."

2. "The rich man also died, and was buried: And in hell he lifted up his eyes, being in torments." He then had a conscious existence after he was dead and buried.

3. The text represents Abraham also, as alive in the spirit world, where good people go when they die. This makes a clear case that Christ taught the doctrine that death is not the extinction of conscious existence. It is worthy of remark, that the word rendered hell in this text, is not gehenna, which is used to denote the final place of punishment for the wicked, but hades, which denotes the place of separate spirits, good or bad, during the intermediate state.

Luke xxiii. 42, 43. "And he said unto Jesus, Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom! And Jesus said unto him, verily I say unto thee, to-day shalt thou be with me in paradise."

Verse 46. "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit: and having said this, he gave up the ghost." We consider these two texts together, because we believe they have a mutual bearing upon each other. This text is as clear a proof of the conscious existence of the soul, after the death of the body, as could well be furnished in the use of language. A few remarks will be sufficient on this plain subject.

1. It cannot be pretended that Christ labored under any mistaken views, as to the prospective condition of himself, or that of his petitioner, nor of the state of the dead in general.

2. They were at the time about to die, and both did die in a few moments after. 3. At this moment of death, the petitioner asked to be remembered, and Jesus answered, "to-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." This, under the circumstances, was clearly a promise of being with Christ in paradise after death, and on that same day. This promise did not relate to their bodies, for they did not both go to the same burial place. And if the soul dies with the body, it could not relate to the soul. Paradise, in this text, can mean nothing more nor less than a place of happiness, and here it necessarily means happiness after death. What else can it mean in this connection? In the Greek, it signifies a garden, or a place enclosed for pleasure, hence, in the Greek version of the Old Testament, the Garden of Eden is rendered Paradise. But it can mean no literal garden here, for the thief was conveyed to no garden, nor can we suppose that his petition concerned the disposition to be made of his body after he was dead, and hence the promise did not relate to the place of his burial, but to the state of his soul, which did not die. "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." Here was the promise of being with Christ, as well as being in paradise; and having made the promise, Christ said, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit, and gave up the ghost." Christ's soul, or

ghost, which he commended into the hands of his Father and gave up, did not die with his body, and hence, it was with it that the thief had the promise of being in paradise. It must mean, therefore, a place of happiness after death. That the New Testament writers use the word paradise in the sense of heaven, is too plain to be disputed. The word occurs, we believe, only three times, including the text under consideration. The next place is II. Cor. xii. 4. "How that he was caught up into paradise," &c. In the second verse, what is here called paradise, is called "the third heaven." This leaves no doubt that the word paradise is used in the sense of heaven. The other text in which the word occurs, is Rev. ii. 7. "To him that overcometh, will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God." Here again the word paradise is used in the sense of heaven. We have, then, a clear case before us; Christ promised the dying thief that he should be with him in paradise on that same day, but after death; and as the word signifies a place of happiness, it is certain that both the mind of Christ and the pardoned thief lived after the body was dead.

Acts vii. 59. "And they stoned Stephen, calling upon God, and saying, Lord Jesus receive my spirit." There can be no question that Stephen was under the influence of inspiration at the time he commended his spirit to Christ, for in the 56th verse he said, "I see the heavens opened, and the son of man standing on the right hand of God." Thus did the martyr, with heaven full in view, commend his spirit to Christ, saying, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." A clearer proof could not be offered of the existence of the spirit after the death of the body. Mr. Grew, in a pamphlet in which he labors to prove the death sleep of the soul by "spirit" in this text, understands life, and urges that Stephen committed his life to Christ, to be restored at the resurrection, and then affirms that it does not prove "that the life is a distinct substance, susceptible of consciousness without the material organization." Such reasoning can only prove the weakness of the cause it is designed to sustain. In the first place, it is a violation of common sense, to render the text life instead of spirit, in the common meaning of the word life as applied to the body; for if there is no life in man, except what belongs to the material organization, and what can have no separate existence from the body, there was nothing to commend to Christ, nothing for Christ to receive. When the body died, life became extinct, it was not taken by Christ, nor was it preserved any where, it ceased to exist upon Mr. Grew's theory, and hence his own theory renders the prayer of Stephen an absurdity. How could the martyr say, "Lord Jesus receive my spirit," if he had no spirit, which did or could exist separate from the body? The language implies, first, an act of reception on the part of Christ, and secondly, something to be received and preserved; but if the whole man perishes at death, no act could be required at death, on the part of Christ, and there could be nothing to receive, either life or spirit.

Rom. viii. 35, 38, 39. "Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Shall tribulation, or distress, or persecution, or famine, or nakedness, or peril, or sword? For I am persuaded, that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." The simple point in this text is, that death cannot separate Christians from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus. This proves, beyond the reach of contradiction, that death is not the extinction of conscious existence. Love towards God cannot be exercised, neither can the love of God be enjoyed, only by a rational being, possessing reason, affections, and consciousness. If, therefore, death be the extinction of the mind, as clearly as it is of the organism of the body—if the soul dies, involving a loss of mental and moral life, as clearly as the death of the body involves a loss of animal life, death does separate from the love of God, and Paul, who perpetuated the declaration, has himself already been separated from the love of God for almost two thousand years, and righteous Abel has been separated from the love of God nearly six thousand years. It will avail nothing, to pretend in reply, that the dust of the saint may be the subject of Divine love, in some sense which will reconcile the apostle's declaration with the death-sleep of the soul, for the following reasons:

1. "The love of God in Christ Jesus our Lord," of which the apostle speaks, is no doubt reciprocal, acting upon a rational soul, with affections capable of receiving and returning love. But the theory we oppose allows of nothing, after death, capable of receiving, or enjoying, or returning love.

2. There is nothing, worthy of the love of God in Christ Jesus, remaining of the brightest saint on

earth, after death, if the soul dies with the body. It is important to understand what there is for God to love after death, according to the theory we oppose. We insist there is nothing, but common earth, water and air, which mingles with the other earth, water and air of this creation. The theory denies that man has a soul, which is distinct from, and which forms no part of his body; and, of course, it assumes that mind is the result of organization, and that intelligence is a property of matter, a function of the brain. This being the case when organization ceases, as it does in decomposition, the mind ceases to exist, is annihilated. If it be a function of the brain, it must cease to exist at death, for the brain has no function after death. As shown in remarks upon Matt. x. 28, man ceases to be man at death, the body ceases to be a human body, it is no more a human body than any other matter, and the mind has no existence. There is nothing for God to love more than any dust of the street, or any water of the ocean. The love of God must pertain to mental and moral qualities, but the theory we oppose allows of no mental or moral qualities after death, and of course there can be nothing after death, which can be the object of the love of God in Christ Jesus, and the conclusion is irresistible, that death does separate from the love of God. But the apostle affirms that death cannot separate us from the love of God, and therefore, death does not dissolve our intellectual and moral nature.

It only remains to apply the words of the apostle, and show by what a variety of forms of expression he sets forth the main truth upon which our argument depends. He enumerates "tribulation, distress, persecution, famine, nakedness, peril and the sword." These are only so many forms of death. Famine kills and the sword kills, and yet these cannot separate from the love of God. He then declares his persuasion that neither life nor death can separate us from the love of God. To this he adds, "angels, principalities and powers," by which he includes the inhabitants or agencies of both worlds, comprehending what is after death as well as what is before death. He then adds, "things present and things to come," including all before death, and all after death. He then adds, "nor height nor depth," by which he includes all space, showing that there is no place above or below, in time or in eternity, which can separate Christians from the love of God. And finally, lest some conceivable power, agency or being, should be thought not to be included, he says, "nor any other creature," which includes every possible being or agency except God, since everything, but God, must be a creature. The argument then is conclusive, for as the Christian cannot, by any time, place, agency or power, be separated "from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord;" and as to be the object of the love of God involves conscious existence, it follows that Christian men at least will not lose their conscious existence through death or any other means; the mind therefore must live after the body is dead.

II. Cor. v.1, 6, 8. "For we know, that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, a house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens. Therefore we are always confident, knowing that while we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord; we are confident, I say, willing rather to be absent from the body and to be present with the Lord." The whole of the apostle's reasoning from the first to the ninth verse, appears designed to prove and illustrate the future conscious existence of the human soul, in a disembodied state; but the three verses we have quoted, are sufficient to answer the purpose of the argument. In these verses the apostle sets forth the doctrine in question in several different forms.

1. He asserts the grand fact, that after death we have a building, a house; that is, a home in heaven. "Our earthly house of this tabernacle" means the body, for in the sixth verse, dwelling in it is called being "at home in the body." By this tabernacle being "dissolved," we can understand nothing more nor less than death. The force of the apostle's language then, is this, when we die, when the body is dissolved in which the soul now lives, it will live without the body in heaven. Thus does the apostle most clearly teach, that the soul does not die with the body.

2. The apostle asserts the same doctrine, by asserting that, to be "at home in the body" is to be "absent from the Lord." That the apostle enjoyed the presence of the Lord, in some sense, cannot be denied; but it came so far short of what he expected when he left the body, that he called it absence from the Lord. While the earthly tabernacle of the body stood, and he was at home in it, it shrouded the soul and

prevented it from entering into that visible and sensible presence of the Lord, which it would enjoy when the tabernacle should dissolve, and leave the soul unencumbered amid the scenes of the spirit world. If the soul dies with the body, then to be at home in the body would not be absence from the Lord, but the only possible means of enjoying any degree of the divine presence.

3. The apostle more directly and fully asserts the conscious existence of the soul after death, by asserting, that to be “absent from the body,” is to be “present with the Lord.” This he asserts as a matter of choice, as a preferable state, to be absent from the body, and be present with the Lord. This language cannot be explained on any other principle than that the apostle believed and taught that when Christians die, they enter more fully into the presence of God than while they live. If the doctrine of the death-sleep of the soul be true, if death be the extinction of conscious existence, there is no such thing as being absent from the body about which the apostle talks; and considering the expression figuratively, as denoting death—and it can refer to nothing else—being absent from the body, is so far from being present with the Lord, that it cuts us off from all communion with God, and throws us beyond the jurisdiction of his moral government.—Paul must have been a strange reasoner to have called this being present with the Lord.

II. Cor. xii. 2, 3, 4. “I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago, (whether in the body, I cannot tell; or whether out of the body, I cannot tell: God knoweth;) such an one caught up to the third heaven. And I knew such a man, (whether in the body, or out of the body, I cannot tell: God knoweth;) how that he was caught up into paradise.”

A few remarks only, will be necessary on this text. We believe it is agreed, by common consent, that Paul here speaks of himself. Nor can there be any doubt as to the reality of the vision; the apostle expresses no doubt on this point, but speaks of it as certain. But there is a point upon which he has doubts, and that is, whether it was in the body, or out of the body, that he was caught up to paradise. Which was the fact, he could not tell. From this we learn two important facts.

1. The body and mind are two distinct things. If there is no soul, no mind, no conscious existence only what is a part of and inseparable from the body, Paul must have known that it was in the body, and not out of the body, that he was caught up to the third heaven.

2. We are sure that the soul or mind is capable of existing, of going to heaven, and of hearing unspeakable words without the body. No one can doubt that Paul understood the truth on the subject; if the soul cannot subsist as a rational being, without the body, he must have known it; but he did not know that it could not, or he would have known that it was not out of the body that he went to paradise and heard what he did. If then, Paul anywhere and at any time, taught that the soul cannot live without the body, he taught what he did not know, for if he had known it, he would have known that he did not go to heaven without his body. Assuming that Paul did understand the truth concerning the soul, as he did not know that the soul cannot subsist without the body, he must have known that it could, for the one or the other must be true. If then, he knew that the soul could sustain a conscious existence without the body, this is what he taught, so far as he taught anything on the subject, and this accounts for the many allusions to the subject in his writings. Those who deny that man has any mind or soul which can exist without the body, assume to know more than Paul did, for if they know the truth of their doctrine, they know that it was in the body, and not out of the body, that Paul was caught up to heaven, a thing which he declares he could not tell. What a pity some of our modern divines, with their new doctrines concerning the soul, had not been there to have instructed the apostle, and solved his doubt!

Eph. i. 10. “That in the dispensation of the fulness of times, he might gather together in one, all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are in earth: even in him.” We are aware that some commentators, who are entitled to much consideration, understand, by things in heaven and things in earth, Jews and Gentiles, but this matters not with those who advocate the death-sleep of the soul, as they repudiate all those writers who are designated as standard authors. If the above view be correct, the text proves nothing material to our purpose, but we prefer another exposition, which also has its advocates, and which is more in accordance with the common use of language, and more simple. It is this: the text refers to the accomplishment of the gospel plan, which will end in the gathering together of all the saved in Christ, in one triumphant church or family. This is not yet done, nor does the text imply that it is accomplished, or

that the fulness of time has yet come. The thing is in process of being accomplished, and when all the saints get home, after the final judgment, it will be finished.—But while the process is yet going on, the parties to be gathered, are those “which are in heaven and which are in earth.” Those in heaven, denote the saints who had lived and died, and whose souls were in heaven; and those on earth, those who then lived on earth, and who might yet live on earth. If this exposition be correct, the text proves that the soul goes to inhabit the spirit world when the body dies, as clearly as it could be proved. We give the text and the exposition, because we so understand it, and not because we consider it essential to our argument, for there is enough without it. It appears analogous to, and is strengthened by the text which follows, and concerning which there can be no doubt.

Eph. iii. 15. “Of whom the whole family in heaven and earth is named.” This clearly makes one family of those in heaven and those on earth, and if a part of the common family to which we belong, have already got to heaven, or have become inhabitants of the spirit world, the question is settled, that death is not the extinction of conscious existence.

Phil. i. 21, 23, 24. “For to me to live is Christ, and to die is gain. For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart and be with Christ; which is far better: nevertheless to abide in the flesh is more needful for you.” In this text the apostle assumes, that immediately after death he should be with Christ. He represents himself as under the influence of two conflicting motives, drawing him in different directions, or producing different desires. These are, first, a desire to depart at once and be with Christ, which he considered far better for himself, by which death would be rendered gain; and secondly, a desire to live longer in the world, for the sake of the benefit he might be to the church, which was needful for them. Between these two, he was in a strait, which supposes but one of the two things in the alternative can be obtained; but if the apostle had believed that the soul dies with the body, there could have been no such alternative presented to his mind. His choice was between dying then and being with Christ, and living longer to serve the church; but if the soul dies with the body, Paul is not with Christ yet, and hence there could have been no possibility of such a strait as he represents, for, in that case, abiding in the flesh for the good of the church, could not have delayed the period when he should be with Christ, one hour. He could have lived and labored a hundred years longer, and then have been with Christ just as soon as though he had died that moment. There can be no doubt then, that Paul really expected to be immediately with Christ when he died; that in proportion as his labors were protracted before death, would the time be put off when he should be with Christ, and that as his period of labor was cut short by an earlier death, would the period be shortened which intervened between him and Christ; and yet this could not have been the case, had he believed that the soul died with the body. Mr. Grew says, upon this passage: “The apostle does not say, that he expected to be with Christ immediately on his departure” We reply, the apostle most certainly does say that very thing in effect. He says he has “a desire to depart and to be with Christ.” He has a desire to depart, as a means; to be with Christ, as an end. Now he could not have had a desire to depart for the sake of being with Christ, unless he “expected to be with Christ,” in consequence of, or as a result of his departure. Such effort to turn aside texts from their natural force and meaning, only prove how hard the theory sought to be sustained is pressed by them.

Rev. vi. 9. “I saw under the altar, the souls of them that were slain for the word of God, and they cried with a loud voice,” &c. This text is sufficient of itself to prove the conscious existence of the soul after the death of the body. There is no way to evade the conclusion. The most likely way to be attempted, is, by saying that it was only a vision, and therefore does not describe literal facts. We admit that it was a vision, and this only can make the fact a literal one. There is no way in which souls can be seen only by some spiritual vision. The writer says at the commencement: “I was in the spirit on the Lord’s day.” And again, he says: “I looked, and behold a door was opened in heaven” He then heard a voice saying: “come up hither and I will show you things which must be hereafter.” And adds immediately, “I was in the spirit,” &c. Here commenced the vision in which he saw the souls of the martyrs. If the vision did not give him a matter of fact view of the souls of such as had been slain, it was a false vision, and none of the representations can be relied upon. But the subject is perfectly free from the obscurity which hangs over most of this book.

1. The subject is a plain one, it being well understood that many had been slain for the word of God.

2. The vision upon its very face, professes to bring John within view of the scenes of the spirit world. He saw a door open in heaven, and was called up to receive representations of things yet to come.

3. In this state he “saw the souls of those who had been slain for the word of God, and for the testimony of Jesus.” After all this, shall we be told that the martyrs had no souls, which existed separate from their bodies, and after their bodies had been devoured by wild beasts, or consumed in the fire? We may be so told; we have been; but before we can believe it, we must have far less confidence in the teachings of the Scriptures than we have at present. No construction can be put upon the passage, which will invalidate its evidence in support of an intermediate state, in which the souls or spirits of those who have died, live without their bodies. The vision itself is based upon the fact that souls exist in a disembodied state. Admit the truth of this doctrine, and you may even conceive of a vision, for some wise purpose, in which such souls are exhibited as representatives or symbols, when no real souls are present; but deny the existence of souls, and such a vision becomes false and deceptive. The vision was from God, and there can be no doubt that John saw something which he calls the souls of the martyrs. If there were no real souls there, what did he see? What did God show him, which he calls souls, if there are no such things as souls? Does some one say that it was a mere representation of souls? But what could be a representation of souls, if there are no such things as souls? What form or figure would represent that which has no existence? There must have been a design in the vision, and as John most clearly saw something which he calls souls, if we deny the existence of souls, we must suppose that God introduced the mere appearance or image of nothing, and that this form of nothing was introduced to represent something. Such is the absurdity in which those must be involved, who deny the existence of souls in a disembodied state. In every instance of symbolical representations found in the Scriptures, real existences are employed as symbols, as beasts are introduced to represent kings and governments, and hence to make a symbolical representation of what John saw, we must admit the existence of souls in a disembodied state.

We have now done with this branch of our argument, and trust that we have proved that the human soul does not die with the body. We might have introduced a number more texts of the same import as those we have quoted, but we deemed it unnecessary; if what we have adduced are not satisfactory, more of the same class would not be, for we do not pretend that there are any more to the point than some we have quoted. By limiting the number of texts, we have been able to indulge more freely in our remarks, and trust we have succeeded in making such an application of each text, as will be understood and appreciated by the intelligent and candid reader, with whom we leave the question to be decided, after reading our arguments, whether the lamp of human intelligence goes out in utter darkness in the hour of death, or only passes away from this state of being, where it sees and shines “through a glass darkly,” to the spirit’s home, where they shall meet face to face, see as they are seen, and know as they are known.

CHAPTER III.

THE WICKED WILL NOT BE ANNIHILATED, OR CEASE TO
EXIST, AT, NOR SUBSEQUENTLY TO, THE GENERAL RESURRECTION.

SECTION I.

An argument founded upon the immateriality of the soul, and its conscious existence between death and the resurrection.

We proceed with our argument upon the supposition that two points have been proved, viz: first, that the soul is an immaterial spirit, which is not matter, and which forms no part of what is usually called the body; and, secondly, that it exists without the body from death to the resurrection. If these two points have not been proved, we have no hope of sustaining the present proposition, upon the principle that nothing can

be proved; for we have made them as plain and certain as we can hope to make any scriptural doctrine. To our own mind the doctrine of the fall, the death of Christ for the redemption of sinners, the resurrection of the body, and a general judgment, cannot be made more certain. After the extended arguments that have been offered on these points, we will proceed to inquire into the bearing which they have upon the present question.

1. It follows that the soul is not mortal in its own nature, tending to dissolution by the action of the elemental laws of its being. The body will, by the operations of its own elemental laws, come to maturity, decay and die; but such cannot be the case with the soul, from what has already been proved. If the soul be an immaterial spirit it will not grow old, decay and die of itself. Again, as it has been proved that the soul survives the death of the body, and lives in a separate state for thousands of years, the argument is pretty conclusive that it will never die, unless God, its Maker, withdraw from it his creative and upholding power which gave it being.

2. It follows, from what has been proved, that the soul cannot be annihilated by those agencies which destroy the body, and to which allusion is made in the Scriptures, in describing the punishment of the wicked. Those who contend that the wicked will be annihilated, rely upon those Scriptures to prove the point, which affirm that the wicked shall be burned up, but this cannot be their meaning. If the soul is immaterial it cannot be burned up by such fire as consumes the body. Moreover, some of the martyrs were burned up; that is, their bodies were burned to ashes, the ashes scattered upon the waters, and yet these martyrs were not annihilated; their souls still exist, and will continue to exist in the intermediate state until the general resurrection. This has been proved, and from it it follows that the soul cannot be burned up, in the sense of ceasing to exist.

3. From what has been proved, it follows that the soul will exist forever, unless it can be shown that God will destroy it by some means or some agency of which we have yet no knowledge. The effect of this on the main argument is this: it throws the burden of proof, on those who deny the immortality of the soul and maintain that it will cease to exist after the resurrection. We have proved that it is immortal in its own nature, that it will never die of itself, and hence that it must exist forever, unless it can be proved that God will annihilate it, that is, cause it to cease to exist. Here we might rest our argument, and call for the proof that God will annihilate the wicked, at, or subsequently to, the resurrection. The most natural conclusion from the premises is, that the soul will exist forever. But we will not stop at this point, but will proceed to prove by additional arguments, what is so clearly a consequence of the positions already sustained, after which we will review the arguments by which annihilationists attempt to support their doctrine.

SECTION II.

The Penalty of the Law is not Annihilation, but conscious suffering.

The real question at issue is, what is the penalty of the law? Or, in other words, what is the punishment which the law of God inflicts for sin? If we can obtain the right answer to this question, we shall know whether or not the wicked will be annihilated; for it may be presumed that no one will contend for annihilation, only upon the supposition that the loss of existence is the penalty of the law. If annihilation is the penalty which the law inflicts for sin, then those who are not saved by Christ will be annihilated; but if the penalty of the law is not annihilation, then it cannot be maintained that sinners will be annihilated. What then is the penalty of the law? It must be one of the three following things:

First, annihilation without conscious suffering; or, secondly, it must be conscious suffering and annihilation combined, consisting in part of both; or, thirdly, it must be conscious suffering without annihilation.

It will not be denied that the penalty of the law must be found in one or the other of these propositions; we will therefore examine them separately, and see if we can determine in which it lies. If it can be proved not to be in either of the first or second, it must follow that it is contained in the third.

The Penalty of the Law is not Annihilation without suffering.

Is annihilation without suffering, or the endurance of other evil than the loss of existence, the penalty of the law, or the punishment due to sin? We answer this in the negative, and render the following reasons in support of our answer:

1. We maintain that the simple loss of existence cannot be a penalty or punishment, in the circumstances of the sinner after the general resurrection. All punishment must consist of pain or loss; but the proposition that the penalty of the law is annihilation without conscious suffering, excludes the idea of pain, and the penalty is made to consist of loss only, the loss of existence. This, in the circumstances of the sinner, is not, and cannot be a punishment. Punishment is an evil, but to have existence taken away is not an evil, in the circumstances of the sinner. The punishment of loss supposes deprivation of something valuable, but existence is not valuable in the circumstances of the sinner, and therefore deprivation of existence cannot be a punishment. To cease to exist cannot be a punishment of loss, only so far as the existence taken away involves happiness, but the existence of sinners, who shall be such after the general resurrection, will not involve happiness, but misery, and, therefore, to cease to exist will not involve a loss of happiness, but an exemption from suffering, and cannot be a penalty or punishment. Would the continued existence of a sinner, after the general resurrection, be an advantage or benefit to him? Certainly not, unless such existence were a happy one; and hence to deprive him of that existence cannot be a punishment, unless it be first proved that sinners will be happy after the resurrection, and when that is proved no one will contend for annihilation. Keeping in mind that God's law threatens the sinner with evil, that its penalty is a curse, and not a blessing, we will state the argument in another form.

The state of sinners after the general resurrection, must be a state of prospective happiness or misery, if they should continue in conscious existence. This cannot be denied by any one, Orthodox, Universalist, Destructionist, or Infidel; conscious existence in a future state implies happiness or misery. If then at the general resurrection, sinners shall be happy, immediately or prospectively so, we admit that annihilation would be a loss. But there is nothing in the theory of the Destructionists on which to base annihilation, while its supposed subjects are yet happy, or within the reach of happiness. Suppose them to be happy, or suppose happiness to be within their reach, suppose their circumstances to be those in which they can and will seek and obtain happiness, and suppose it to be consistent with the government of God that they should thus seek and obtain happiness, upon what principle would God annihilate them? We know of none. The developments of the divine administration, as well as the declaration of God's word, show that he never seals the sinners overthrow, be it misery or annihilation, until he has progressed beyond the reach of reformation, and rendered hopeless his own restoration to holiness and happiness. Indeed, those who contend for annihilation, always place it in opposition to endless conscious suffering, and insist that it is more consistent with the benevolence of God to take away their existence, than to continue them in existence, subject to endless misery. It is then plain that annihilation is advocated, only in opposition to a miserable existence; no one contends that God will annihilate happy beings, or those whom he can render happy, consistently with the principles of his government. If annihilation takes place at all, it will be only in the case of those who would otherwise be miserable, and with such it cannot be a punishment, and therefore cannot be the penalty of the law, for that is an evil, a curse. Those who contend for annihilation, as the only means of relieving the mind of the horrible conception of attributing the infliction of endless misery to a benevolent Creator, as all do who advocate the doctrine at all—must admit that by annihilation the sinner is saved from more misery than he is deprived of happiness; so that, as a whole, he is relieved rather than injured by it. To contend for annihilation to save God from the imputation of inflicting endless misery, and maintain that it is worse than such supposed endless misery, so that it is a loss, a punishment, is too great an absurdity to be embraced by a sane mind. Annihilation, then, cannot be a punishment; it cannot be the penalty of the law; for the simple fact that punishment or a penalty inflicted, involves suffering or loss, but annihilation, under the circumstances of the case, cannot be a loss, but must be a relief. There are but three conceivable states; existence with happiness, existence with misery, and no existence or annihilation. God will never annihilate a happy existence, or an existence which would be happy but for such annihilation; and annihilation, to a being who would

otherwise exist only in misery would not be a punishment or loss; and therefore annihilation cannot be the penalty of the law, the punishment due to sin; otherwise the curse of the law, to those who alone are exposed to it, ceases to be a curse, and becomes an actual benefit, and the sinner's only hope of deliverance from a more dreadful calamity, a miserable existence. Take what view we please, annihilation cannot be the penalty of the law.

2. To suppose that the penalty of the law is annihilation without conscious suffering, would not admit of any degrees of punishment. There can be no degrees in annihilation; each and all who are annihilated, must be punished, if it be called punishment, precisely with the same amount or degree of punishment. If the penalty be annihilation, none can be punished less than what amounts to annihilation, and none can be punished more than what amounts to annihilation, and annihilation admits of no degrees.

Some have sought to avoid this difficulty by making the degrees of punishment, consist in the different degrees of loss sustained by different persons, according to their respective degrees of capacity to enjoy happiness. This would have some force in it, did annihilation stand opposed to a happy existence, but it does not, but is urged only in opposition to endless suffering, as shown above. Taking this view, as the mind that is capable of a larger degree of happiness, must also be capable of a greater degree of misery, instead of sustaining a greater loss by annihilation, he is only saved from a greater amount of suffering.

It is clear then that there can be no degrees in punishment, if it be annihilation without conscious suffering, and this must of itself be fatal to the theory. Reason teaches us that some are greater sinners than others, and justly deserve more punishment, and hence if annihilation be the punishment, some must suffer more than they deserve, and others must suffer less than they deserve. Moreover, the Scriptures teach that there will be degrees of punishment. Christ said to the Scribes and Pharisees, for a certain cause "Therefore shall ye receive the greater damnation." Matt. xxiii. 14.

"So he that knows his Master's will and does it not, shall be beaten with many stripes, while he that knows not his Master's will and does it not, shall be beaten with few stripes." See Luke. xii. 47. 48.

3. That the penalty of the law is not annihilation without suffering, is further proved by these Scriptures which teach directly that sin is punished by suffering, or conscious pain. These constitute a numerous class, but we need quote but a few.

Matt. xxv. 30. "And cast ye the unprofitable servant into outer darkness: there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth"

Luke xiii. 28. "There shall he weeping and gnashing of teeth, when ye shall see Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and all the prophets in the kingdom of God, and you yourselves thrust out." Luke xvi. 23. "And in hell he lifted up his eyes, being in torments."

Rom. ii. 8, 9. "Indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doth evil; of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile."

Luke xii. 47. "And that servant which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes." These texts prove beyond a doubt, that sin is punished with positive inflictions, and hence, the penalty of the law cannot be annihilation without conscious suffering.

SECTION III.

The same subject continued.—The Penalty of the Law is not Annihilation with conscious suffering.

Is annihilation, with suffering, the penalty of the law, or the proper punishment for sin? We take the negative of this question, and assign the following reasons in support of our position:

1. It is liable to the first objection urged against the former position, that annihilation, under the circumstances, cannot be a punishment. We need not repeat the argument further than to show its

applicability to this point. The object of the annihilationist, in combining suffering with annihilation, is to escape the two objections urged above, viz: first, that annihilation without suffering does not admit of degrees, and, secondly, that the Scriptures teach the doctrine of positive conscious suffering as a punishment for sin. If then the law inflicts pain, fitly represented by “the worm that dieth not, and the fire that is not quenched,” and which produces “weeping and wailing, and gnashing of teeth,” annihilation must be a relief and cannot be a punishment; it must be an advantage, and cannot be an evil under the circumstances. For more ample reasoning on this subject the reader is referred to what has been said under the head of annihilation without suffering; we only say enough here to show that the position under consideration is liable to the objection there urged. But this position is subject to additional objections not urged against that, some of which shall be noticed.

2. To suppose that the punishment of sin consists of suffering in part, and of annihilation in part, renders annihilation exceedingly insignificant as a punishment, supposing it to be a punishment in any degree. Supposing it to be, in part, the penalty of the law, it follows that it must be inflicted upon all who are punished in any degree. We cannot suppose a sinner to be half annihilated; hence, he must be absolutely and entirely annihilated, if annihilation be any part of the penalty of the Divine law. Take the case of two sinners, one guilty in the least degree that a person can be, and still deserve punishment, and the other guilty to the greatest extent that a sinner can be, and, so far as annihilation is concerned, they must both be punished alike. The excess of punishment which the greater sinner receives over the less guilty sinner, must be made up in actual suffering, and this must constitute its principal portion, so that annihilation is a mere tittle. One dies so soon as he is capable of knowing right from wrong—his first act of sin is his only one, and that involves as little guilt as any wrong act can, and yet for this he must be annihilated. Another lives to be a hundred years old, and fills up the entire period with crimes of the deepest dye, and goes to his retribution as guilty as a sinner can make himself in one hundred years, and he can be no more than annihilated. It is said that he suffers for his greater guilt before he is annihilated. Granted; but as there is almost no comparison between his guilt, and that of the one less guilty, who is also annihilated, so there is almost no comparison between the suffering he must endure, and annihilation; his suffering constitutes nearly the whole of his punishment. In proportion to the amount of suffering a sinner has to endure, is annihilation rendered less fearful, or rather more to be desired; and the more guilty a sinner renders himself, the less does he lose, or the more does he gain by annihilation; and the less guilty a sinner is, the more does he lose or the less does he gain by annihilation. Such absurdities and contradictions are involved by supposing the penalty of the Divine law to be composed, part of suffering, and part of annihilation. The penalty of the law is an evil, a curse, and yet this view supposes that one part of the curse of the Divine law renders the other portion desirable.

3. To suppose that the punishment of sin consists of suffering in part, and of annihilation in part, represents the penalty of the Divine law to be indefinite, confused and heterogeneous. If annihilation be the penalty of the law, even in part, it must be inflicted in every case of punishment. As shown above, the least of sinners must deserve annihilation, if it be the penalty of the law, for less cannot be deserved or received in kind, and it must be inflicted on the smallest sinner; otherwise he cannot receive all his sins deserve. This being the case, annihilation must be threatened in the Scriptures, in every text, where any degree of punishment is threatened. If the Scriptures are true in fact, when they threaten sinners with punishment, they threaten just what they deserve, both in kind and degree. If then the Scriptures, in any case, threaten punishment without threatening annihilation, sinners may deserve and receive punishment for sin without deserving or receiving annihilation, and the conclusion must be irresistible, that annihilation is no part of the penalty of the law. What confusion must it introduce, to be compelled to understand annihilation in every denunciation against sin. A few examples will be sufficient to show the absurdity of the thing.

Matt. viii. 11, 12. “Many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and with Isaac, and with Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven; but the children of the kingdom shall be cast out into outer darkness; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.” This text must mean

annihilation, if that be the final punishment for sinners. And yet every one knows that there is not a word in it that suggests the thought of annihilation. Nor does it express two things, suffering and annihilation, but one thing, being cast into outer darkness. This expression cannot mean both suffering and annihilation.

Matt. xxii. 13. "Take him away, and cast him into outer darkness; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth." This must mean annihilation, if that be the final punishment of the wicked, and yet, like the former text, it expresses but one thing, and that has no relation to annihilation.

Matt. xxv. 46. "These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal." Here are two words used to express the entire punishment of sinners, "everlasting," and "punishment." These two words must express the whole penalty of the Divine law, in this instance. Does either of them express annihilation by itself? or do they both together express it? Let us see. This is a proper text on which to test this question, as it relates most clearly to the final punishment of the wicked.

(1.) Is the idea of annihilation, or non-existence, contained in the word "punishment?" As an English word it certainly does not mean annihilation. Dr. Webster defines it thus: "Any pain or suffering inflicted on a person for a crime or offence, by the authority to which the offender is subject, either by the constitution of God or of civil society." This settles it so far as this word is concerned. But Dr. Webster derives it from the verb, to punish, and this he defines, "to pain, to afflict with pain, loss or calamity, for a crime or fault. To chastise. To reward with pain or suffering inflicted on the offender." There is then nothing in the English word punishment, to denote annihilation or loss of existence. "To afflict with loss," does not imply the loss of existence, but the loss of possession or privilege. A person annihilated, would not, in any proper sense, lose his possessions, but his possessions would lose him. The very idea of loss supposes the existence of the loser. Suppose a person to possess much property, wife, children, friends, and everything that can make a man happy, but he meets the fate of all men; he dies. And in reporting his death, will you say that the man has lost his property, his wife, children, and all his friends? Surely not; the term loss, is applied only to those who survive; they have lost him who is now dead.

Let us then look at the Greek word which is here rendered punishment, and see if that conveys the idea of annihilation. The Greek word here used is *kolasin*, and is defined thus: "Punishment; chastisement, torture, the rack; a punishing or infliction of punishment; a check, restraint, hindrance; pruning, lopping." (See Grove's Greek and English Dictionary.) Here it is seen that the word has no signification which indicates annihilation or loss of existence.

(2.) Is the idea of annihilation or non-existence found in the word "everlasting?" This cannot be, for more reasons than one. First, the word expresses perpetual duration; hence, it proves the endless existence of whatever it is applied to, rather than its annihilation or non-existence. Secondly, the same word is applied to the life of the righteous in the same verse, rendered, eternal. The word in the original is *aionion* in both cases. "These shall go away into [*kolasin aionion*] everlasting punishment, but the righteous into [*zoe aionion*], eternal life." Everlasting, and eternal, then mean the same thing in this text, and hence, if the word everlasting, as applied to the punishment of the wicked, contains the idea of annihilation, the same word applied to the righteous would make an end of their hope. Thirdly, if the punishment be annihilation, then the word everlasting, applied to it, cannot express annihilation. If the punishment is merely ceasing to exist, it is necessarily everlasting, for when a being has ceased to exist, is not, such state of non-existence is necessarily endless, unless existence can spring from non-existence; and hence, to apply the word everlasting to non-existence is to talk of everlasting nothing; for there is nought but nothing to be everlasting after annihilation. We see then that the word everlasting does not express annihilation.

(3.) Do the words "everlasting" and "punishment," associated as in the text, express annihilation? Certainly they do not, and cannot. Keep in mind, that "everlasting punishment," in this text, expresses the entire penalty of the law, involving all the punishment that sinners will ever receive under the Divine

government. The word everlasting is an adjective, and punishment is a noun, and the adjective expresses nothing concerning the nature or quality of the punishment, more than its simple duration. It simply determines that the punishment will be everlasting in point of duration, whatever it be in kind and degree. We have seen that the word punishment does not express annihilation, but only the idea of suffering of some sort, and the addition of the word everlasting, cannot add the idea of annihilation, but only the idea of the perpetuity of the suffering previously expressed.

But we are proving that the penalty of the law cannot consist of suffering and annihilation, in part of each, and we have reached a point where we may clinch the argument. Everlasting punishment here expresses the whole penalty of the law, the entire punishment inflicted for sin; and if punishment includes suffering and annihilation, then the word everlasting, being applied to the punishment, must qualify the suffering as much as it does the annihilation, and the suffering is affirmed to be everlasting just as clearly as is the annihilation. Thus is God's law made to contradict itself, by threatening sinners with a complex penalty, the parts of which are made to contradict each other. The argument of annihilationists is, that the punishment of the wicked is made up of suffering and annihilation, and that it takes both the suffering and the annihilation to constitute the entire desert of sinners; and we have shown that if it be so, the suffering must constitute far the largest portion of the sum total, as the punishment for all sin beyond the smallest offence must consist of suffering, since the smallest offence involves annihilation, if it be the penalty of the law in part or in whole. Now, this punishment; not this annihilation, but the punishment, the greater part of which is suffering, is declared to be everlasting, which involves an absolute contradiction and impossibility. We therefore conclude that the penalty does not consist of suffering and annihilation, in part of each, and insist that our proposition is sustained, that to suppose the punishment to consist of suffering and annihilation, each making up a part of the punishment, represents the penalty of the law of God to be indefinite, confused, and heterogeneous. It makes the single word, "punish," express two things at the same time, which are entirely dissimilar in nature, and makes the penalty of the law to consist of two things, which have no affinity in nature, which cannot exist together, insomuch that the very presence of the one involves the absence of the other. This is certainly making confusion confounded out of the penalty of the Divine law

(4.) To maintain that the curse of the law, or the proper punishment of sin is both suffering and annihilation, is to suppose that all the righteous suffer the penalty of the law once, and that the wicked endure it twice. The theory we oppose maintains that man has but one element in his nature, which is matter; that he has no spiritual nature or soul, which forms no part of his material organization, that when he dies the whole man ceases to exist, in the same sense, and to the full extent which we know the body ceases to exist when it dies, and decomposes or is burned up. This is what we call annihilation, it is an entire dissolution of being, a ceasing to exist, a loss of existence. According to this theory, Adam, Abel, Moses, Aaron, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob are not; they are now in a state of non-existence as much as the wicked ever will be, and some of them have been so nearly six thousand years, and all from the date of their departure out of this world. This loss of existence they insist is the punishment of sin; all the dead therefore have suffered the penalty of the law once, in as much as they have once died which is a dissolution of their being, a loss of their existence.

But they have not only lost their existence, but have also suffered all that is necessary to accomplish the dissolution of being, and have endured all the suffering and tortures that humanity can endure without being dissolved. If this loss of being then is the penalty of the law, as is maintained by the theory we oppose, all, saints and sinners, who are dead, have suffered the full penalty of the law once.

But the theory we oppose insists that at the resurrection, God will recall all these from their state of non-existence, and cause them once more to exist; that he will then render the righteous immortal, and again take away the existence of the wicked; burn them up, root and branch, so that they shall have no existence, more than they had before the resurrection. Thus do the wicked endure the penalty of the law twice, and many of them in the same way. The people of Sodom were burned up in the days of Abraham and Lot, and according to this theory, they are to be brought into existence that they may be burned up again. Much is said and written in these days, against capital punishment, but this theory represents God in the attitude that

government would be in, should it, having the power so to do, hang men, and then bring them to life for the sake of the privilege of hanging them again.

SECTION IV

The same subject Continued.—The argument Concluded.

To maintain that the penalty of the law or proper punishment of sin is both suffering and annihilation, consisting in part of each, must either fritter away the penalty of the divine law to the mere pangs of a common death, a moment's pain, or represent God unnecessarily severe and cruel, and as punishing for the sake of punishing. If loss of existence be the penalty of the law, then does reason say it involves only so much suffering as is necessary to dissolve our being. It may be presumed, that if God annihilates, or takes away the existence of the wicked as a punishment for their sin, he will have some uniform method of executing the sentence. This is believed to be by fire. All who hold that the wicked will cease to exist, insist that God will burn them up. Admitting this, the portion of suffering must be so much, and should be only so much as a person endures while he is burning to death. Understand—the theory we oppose, holds that the wicked will not be raised immortal, with undecaying natures, but that they will be raised as they now are, mortal, subject to the action of fire. As they have no souls or spiritual nature here, so they will have none in the resurrection; as they are nothing but organized matter before death, so they will be nothing but organized matter in the resurrection, and like all matter may be burned up in the common sense. Admitting then that they are to be burned up, it is not possible to see how they can suffer more than an ordinary death by fire. The pains of hell, according to this view are less than many good people have endured in this life, for they have been roasted by a slow fire, which did not burn them up as quick as the fire of the last judgment will, when the heavens shall be on fire and the elements melt with fervent heat. Some have had their flesh picked from their limbs in small pieces with hot pincers, which must cause more pain than to be burned up in a very hot fire. All this follows from the frailty of our being, on the supposition that sinners are to be raised as we now are, a material organism, subject to the action of fire and death; and unless sinners are thus raised, fire will not burn them up, and the argument is at an end. A material organism like the human body can endure but a limited amount of heat and pain without dissolving, and that amount must fix a limit to the pains of hell. Thus is the penalty of the divine law frittered away to even less than many of the martyrs endured in this world.

To escape this aspect of the subject, our annihilationists insist that the suffering of the wicked will be long and fearfully great before they cease to exist. This we insist is not possible, unless God in the resurrection should constitute man a different being from what he is in this world, so as to require the action of five, ten, fifty, a hundred, five-hundred, or a thousand years to burn him up. To say the least of this, it is without proof. There is not the slightest evidence or shadow of proof, upon the supposition that man has no spiritual nature, and that he is to be raised mortal, capable of being burned up. Upon this principle, this semi-immortal nature which is to resist the action of fire for a thousand years, or for one whole year, is a mere chimera of the brain. But we are not prepared to say that God cannot produce an organization, just such as this theory supposes, or that he could not suspend the laws of nature, so as, by his power, to hold a sinner in existence with his present organization, under the tortures of fire for a thousand years, but very strong considerations go to show that he will not do it.

1. We can see no important end to be secured by it. It is certainly not to dispose of the sinner, and place him beyond the power of further depredations upon God's moral government; for as it is insisted that death is the extinction of being, he is already disposed of, and God has only to let him be in his non-existence, and he will be harmless forever. Why should God raise the sinner that he may torture him for a time, and then send him back into non-existence?

2. It represents suffering as expiating guilt, which must do away the necessity of annihilation. If God be not cruel, and inflict suffering for its own sake, why does he not leave the sinner in non-existence, or, having raised him, why does he not annihilate him at once, without first causing him to pass through a

long and dreadful age of suffering? The only valid reason that can be given, is, that justice demands that the sinner should suffer so much, according to the degree of his guilt, before God can send him into non-existence. This implies that the suffering expiates the sinner's guilt, otherwise justice will always require him to remain under the same degree of suffering. If when the sinner has suffered a hundred years, he is just as guilty as he was when he commenced, he deserves just as much punishment as he did at the commencement, and he is no nearer the point when justice can allow of his annihilation, if it cannot allow of it at once. If the sinner is at the commencement so guilty that it would be unjust to annihilate him, then if he remains just so guilty, it will always remain unjust to annihilate him, and he must always remain just so guilty, unless his sufferings expiate his guilt, rendering him less guilty as he continues to suffer. But if suffering does expiate the sinner's guilt, rendering him less deserving of punishment as he suffers, when he has reached a point where it becomes just to annihilate him, God might, by causing him to suffer a little longer, expiate the remainder of his guilt, and render his annihilation unnecessary. If suffering does not remove the sinner's guilt, God could dispense with it by annihilating him at once, and inflict unnecessary tortures; and if it does remove the sinner's guilt, a little more of it could remove the whole of it, and God is represented as unnecessarily taking away his existence. The annihilationist may take which horn of the dilemma he pleases, either will gore his theory to death.

3. To suppose God to give to sinners an organization capable of enduring a thousand times as much suffering as his present organization, or that he will support, by his direct power, the sinners present organization, for the express purpose of having him endure a thousand times as much suffering as he could otherwise bear, will overthrow the entire foundation on which annihilationists build their theory. As has been seen in preceding arguments, they always urge their theory in opposition to endless suffering, and insist that it is the only theory which will carry them clear of this terrible doctrine. But here God is represented as supporting man's frail organization for the purpose of causing it to suffer a thousand times more anguish than it could otherwise endure, before he will allow the sinner the relief of annihilation. This suffering must be inflicted on the part of God, from a love of inflicting suffering, or from some necessity found in the principles of the divine government. If it be from the love of suffering, no one can infer from the divine goodness that endless suffering will not be most in accordance with the divine nature. If it be from some necessity found in the principles of the divine government; if there be a necessity with the divine government, for holding sinners in existence a long time, for the express purpose of causing them to suffer before annihilating them, no one can prove that the same necessity does not exist for endless suffering. Thus it the destructionist, by the carrying out of his own theory, robbed of all the support he attempts to derive from the horrors of endless punishment, and its supposed inconsistency with the divine benevolence. His own theory makes God cruel, or else it lays him under the necessity of inflicting long and terrible suffering; and if God is under a necessity of inflicting a thousand years' suffering, the same necessity may require him to inflict it longer, ad infinitum. We trust we have now proved, by a great variety of arguments, each of which is conclusive in itself, that the penalty of the law does not consist of suffering and annihilation, and we will close the general argument on this point just where we are.

The proposition is, that the penalty of the law, or the proper punishment of sin, must be annihilation without suffering; suffering and annihilation consisting in part of both; or it must be suffering, of some kind and degree, without annihilation. But it has been proved,

1. That the penalty of the law is not annihilation without suffering.

2. That it is not suffering and annihilation, consisting of both in part; and, therefore, 3. It follows that it must consist of suffering, of some kind and degree, without annihilation; and that sinners will never be annihilated, or cease to exist.

SECTION V

An argument from those Scriptures which in various ways, represent the punishment of sinners as consisting in actual suffering, and not in annihilation or loss of conscious existence.

The texts of Scripture to be introduced in this argument are numerous and various, and for the sake of greater clearness and brevity, we will classify them, and introduce only a few of each class.

1. The Scriptures employ terms to describe the punishment of sinners, which express the idea of suffering, pain and anguish. Mark ix. 43, 44. "It is better for thee to enter into life, maimed, than having two hands to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched: where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." This text clearly implies positive suffering. By the worm that dieth not, may be meant the gnawing of a guilty conscience, that painful, perpetual remorse, which sinners will experience, when they see and feel the full enormity of their sin and guilt, in their alienation from God and their exclusion from the society of the good and happy. The expression "enter into life;" confirms the idea of positive suffering, for this denotes more than continued existence. They are already in possession of life, in the sense of mere existence, and hence, if mere continued existence be meant, they do not "enter into life," but remain in life, or life remains in them. It is clear then that by entering into life, must be meant, being admitted to the joys of heaven; and, hence, to "go into hell," must mean entering upon the sufferings of hell. The expression "go into hell," implies a place, and an actual going into that place, which does not express annihilation but continued existence. A being, on ceasing to exist, goes nowhere, he is nowhere. But the strong point in the text, is the expression, "their worm dieth not." If this means remorse of conscience, as it undoubtedly does, it proves that consciousness will never become extinct, and annihilation cannot take place, for that would be the death of the worm that dieth not.

Luke xvi. 19, 31. "There was a certain rich man," &c. This whole subject proceeds upon the principle, that conscious suffering and not annihilation, is the portion of sinners in the future world. The rich man was in "torment," which implies conscious suffering. He saw Abraham and Lazarus, and was told they could not pass from one place to the other, but there is not the slightest intimation that the rich man was in the process of annihilation, or likely even to be annihilated.

Rev. xxii, 14, 15. "Blessed are they that do his commandments, that they may have right to the tree of life, and may enter in through the gates into the city. For without are dogs, and sorcerers, and whoremongers, and murderers, and idolaters, and whosoever loveth and maketh a lie." Here the punishment of the wicked is made to consist of exclusion from heaven, and of the miseries of the terrible association of evil doers which the excluded will constitute. There is not the slightest allusion to annihilation.

Rev. xiv. 11. "The smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever." We need not inquire whether or not this text strictly relates to the final destiny of sinners; it is not important to the argument; for if it does not, the representation is so clearly borrowed from it, it indicates what it will be. The point is, that the most terrible feature of punishment is the duration of torment, which necessarily implies conscious suffering, and not annihilation.

Rev. xx. 10. "Shall be tormented day and night forever and ever." This clearly teaches the doctrine of conscious suffering. If it be supposed that it is the devils, and not men, that are the subjects of this torment, it will be observed that it is in the same place where the beasts and the false prophets are, and these are men. By the beasts we understand, certain kings and rulers.

2. The Scriptures lay great stress upon the duration of the suffering, which constitutes the punishment of sinners. This point has been involved in several other positions, but it is proper to make it distinct and prominent in this place. Matt. xviii. 8. "To be cast into everlasting fire." Chap. xxv. 46. "These shall go away into everlasting punishment." Verse 41. "Depart ye cursed into everlasting fire." 2 Thes. i. 9. "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction." Rev. xiv. 11. "The smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever."

Chap. xx. 10. "Tormented forever and ever." In this argument we rely wholly upon the duration of the suffering, and not on the fact that conscious pain is expressed, as in the argument above. If annihilation were the punishment, its terror would depend upon its being an utter extinction of being, but it is made here to depend upon its duration, to express which, the strongest terms are employed which language furnishes. These terms are applied directly to the suffering. It is everlasting fire into which they are to go. But it may be said that the fire can be everlasting, and the sinner who is cast into it be very soon burned up. True, this might be the case, but is there anything more alarming in being burned up in everlasting fire, than in fire that will burn only long enough to consume us? Everlasting fire was doubtless designed to express the terribleness of the punishment, and yet it adds nothing to it, if it only burns up in the sense of terminating conscious existence, and Christ has failed to express what he obviously intended to. No matter how long the fire burns after the sinner ceases to exist, it adds nothing that need alarm him, or that can make his punishment worse. The punishment is everlasting, consisting in one case of everlasting destruction. We know that this word, destruction, is relied upon to prove annihilation, but this shall be met in another place, and fully considered. It is sufficient to say in this place that it cannot mean annihilation, from the simple fact that everlasting could not be applied as a qualification to annihilation with any good sense.—Moreover the destruction is a punishment, and this punishment is everlasting; whereas annihilation is a non-entity, and has no existence; or it is the act of reducing to the state of non-existence, and that cannot be everlasting, hence the punishment, which is called destruction, must have a positive existence, and cannot be annihilation.

3. The Scriptures describe the terrible nature of the punishment which the wicked will endure, in a manner which clearly proves it to be conscious suffering, and not merely ceasing to think and feel. Romans i. 18. "The wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men." Rom. ii. 8, 9. "Indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil." Heb x. 28-31. "He that despised Moses' law died with out mercy, under two or three witnesses: Of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy of, who hath trodden under foot the Son or God, and hath counted the blood of the covenant wherewith he was sanctified an unholy thing, and hath done despite unto the Spirit of Grace? For we know him who hath said, vengeance belongeth unto me, I will repay it saith the Lord. It is a fearful thing to fail into the hands of the living God" This whole exhibition of the impending wrath of God, impresses the mind with an idea of punishment more awful than death; more terrible than "to be slain by the sword, or to be consumed in the fire; more appalling than ceasing to think and feel. But it is said that those who reject Christ are worthy of a sorer punishment than those who died without mercy under the law of Moses. The expression, "how much sorer punishment," denotes a punishment vastly more severe. But that amounted to all the terrors of annihilation, according to the theory we oppose, hence this must be more terrible than annihilation, and that which is worse than annihilation cannot be annihilation.

4. The Scriptures associate the punishment of sinners with the existence and punishment of devils, in a manner which proves punishment to be suffering and not annihilation. That devils are disembodied spirits and inhabitants of the invisible world, we will not undertake to prove in this place; it is so clearly taught in Scriptures, that probably none with whom we have to deal on this subject will deny it. They are believed to be fallen angels, and to have fallen before this world had an existence, and still to exist bound to the judgment of the great day. 2 Peter, ii. 4. "For if God spared not the angels that sinned, but cast them down to hell, and delivered them in the chains of darkness to be reserved unto judgment." Jude 6. "And the angels which kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved in everlasting chains, under darkness unto the judgment of the great day." These texts prove the fact of fallen angels. How many of them there are we know not, but that there is a chief as leader, who is often called the devil, is certain. Matt. ix. 34. "The prince of the devils." Chap. xii. 24. "Beelzebub the prince of the devils." Chap. xxv. 41. "The devil and his angels"

That the devils are in misery and await with fear a judgment to come and greater punishment,

is also plain. Matt. viii. 29. "They [the devils] cried out, saying, what have we to do with thee, Jesus, thou Son of God, art thou come to torment us before the time?" Mark, v. 7. "I adjure thee that thou torment me not." Luke, viii. 28. "I beseech thee torment me not"—These texts prove that the devils are subjects of punishment, and are looking forward to a time of punishment, being "reserved unto judgment." The time referred to is the judgment day, when all will stand at the bar—

"Nor man alone; the foe of God and man
From his dark den, blaspheming, drags his chain, And
rears his brazen front with thunder scarr'd; Receives
his sentence and begins his hell. All vengeance past
now seems abundant grace; Like meteors in a stormy sky,
how roll
His baleful eyes! He curses whom he fears; And
deems it the first moment of his fall."

That the punishment of sinners is associated with the punishment of devils, is also very clearly taught in the Scriptures. Matt. xxv. 41. "Depart from me ye cursed into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels." I. Tim. iii. 6. "Lest being lifted up, he fall into the condemnation of the devil." Rev. xx. 10, 15. "The devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire, where the beasts and the false prophets are, and shall be tormented day and night, forever and ever. And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire."

The above texts prove, as clearly as anything can be proved in the use of words, that sinners and devils will receive their punishment together. They are clearly associated in point of time, place, and the kind of punishment they will endure; in degree there will be variations. Will it then be pretended that the devils are to be annihilated? Unless it be so contended, the doctrine of the annihilation of sinners falls to the ground. But where is the proof? The devils have survived, we cannot tell how many thousand years, since they sinned and were cast down to hell, and there is no proof that they will ever cease to exist. This strongly indicates that it is no part of the economy of God to annihilate the moral agencies he has created, but only to punish them according to the magnitude of the offences they commit.

There is one text which may be quoted to prove that the devils will be annihilated, and it is proper to notice it in this place. Heb. ii. 14, 15. "That through death he might destroy him that had the power of death; that is the devil, and deliver them who through fear of death were all their life-time subject to bondage." The stress must be laid upon the word, destroy, to prove from this text that the devils will be annihilated. We design to examine this word more thoroughly in another place, but will remark here, that whatever its meaning may be elsewhere, it cannot mean annihilation in this text. The process of proving this is very simple. The destruction of the devil, in the sense of this text, is represented as necessary in order to the deliverance of those who through fear of death were subject to bondage; and hence, the destruction must take place before the deliverance can be effected. But Christ has already delivered thousands from this bondage through fear of death. Rom. viii. 15. "For ye have not received the spirit of bondage again to fear; but ye have received the spirit of adoption, whereby we cry Abba, Father" Verses 38, 39. "For I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." See also, Gal. iv. 3-7.

Christ has then already delivered his people from bondage through fear of death, and of course he has already destroyed the devil, in the sense of the text, for that was the means leading to the end. But it will not be pretended that the devil has been annihilated, and hence it is certain that destruction, in this instance, at least, does not mean annihilation. Dr. Macknight translates the text thus: "That through death he might render ineffectual him who had the power of death, that is, the devil." The meaning undoubtedly is, that he might so counteract the influence of the devil, or take away his power, as to deliver those who were subject to bondage. The same idea is expressed in Acts xxvi. 18. "To turn them from darkness to light, and from the

power of Satan unto God” When any sinner is turned “from the power of Satan unto God, he is delivered from bondage through fear of death.

We will conclude this argument by remarking that the punishment of sinners, is associated with the punishment of devils, in point of time, place, nature and duration; and that there is no proof that the devil will ever cease to exist, that the whole weight of proof is on the other side of the question; they having survived ages on ages, as inhabitants of the spirit world, where death, in the sense of dissolution, has never been known to invade, and the conclusion is very certain that sinners are not to be annihilated.

CHAPTER IV.

OBJECTIONS AND ARGUMENTS ANSWERED.

SECTION I.

An answer to the objection that our theory of the human mind, and our method of proving its immateriality from its own phenomena, will prove that brutes have immaterial souls.

We have argued that the human mind is an immaterial spirit, from its intellectual and moral developments, such as reason, will, memory, affections and desires. These arguments are contained in the first part of this investigation, and need not be repeated here. To these arguments it has been objected that if they are sound, they prove with equal force that brutes have immaterial souls. To the objection we offer the following reply:

I. If the objection be well founded, it does not prove our arguments unsound. We shall not deny ourself a soul lest we should give one to our faithful dog. We shall not reason our own soul out of existence lest we should reason one into a brute. We would sooner embrace a theory which would elevate brutes to men, by giving them souls, than one which would degrade men to brutes, by taking away their souls. Is there anything more frightful in supposing that men and brutes are so far alike as to both have souls, than there is in supposing that they are so far alike as neither to have souls? The objector appears alarmed at the idea that a horse should be so much like a man as to have a soul; and yet he contends that a man is so precisely like a horse, as not to have a soul. We would rather a horse should have a soul, than not to have one our self. The arguments in question, prove to our entire satisfaction, the immateriality of the human soul, and if any one can prove from them that beasts have souls, we shall not do violence to the reason which God has given us to escape the consequences. But we cannot see that any such consequences follow from our arguments; we believe our arguments prove the immateriality of the human mind, without proving that beasts have souls, like the souls of men, yet did the conclusion follow, we should not shrink from the consequences. Some eminent divines have held that brutes will have a future existence, but we differ from them, and trust we shall prove before we get through, that the doctrine does not follow from our arguments.

II. The objection, if admitted, would involve the objector in precisely the same difficulty, in relation to his own theory, which he charges upon us, in view of our theory. We suppose his objection to allowing that beasts have souls, is, that it would give them a relation to the spirit world, and a future existence. This we charge back upon himself; for whether you raise brutes to a level with men, by giving them souls, or degrade men to a level with brutes, by denying that they have souls, the result, in this particular, is the same, as it is admitted on both sides that men do sustain a relation to the future world. Let it be noted that the objection is not founded upon a denial of the powers and susceptibilities of the human mind, upon which we have founded our arguments, but upon the assumption that brutes possess the same powers and susceptibilities, or that they exhibit the same mental phenomena. If brutes do not exhibit the same mental phenomena as that upon which we have based our arguments, then the arguments can prove nothing concerning brutes, and the objection

falls to the ground. If brutes do exhibit the same mental phenomena, then they must possess the same intellectual and moral character, sustain the same relation to God's moral government, and be equally entitled to a resurrection and a future existence. The objector may take which horn of the dilemma he pleases; if he takes the former, his objection falls; if he takes the latter, he involves himself in it, and must fall under it.

III. We deny that brutes ever exhibit those mental phenomena which we have made the basis of our arguments. If this can be sustained, the objection falls, and our arguments will bear the souls of men upward to the immortal world, without carrying with them the spirits of brutes that go downward to the earth. Our arguments are founded exclusively upon the intellectual and moral phenomena of the human mind, which brutes never exhibit. That brutes have some sort of mind, we admit; and that where there is mind, there is something more than matter, something superior to matter, we affirm. Some spirits are of a higher order than others, and hence the fact that brutes have minds, and per-consequence have associated with their material organization an inferior spiritual nature, neither proves them immortal, or invalidates the argument by which we have proved man's spiritual nature from his mental phenomena, and his immortality from his spiritual nature. We will now enter upon our main defence, after stating the points.

The reader will bear in mind that we have not, and do not argue that the human soul will necessarily always exist, because it is an immaterial spirit. We only argue that it may exist forever, and that it will exist forever if left to the operations of the laws of its own elemental nature, and further, that it cannot be destroyed by the action of material agents. We have not, and do not, deny that God can annihilate the human soul, we insist that he can, but we insist at the same time, that should God annihilate the soul, it would not be by an exertion of power upon it, but by simply withdrawing from it that power which created it, and which sustains it, leaving it to vanish from existence. When we say that God could do this, we mean no more than that it is physically possible; we do not believe he could do it consistently, because he has given to man a nature which sustains a relation to the future world, and the principles of his moral government require that man should meet the retributions of that world. Here then is the point, the phenomena of the human mind, upon which we have based our arguments, clearly ally man to a future state; while brutes are so clearly wanting in all those mental qualities which ally man to a future state, as to prove as clearly that they can sustain no relation to the future world. We think the argument turns on this one question. Is the intelligence of men and brutes the same in kind, the difference being only in the circumstance that a man has more of the same thing than a brute; or, is the intelligence of men and brutes essentially different in nature? We take the latter position, and upon this do we rest our main defence against the objection under consideration. We deal frankly with opponents, and admit that if the minds of men and brutes are the same in nature only differing in degree, we must yield to the objection, and give up the immortality of the human soul, or admit the immortality of brutes. So, on the other hand, if we can show that the minds of men and brutes differ essentially in nature, the objection must fall. We have now narrowed the subject down to a single point, which is the difference between human intelligence and brute intelligence. This difference, we affirm, lies not in degree, but in nature.

It is not denied that men and brutes have some things in common. They both possess sensation and perception, and brutes possess the first of these in as high a state of perfection as man; they can feel, see, hear, taste, and smell, as acutely as men. But these constitute their entire mental powers and susceptibilities, and are the basis of all the mental phenomena they exhibit. To these man has added reason, involving consciousness, will, memory, conscience, hopes and fears, which brutes have not; and these alone can constitute a moral agent, sustaining a relation to the retributions of a future state.

Sensation and perception, without reason amount only to instinct, which we admit brutes have. Instinct is that power and disposition of mind by which animals are spontaneously led to do whatever is necessary for their preservation, and the continuance of their kind, independent of

instruction and experience. This, and not reason, leads the bee to form her comb, the spider to weave his web, and the beaver to build his house; it is this that impels the infant, in whom reason is not yet developed, to draw its first nutriment with as perfect skill as it ever can, and with a skill which, in nine cases out of ten, is lost in after years beyond the power of reason to recall. But all this differs widely from reason, which distinguishes men from brutes, and we will now state some of the principal points, with their bearing on the subject.

1. Instinct never improves, while it is the very nature of reason to progress. Animals acting from instinct, perform the same acts in the same way for ten thousand generations in succession; while men, acting from reason, vary their plans, improve their skill, and push their results onward towards perfection. Reason is that faculty which discovers resemblances, compares judges and deduces conclusions. This results from what some call apperception, that is, pure thought. Animals have sensation and perception, but they never think; their mental operations are limited to the sphere of sensation and perception, while men abstract themselves from all that is external, and operate within by what is purely a thinking process; they think of things far away, of things they never saw, heard, felt, tasted or smelt; they think of thoughts, and compare thought with thought, and thing with thing. This is a mental process of which animals are clearly incapable; and it is this that lays the foundation of improvement; hence, men progress onward, and still onward to a higher destiny, while animals remain the same from age to age. Again, animal instinct never imparts to its fellow animal, the limited education it is capable of receiving from the more skillful hand of man. Some years since the gullible portions of community, gaped with wonder at the performance of a learned pig, but one learned pig never educated his fellow pig in the arts of his profession, but the human mind under the influence of the higher endowments of reason, imparts its acquisitions to fellow minds. Thus the human mind is capable of improving itself, while each can impart its own acquisitions, and receive the acquisitions of others, marking the race distinctly and undeniably as destined for, and capable of perpetual improvement, which indicates a preparation for a higher state of existence, and allies the race to some future destiny. On the other hand, as animals have not the mental elements of intellectual improvement, as none have conceived and developed philanthropic schemes for the improvement of their respective species, and as none ever have improved and broken the chain which bound them to the sphere and destiny of an instinctive brute ancestry; they are not only separated from man by a chasm so wide that no art of reasoning can link them on to human destiny, but they are distinctly marked as designed only for their present sphere, exhibiting no elements, suited to, and making no preparation for a higher destiny.

2. Men possess consciousness; brutes do not. As consciousness is that notice which the mind takes of itself, of its own operations and modes of existence, it involves a purely thinking process or reflection, which brutes cannot perform, they being only capable of sensation and perception as shown above. To explain, you may throw hot water upon a man, and a brute, and they both experience pain; this pain is called sensation. But at the same time, both learn that hot water will produce pain, and both the man and the brute will be afraid of hot water in future, wherever they meet with it. This knowledge or idea which they obtain of the quality of hot water is called perception, that is, they perceive the relation between the sensation, the pain, and the external object, hot water, that produced the sensation, otherwise they would not avoid hot water the next time they met with it. But here the brute stops, never thinking about the sensation or perception, only as they are revived by the presence of hot water; while the man will a thousand times call them up and spend seasons in thinking about them, will review all the circumstances a thousand miles from the place where it happened, and without the presence of hot water to revive the sensation and perception. This is thought or reflection, and here comes in what is called consciousness of identity. While the brute never thinks of the sensation in the absence of the place and agent that produced it, nor of the perception of the quality of hot water, only when it is present; the man reflects on the whole matter away from the place, and in the absence of the agent that produced the sensation, and is conscious of his own identity; that is, he takes notice that the mind that now thinks, is the same mind that so many years ago in such a place, by contact with hot water received such a sensation, and obtained such a perception of the

quality of the external object that produced the sensation. This is absolutely essential to a moral nature, and future accountability for present or past conduct, and as men possess it, they are allied to a future retribution; and as brutes have it not, they cannot be allied to a future retribution.

3. Men possess volition and will; brutes do not. Brutes exercise a kind of choice, as a horse prefers fresh grass to dry hay, and as an animal often exhibits obstinacy by preferring to go in one direction, rather than to be driven in another, but these are only the impulses of instinct. The will of man, which involves accountability, is a very different thing. A rational will supposes judgment a power to compare different objects which operates as motives, and to determine their comparative value. Brutes are never influenced by motives addressed to the understanding. An ox will make a choice of two bundles of hay, founded upon the sense of smell or taste; but not upon a comparison of their relative nutriment or power to sustain life, nor even upon their comparative size, for this would require reflection, comparison and judgment which constitute the elements of reason, which brutes never exhibit.

4. Men possess the power of memory, which brutes have not. We know that superficial observers often affirm that animals have memory, but it is for want of discrimination that they affirm this. They mistake mere sensation and perception for memory. A horse may fall through a bridge, and when he approaches that bridge again, or perhaps some other bridge, he will be alarmed; but this is not memory; the philosophy is this, the presence of the bridge revives the painful sensation and the perception, that the bridge produced the sensation. To remember it, would be to retain a knowledge of it, and to make it a subject of thought and reflection ten years afterwards, a hundred miles from the place and object that produced the sensation. This men do, but horses never.

A dog may be in the habit of committing depredations in the cellar, and you will not cure him by punishing him in the barn. To render punishment effectual, it must be inflicted in connection with the place where the mischief is done, or in connection with the thing injured, and then, though the animal has no memory of the transactions, beyond the mere sensation and perception, their presence revives them, and prevents a repetition of the fault.

5. Men have conscience but brutes have none. Some may have supposed that they have seen animals exhibit signs of conscience, upon the same principle that they have attributed to them the faculty of memory. The signs of compunction which they have thought them to exhibit, have grown out of the painful sensations of punishment for the same or similar offences, which have been revived by the sameness of the present offence or contiguity of place. This is clear from two circumstances. First, animals never exhibit what are called signs of conscious guilt, for offences for which they have never been punished. Secondly, these signs, when they appear, are never increased, but uniformly disappear under the influence of kind treatment. Kind treatment often awakens compunction in man, but never in an animal.

6. Men are the subjects of hopes and fears, joys and sorrows, beyond the influence of their present sensations, but brutes are not. Man looks back to the dawn of his being, and sorrows, and rejoices over what is past, while, to the brute, the past has no existence, only so much as lives in present sensations. Man looks forward and experiences the joy of hope, and the torment of fear; gathered from periods far distant in the future, while, with brutes, futurity is all a blank beyond what is connected with their present sensations.

After perusing this defence, we will cheerfully submit it to the candid reader, whether the future existence of brutes follows from our argument, founded upon the phenomena of the human mind.

SECTION II.

Reply to the assumption that the term death expresses annihilation, when applied to the punishment of sinners.

It is urged in support of annihilation that the punishment of sinners is termed death, which it is insisted signifies a loss of conscious existence. So far as we know, this position is held and urged by every advocate of annihilation without a single exception, and is, therefore, entitled to a candid and

serious reply. We admit that the punishment of sin is termed death. "The soul that sinneth it shall die." "The wages of sin is death." "Sin when finished bringeth forth death." In the light of these positive declarations of God's word, the only question that can be debated is, what is death? If death be annihilation, if to die be to cease to exist, and if to be dead is to have no existence, then is the argument conclusive against us; but if the reverse of these can be maintained, the argument will be fully answered, and can have no force as an objection to our theory of the immortality of the soul. We will now reply to the position as follows:

1. To assume that death is the extinction of being, is to beg the question in dispute, by taking for granted that which should be proved. Instead of proving that death means the extinction of being, they only prove that the punishment of the wicked is called death, a point which we frankly admit. The main point to be proved is, that death necessarily means annihilation, or the extinction of being; and this never has, and never can be proved, as will be seen before this reply is concluded. On the other hand, we have proved by the whole series of arguments under the head of the intermediate state, that death is not the dissolution of being, but only of the body, that the soul lives after the body is dead.

2. The term death is applied to both the righteous and the wicked, and it is affirmed, Heb. ix. 27, "It is appointed unto men once to die, and after this the judgment." All good men die as well as bad men, which is sufficient of itself to show the absurdity of relying upon the force of the word death, to prove what the punishment of sin is, and that it is annihilation or extinction of being. If the word "death," expresses in its true sense, the punishment of sin, and that be annihilation, then when the righteous are said to die, or to be dead, they must receive the punishment of sin in the shape of annihilation.

3. There is nothing in the etymology, or common scriptural use of the word, to justify the assumption that it means annihilation. A few references will show this. We will commence with a text which clearly refers to death as a punishment for sin.

Rom. vi. 23. "The wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord." The word here rendered death, in the original Greek, is, *thanatos*. This word is defined thus: "Death, i. e. the extinction of life; exposure to danger of death, disease, pestilence, spiritual death; unhappiness, misery, condemnation, punishment, eternal death, eternal unchanging state of wretchedness and misery. (See the Polymicrian Greek Lexicon.)—Grove's Greek and English Dictionary defines the word thus: "Death, imminent danger; a plague, pestilence." The word is derived from the verb, *thnesko*, which is defined thus: "To die, fall, perish, expire." From this it is seen that by going back to the original, we get no nearer the idea of annihilation than we are with the plain English, and in the English language we may best settle it.

In the text above quoted, it will not be denied that death and eternal life are opposed to each other, and by their different significations, mark the difference in the destiny of the saved and lost. What then is life? The word is *zoe*, and has as many significations as the word death has, the first of which is, "life." We maintain that in its primary meaning, *thanatos*, death, denotes simply what we call death, the death of the body, no more and no less; and that *zoe*, life, denotes natural life, the life which we now live. We will give two cases of each. Luke ii. 26. "It was revealed unto him by the Holy Ghost, that he should not see death before he had seen the Lord's Christ"—Mark ix. 1. "There be some of them that stand here, which shall not taste of death, till they have seen the kingdom of God come with power." In both these texts the word rendered death is the same as in Rom. vi. 24, where it is said, "the wages of sin is death." In these two texts all must see that the common death of all men is meant, that which both saints and sinners die. The punishment of sin is not meant. The other word *zoe*, life, is used, Luke xvi. 25. "Thou in thy life time receivedst thy good things." Acts xvii. 25. "He giveth to all life and breath, and all things." In both these texts the word is used to denote the animated existence which we now possess, the life we now live. Thus we have the primary meaning of these words, and yet in Rom. vi. 23, one is used to denote the punishment of the wicked, and the other to denote the happiness of the righteous. They are used in opposition to each other; if, therefore, death means loss of existence, annihilation, eternal life means no more than continued being. If eternal life means only eternal conscious existence, then endless torment would be eternal life; and if life in this case means more than existence, then death must mean something different from mere loss of existence. The truth is, death and life are both used in a figurative sense, and hence there is not the least proof that

death signifies annihilation, when it is used to denote the punishment of sin. The word death is often used when loss of existence cannot be meant, as we will now show.—Matt. viii. 22. “Follow me; and let the dead bury their dead.” Here death is used in two senses. The dead to be buried, were those who were literally dead: and those who were to bury them, were the spiritually dead, dead in sin.

Eph. v. 14. “Awake thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give you light.” Those said to be dead in this text, were not annihilated.—They were only spiritually dead, through a loss of the favor and image of God.

Col. ii. 20. “If ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances?” Here death does not mean loss of existence, but non-conformity to this world, and conformity to Christ.

Eph. ii. 1. “You hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins.” They had never been annihilated, but were only dead in the sense of alienation from God by wicked works.

I. Tim. v. 6. “But she that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth.” To live in sin, then, is to be dead while we live, to be spiritually dead while we are naturally alive.

Rev. iii. 1. “I know thy works, that thou hast a name, that thou livest, and art dead.” In what sense were they dead? They were not annihilated; they had not lost their existence; nor were their bodies dead. Their souls were dead, in the sense in which all sinners are said to be dead, and the only sense in which souls ever die. They were dead by being destitute of the life, and love, and peace of God in their souls. Sinners are dead in the sense of Eph. iv. 18. “Being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart.”

From what has been said, it is clear that sinners are said to be dead in consequence of their alienation from God, and this fact being understood, it is natural that the term, death, should be employed to denote their final and irrecoverable alienation, with the punishment it will involve, when God shall judge and sentence them.

But it may be urged that we read of a “second death,” and that that is annihilation. We do read of a second death, but where is the proof that it means annihilation? The expression, “second death,” occurs four times in the book of Revelations, as follows:

Rev. ii. 11. “He that overcometh shall not be hurt of the second death.” Whatever else may be meant in this text, there is no annihilation in it. The second death is something that can hurt, some evil or suffering to be endured, some active principle or positive existence; but annihilation is a nonentity; it implies absolutely nothing, and cannot hurt, for where it exists there is nothing to hurt or to be hurt.

Chap. xx. 6. “Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection: on such the second death hath no power.” This text cannot mean annihilation, for it being a nonentity, involving absolute non-existence, can have no power over anything.

Verse 14. “Death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death,” Death is here personified, that is common death; as the general resurrection has taken place, and as there will be no more dying in the common sense, death is represented as being destroyed. Hell is here so rendered, from hades, which denotes the place of separate spirits, and as all these will have been recalled, at the general resurrection, this place of spirits is said to be cast into the lake of fire. “This is the second death;” but it is death itself that is cast in, and if death means annihilation, then annihilation is cast into the lake of fire. It cannot mean the annihilation of sinners, for they too were also, in the 15th verse, cast into the lake of fire.

Chap. xxi. 8. “But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and whoremongers, and sorcerers, and idolaters, and all liars shall have their part in the lake that burneth with fire and brimstone, which is the second death.” This does not imply annihilation, but directly the reverse. Their part is punishment, suffering, and not annihilation, as may be seen from Chap. xx. 10. We trust we have now shown that death does not signify annihilation.

SECTION III.

Reply to the assumption that the word destruction means annihilation, or loss of conscious existence.

The word destruction, in a few instances, is applied to the end of the wicked, and hence it is argued that they will be annihilated, or cease to exist. The argument assumes that destruction means annihilation, or loss of existence, and that to destroy is to reduce to a state of nonentity. This, we, of course, do not admit, and will attempt to prove that the word has no such meaning, when applied to the destiny of the wicked. We will commence with the strongest text relied upon by annihilationists.

2 Thes. i. 9. "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power." If this text does not prove that the wicked will cease to exist, it cannot be proved from any use made of the word destruction in the Scriptures. Around this text then we will rally our reply and meet the argument on its strongest ground.

I. The word destruction, does not necessarily mean loss of existence. The Greek word is *olethron*, and is thus defined in Grove's Greek and English Dictionary: "Destruction, ruin, plague, pestilence; death; a wretch, villain." In the Polymicrian Greek Lexicon it is defined thus: "Perdition, destruction, ruin, misery."—Were we to leave the subject without another remark, the judicious reader would never rely upon the meaning of the word destruction, to prove annihilation in the face of all the direct evidence that has been offered on the other side. Here are three renderings of which it will admit, either of which will make perfect sense, and be perfectly consistent with the endless existence of those threatened with destruction. The text, according to the definitions above given, might be translated thus: "Who shall be punished with everlasting perdition." Or thus: "Who shall be punished with everlasting ruin." Or thus: "Who shall be punished with everlasting misery." This is sufficient to show that no certain conclusion can be drawn from the meaning of the word in favor of annihilation.

II. A fair exegesis of the text cannot fail to show that in this particular case, destruction cannot mean annihilation. There are three points in the text which are against the idea of annihilation.

1. This everlasting destruction is a punishment, which has been shown to be suffering and not annihilation. In the sixth verse the same punishment is called tribulation, which implies suffering, and not loss of existence.

2. The punishment threatened, which is called tribulation, is everlasting destruction. The word, everlasting, cannot well be applied to any term denoting annihilation. If the destruction be an utter extinction of being, it is necessarily irrecoverable, as there will then be nothing where such destruction has taken effect, and where nothing is, nothing must ever remain. God himself cannot restore a person thus destroyed. There being an entire loss of existence, a ceasing to exist, there is nothing to be restored. God can create another being but as it cannot be moulded out of the defunct being, that having no existence, having ceased to exist, and, as per-consequence, God must form the new being out of some other material, or from nothing, it cannot be the same creature that was, but which has ceased to be. Destruction, therefore, if it signifies loss of existence, necessarily implies a loss beyond restoration, and to call it everlasting is an abuse of language; the word everlasting, adds no force to destruction, if such be its meaning, while it implies that there may be a destruction which is not everlasting, and to admit this would be to abandon the argument founded upon the meaning of this term. Destruction is a noun, and everlasting is an adjective added to it, to qualify its meaning. If, then, the word destruction signifies an entire loss of existence, in the sense of annihilation, the adjective adds no quality to it, nor can it express any quality concerning it which the noun does not express without the adjective. The very fact, therefore, that the word destruction has everlasting appended to it, proves, beyond a doubt, that the word does not of itself express an entire loss of existence or annihilation, and the argument designed to prove that the wicked will cease to exist, being based upon it, must fall, unless it has some other and more sufficient support.

3. The nature of this punishment called destruction, proves it not to be annihilation. It consists in being banished "from the presence of the Lord and the glory of his power." The expression, "from the

presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power," clearly implies exclusion from the immediate presence and glory of God, which will constitute the happiness of the righteous. Banishment and annihilation are not the same, and are irreconcilable with each other.

We know that some have urged this idea of banishment from the presence of the Lord, as positive proof of annihilation, on the ground that God is everywhere, and that there is no such thing as going from his presence, only by going out of existence. This view is so weak and unscriptural, that it only proves how severely those feel pressed who adopt it. It is not denied that God's presence is everywhere in one sense, but not in the sense in which he is said to be in heaven. It is written, "no man hath seen God at any time;" and again, it is written, "blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." We are taught to pray, "Our Father who art in heaven." God is then in heaven, in a sense in which he is not everywhere, otherwise we might just as well pray, our Father who art on earth, or in hell. It is written again, Isa. lix. 2, "Your iniquities have separated between you and your God." There is a sense then in which we may be separated from God, and banished from his presence; that is from his visible and glorious presence, which angels enjoy, and which saints shall enjoy. The Saviour prayed, John xvii. 24. "Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory." But to the unbelieving, he said, Luke xiii. 28, "Ye shall see Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, and all the prophets, in the kingdom of God, and you, yourselves thrust out." Again, it is written, Matt. xxv. 41, "Depart from me ye cursed;" and again, verse 46, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment." These texts clearly show what is meant by the expression, "from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power." It does not mean exclusion from his general presence, in the sense in which he is everywhere, but it means exclusion from his favor and visible presence, which the saints will see and enjoy in heaven. This is the everlasting destruction which is threatened, a punishment consisting in banishment from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power, and a punishment consisting in such an exclusion from heaven, absolutely forbids the idea of annihilation. Thus it appears that a fair exegesis of the text, proves that annihilation cannot be meant.

III. A few illustrations of the use of the word, destruction, in other senses, must close these remarks.

Hosea xiii. 9. "O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thy help." Destruction here does not mean loss of existence, but only injury or ruin.

1 Cor. i. 19. "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise." Here destruction means no more than to expose and confound, by showing its false pretensions.

Rom. iii. 16. "Destruction and misery are in their ways." Here destruction means ruin or perdition. To make misery to lie in their path, after annihilation, would not make very good sense.

Matt. vii. 13. "Broad is the way that leadeth to destruction." In this text destruction means ruin or perdition.

Luke xvii. 27. "The flood came and destroyed them all." Here destruction means death by drowning.

Acts ix. 21. "Is not this he that destroyed them which called on his name in Jerusalem?" Here destroy means to persecute, or at most to kill; to "kill the body," as Christ called it.

Matt. v. 17. "Think not that I am come to destroy the law." Here destroy means to repeal or abrogate. With these remarks, we dismiss our consideration of the word destruction.

SECTION IV

Reply to the assumption that the word perish signifies annihilation.

The words perish, perished, and perisheth, being applied to the end of the wicked, are urged as positive proof that they will cease to exist. These words are nowhere used to describe or express the quality of the punishment of sin, but are in a few instances employed in a manner to assert the

general fact of punishment, by implication at least. The following are the principal, if not all the texts, in which it can be claimed that the final punishment of sinners is termed perishing. In some of these, it may be doubted whether the final state of sinners is referred to.

Luke xiii. 3. "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." John iii. 15, 16. "That whosoever believeth in him might not perish, but have everlasting life." Rom. ii. 12. "As many as have sinned without law, shall also perish without law." 1 Cor. xv. 18. "Then they also which have fallen asleep in Christ, are perished." 2 Peter, ii. 12. "Shall utterly perish in their own corruption." Jude 11. "Woe unto them! for they have gone in the way of Cain, and ran greedily after the error of Balaam for reward, and perish in the gainsaying of Core."

In these few texts, the reader may see at a glance, the substance of all the evidence of annihilation, which the Scriptures furnish by the use of the word perish, to describe the end of sinners. An argument in support of a point so awfully important, based upon such slight and uncertain grounds, cannot exert much influence with the reflecting. We will, however, give it a review.

1. The original word rendered perish in these texts, is very far from settling the question in favor of annihilation, or the final extinction of the wicked. Let us look at each text by itself. Luke xiii. 3. "Ye shall all likewise perish." The Greek word here used, is *apoleisthe*; it is the second person, plural, of *apollumi*, or *apolluo*, which is defined thus: "To abolish, destroy, ruin; to kill, slay; to lose; *apolluamai*, to be ruined, lost, undone, to perish, decay. (See Grove's Greek and English Dictionary.) Surely, the candid reader can see no certain proof of annihilation in this word as used in this text. As Christ was speaking of those who had suffered temporal death, it is only by inference that it can be made to mean anything more when he told his hearers that they should also perish. John iii. 15, 16. "Might not perish." This is admitted to refer to the final consequences of sin, in the case of those who are not saved through faith in Christ. But what is it to perish? Here the word is *apoletai*, which is but another form of *apollumi*, and has its explanation above. It might, therefore, be rendered, might not be destroyed; might not be ruined; might not be lost; or might not be undone. This makes the text perfectly plain, without supposing annihilation. In Romans ii. 12. there is nothing peculiar which has not a sufficient explanation above, as the same word is there translated perish.

1 Cor. xv. 17, 18. "If Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins. Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished." These two verses taken together make the subject plain. The apostle makes the virtue of the atonement depend upon the fact of the resurrection of Christ; if he was not raised they were yet in their sins, and of course those who had fallen asleep in Christ, had fallen asleep in their sins; and having died in their sins, they are perished; that is, they are ruined; they are lost; or they are undone, as it has been shown above that the word used will admit of either of these renderings.

2 Peter, ii. 12. "Shall utterly perish in their own corruption." In this, another word is used in the original. It is *kataphtharesontai*. This word comes from *kataphtheiso*, from *kata*, intensive, and *phtheiro*, to corrupt, and is defined, "to mar, spoil, ruin, destroy totally; to deprave, corrupt, vitiate."

Dr. McKnight renders the clause "shall be utterly destroyed by their own corruption." Of the nature of their corruption we are informed in verses 10 and 18, "Them that walk after the flesh in the lust of uncleanness."—"They allure through the lusts of the flesh, through much wantonness, those that were clean escaped from those who live in error." These were false teachers, and every one must see that those living as corruptly as is here described, must utterly fall and destroy themselves by their own corruption. The most probable meaning of the text is, that by their corruption they shall completely and utterly ruin themselves; no reference being made to any supposed loss of existence after the resurrection of the dead. There have been such teachers in our own day, and without a single exception, they have perished in their own corruption; or, in common parlance, they utterly ruined themselves by their corruption. There are several translations of which the text will admit, without supposing annihilation. They shall be utterly marred in, or by,

their own corruption; they shall be utterly spoiled in, or by, their own corruption; they shall be utterly ruined in, or by, their own corruption. These remarks are sufficient to show that no reliance can be placed upon the word perish, as here used, in support of annihilation.

The common use of the word perish, in the New Testament, is such as to furnish no ground for the assumption that it signifies annihilation, or loss of conscious existence. A few illustrations will answer. Matt. viii. 25. "Lord save us, we perish." Here perishing means only death by drowning. Chap. ix. 17. "The bottles perish." Here, to perish is to be rendered useless, or worthless. Luke xiii. 33. "It cannot be that a prophet perish out of Jerusalem." Here, to perish is to die, or be put to death. Chap. xv. 17. "I perish with hunger." Here perishing means to die of hunger.

If illustrations from the Old Testament are required, the following will answer: Eccle. vii. 15. "There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness, and there is a wicked man that longeth his days." Perishing in this text must mean death, which comes to the righteous, while the wicked man escapes. Isaiah lvii. 1. "The righteous perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart." Surely, perishing does not mean annihilation in this text. Jer. ix. 12. "That he may declare it, for what the land perisheth and is burnt up like a wilderness, that none passeth through." Here perishing means to be rendered barren, as waste land.

There are a few other texts and positions urged in support of the doctrine of annihilation, but we have reviewed the strongest of them, with what success the readers must now judge. If we have been successful in removing the objections we have examined, we think it will not be pretended that there are other stronger ones which we could not remove. And if we have not been successful in removing the objection which we have considered, it would be only a waste of time and paper, to examine others; we will therefore leave the matter to the judgment of the reader, just as it is. Our argument is closed, and we have only to add our prayer that the blessing of God may attend the effort, and His Holy Spirit shine upon the minds of all who shall read it, to guide them into all truth. So far as honesty of intentions and purity of motives are concerned, we can appeal to the Searcher of hearts with confidence, and refer the whole to the day of final retribution, without a shadow to dim the prospect of that most interesting of all days. For happy results, we can hope only through the influence of the Divine Spirit. Our prayer is that it may appear, when God shall make up His jewels, that through His abounding grace, this little volume has been instrumental in guiding some bewildered spirit from the land of mist and error, to the land of which it is said "there shall be no night there." Amen